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This thesis comprises four studies, each designed to form an independent 
contribution. The central theme is change in the provision of investment 
research. The study focuses on independent investment research firms. 
 
The first study documents the mechanisms used to pay for investment 
research. Through interpretation of documents and event participation, I use 
qualitative analysis to explain the payment mechanisms used in recent 
decades and how these mechanisms have changed. A key finding is that since 
2017 many investment-management firms have shifted from an opaque, 
reciprocal arrangement, which resembles a gift exchange economy, towards 
a neoclassical economic model.  
 
Investment management and research firms are adapting to change in 
payment mechanisms at a time of falling asset management fees and 
commission rates. One response is to automate. While many firms are 
exploring machine learning, little evidence on the potential for such 
approaches exists in the public domain. The second and third studies in this 
thesis address this gap by evaluating the effectiveness of machine learning in 
the investment research function. Both studies compare a large, global sample 




The second study evaluates the relative effectiveness of analyst and machine 
learning valuations in predicting future returns. Analysts make unbiased 
valuations using a standardized discounted cash flow model. Although neither 
analyst nor machine learning valuations serve as viable predictors of 
subsequent returns, when used together they offer credible explanatory power 
which can be increased by adding a price momentum factor. Analyst and 
machine learning accuracy could be improved by placing greater emphasis on 
past returns. 
 
The third study uses regression analysis to compare analyst and machine 
learning risk assessments using next quarter volatility as the outcome variable. 
Both assessments can benefit by incorporating information from the other, and 
both are more accurate in countries considered to have superior informational 
environments. Analysts seem to underestimate risk associated with their own 
“buy” recommendations, but no equivalent miscalibration is apparent in 
machine learning predictions. The results confirm both the value of analysts’ 
research and considerable potential for machine learning in financial analysis.  
 
The final study summarizes the informational environment in light of regulatory, 
institutional and technological change. Stock coverage by analysts provides a 
window on the level of information available to investors. Archival and case 
study analysis indicates that analysts are providing research on most large and 
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mid-cap listed companies in the US and UK, i.e., stock coverage remains wide. 
Coverage also remains deep, with most companies receiving coverage from a 
similar number of analysts and few companies covered by only one analyst. 
The exception is that fewer companies are now covered by more than 20 
analysts, indicating that some surplus research has disappeared.  
 
Independent research has expanded over the past decade. Despite this, the 
tendency for analysts to provide optimistic recommendations persists. 
Independent analysts rarely contribute to archives and are redefining coverage 
models. Analyst forecast datasets assembled by established data vendors 
understate the wider selection of research which is now available, but only to 
those who can find and afford it. Taken together, there is little evidence to date 




























Decades of research has produced extensive documentation of securities 
analysts’ outputs. As a result, we have a detailed understanding of their 
earnings forecasts, recommendations, target prices and other outputs such as 
the content of analyst reports. Many studies use these outputs to infer the role 
of analysts in markets. To complement these, researchers from various 
disciplines employ qualitative methods such as interviews. Yet the large 
literature on analysts rarely touches on the economics of their own industry. 
Expanding our knowledge of the market mechanisms would therefore be a 
useful complement to the extant literature. 
 
The environment for analysts has undergone significant change in recent 
years. Two particularly disruptive changes have become evident. The first is 
the economics of analyst research. Since the start of 2018 investment 
managers operating in Europe have been required to change the mechanisms 
for paying for research. In most cases research is now paid for by investment 
management firms rather than end investors. This change and its implications 
have induced press coverage and industry discussion but few scholarly 
papers. Some existing theory and empirical evidence may be rendered 
obsolete. 
 
The second change is the use of machine learning in investment research. A 
flurry of industry reports has emerged (see for example Deloitte, 2019). 




presents both threats and opportunities. This second change is topical in many 
knowledge industries but, in the area of investment analysts, such change 
remains largely undocumented.  
 
This thesis comprises four empirical studies which address these regulatory 
and technological changes and the associated institutional change. Each is 
designed as a separate research paper.  
 
The first study – chapter 2 – documents how the procurement mechanism has 
changed from a reciprocal gift-exchange system towards a neoclassical 
economic model. Payment data has generally been unavailable. Through 
several years of industry engagement and analysis of archives, I illustrate the 
five exchange mechanisms which have been used in the past four decades. 
The market-based system adopted via MiFIDII is replacing the long-
established exchange of research (gift) and brokerage commission (counter-
gift). Participants are now choosing to treat research as a cost to their firm thus 
marking a significant change in practice.  
 
While many firms are exploring machine learning, little evidence on the 
potential for such approaches exists in the public domain. The second and 
third studies in this thesis address this gap by evaluating the effectiveness of 






The second study – chapter 3 – evaluates the relative effectiveness of analyst 
and machine-learning valuations in predicting future returns. This is a 
demanding task. Analysts make unbiased valuations using a standardised 
discounted cash flow model. Although neither analyst nor ML valuations serve 
as viable predictors of subsequent returns, when used together they offer 
credible explanatory power which can be increased by adding a price 
momentum factor. Analyst and ML accuracy could be improved by placing 
greater emphasis on past returns. 
 
The third study – chapter 4 – provides further insight by contrasting the 
accuracy of risk assessments made by analysts and a machine learning 
process. Prior studies indicate that analysts tend to make informative risk 
assessments after controlling for risk characteristics. We compare analyst and 
machine-learning risk assessments using next quarter volatility as the outcome 
variable. Both assessments can benefit by incorporating information from the 
other and both are more accurate in countries considered to have superior 
informational environments. Analysts seem to under-estimate risk associated 
with their own “buy” recommendations, but no equivalent mis-calibration is 
apparent in machine-learning predictions. The results confirm both the value 






Machine Learning is now being used to perform some of the tasks performed 
by financial analysts. We evaluate the relative effectiveness of valuations 
made by analysts and machine learning in US and non-US samples. The 
analyst valuations predict subsequent returns. Machine learning valuations are 
contrarian until combined with the analyst valuation and lagged returns. Rather 
than choosing between mind and machine, investors would be best to use both 
sources of valuation. Our results indicate that the machine learning used by 
the early adopter in our study could be adapted to expand stock coverage in 
global equity markets. 
 
The final study – chapter 5 – provides an overview of the informational 
environment in light of regulatory, institutional and technological change. Stock 
coverage by analysts provides a window on the level of information available 
to investors. Although some surplus research has disappeared, archival and 
case study analysis indicates that stock coverage remains wide and deep. 
Independent analysts rarely contribute to archives and are redefining coverage 
models. Archival data understates the wider selection of research which is now 
available, but only to those who can find and afford it. Taken together, there is 
little evidence to date of a diminished informational environment for equity 











From gift exchange to neoclassical economics: 









Investment analysts play a key role in financial markets (Spence et al., 2019). 
Brokerage firms supply analyst research to buy-side firms such as investment 
management firms, pension funds and hedge funds. Their summary 
recommendations are incrementally informative (Womack, 1996), as are their 
target prices (Brav and Lehavy, 2003) and their reports (Asquith et al., 2005). 
Contextual information and the basis for the analyst’s investment thesis are 
even more valuable (Imam and Spence, 2016). Despite confirmation that 
analysts perform a valuable role, a deep-seated perception remains that the 
research they produce is free (Feng et al, 2019). How can analyst research be 
valuable yet given away free of charge?  
 
This paper addresses this question by undertaking a qualitative study of the 
system which connects fund managers to external investment research, a 
marketplace which has undergone significant regulatory, institutional and 
technological change since the turn of the century. Most recently, the 
procurement mechanism has changed from one based on social and relational 
exchange to one based on a neoclassical economic model. Through 
qualitative analysis of archives and event participation, the paper illustrates the 
five exchange mechanisms used. The market-based system imposed by the 
UK regulator, and adopted across Europe due to the Second Markets in 




Invoices and budgets display explicit prices which replace the exchange of 
research (gift) and brokerage commission (counter-gift). Participants are now 
choosing to treat research as a cost to their firm, thus marking a significant 
change in practice. Investment managers now benefit from an expanded 
choice of research suppliers and better value for money but can no longer use 
research without first negotiating payment. 
 
The analysis presented, which is based on event participation and analysis of 
documents, indicates that research is not free. Brokers offer research with the 
objective of obtaining payments which can be disproportionately large. For 
successful brokerage firms, and the analysts who work there, this results in 
substantial asymmetric payoffs at the expense of other brokers who can lose 
out completely on the commissions paid to trade any given share. The opaque 
nature of this reciprocal system is beneficial both to producers and consumers 
of research, not least because the cost of research is charged to the end 
investor. 
 
Perhaps such complexity provided a smoke-screen for analysts operating in 
tandem with dealmakers and thus creating conflicts of interest (Mehran and 
Stulz, 2007). Analysts had come under little scrutiny during the late 1990s 
technology-stock boom but media coverage of the subsequent market crash 
revealed that investment bank analysts had misled investors with overly 




had disadvantaged all but the largest investors. Analyst conflicts had become 
headline news in the financial press and litigation against analysts proceeded 
(Wu et al. 2017).  
 
Eventually this led to investigations led by the US State Attorney and to US 
congressional hearings into biased recommendations by some Wall Street 
analysts, notably, buy recommendations made to attract interest in companies 
issued by the investment bank, sometimes accompanied by warning stock 
selecting investment management clients. The investigations resulted in the 
2003 Global Analyst Research Settlement (hereafter GS) through which ten 
investment banks were required to pay a total of $1.4bn in fines and to 
subsidise independent research, accompanied by tightening of New York 
Stock Exchange and other US stock exchange rules. Taken together, these 
rules marked out clearer separation between analysts who serve investment 
management clients and investment bankers who are paid by the corporates 
covered by the analysts. For example, analysts could no longer report to 
investment bankers and the publication process mitigated interference from 
deal makers. The GS had global ramifications as the firms involved had 
substantial non-US operations. Many non-US firms and regulators adopted 
similar practices. 
 
The European regulatory environment also goes back several decades.  The 
UK regulator has been the main driver of policy on analyst research with other 




with US congressional hearings in the early 2000s, the UK government 
commissioned a report into the UK investment management industry by the 
former chairman of a large UK investment management firm (Myners, 2001). 
In the report Lord Myners, an industry veteran, recommended a very different 
approach to that taken by US authorities: the emphasis was not on rules for 
brokers but instead on incentives for investment managers. Myners 
recommended that dealing commissions should not be used to pay for 
research and instead should be separated or ‘unbundled’ in order to create a 
more efficient market:  
Clients’ interests would be better served if they required fund managers 
to absorb the cost of any commissions paid, treating these commissions 
as a cost of the business of fund management, as they surely are… 
Under this system, the incentives would be different… Fund managers 
would choose which services to buy and which to provide 
themselves…The pressure would be to purchase only those services 
which contributed to such returns, and to do so in the way which is most 
efficient.  
(Myners, 2001, p11-12)  
 
In 2003 the UK regulator (then known as the FSA) engaged in an industry 
consultation based on Myners’ recommendation. The outcome of this 
consultation process led to more moderate innovation. In the UK regulator’s 





…the responses to the consultation argued that alternative approaches 
could deliver similar improvements at less cost and impact to the 
industry. The FSA was therefore persuaded to work with the grain of an 
industry-led solution and evolving market practices (FCA, 2014, p15).  
 
The result was the FSA ‘use of dealing commissions rules’ which came into 
effect in 2006, requiring non-execution commission to be limited to research 
and not used for other purposes, thus differentiating it from the concept of soft 
dollars, where commissions charged to clients could be used to pay for data 
vendors and other business services, meaning the end investor pays the bill. 
It also encouraged the use of Commission Sharing Arrangements (CSAs). The 
Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation (CSFI) commented as follows: 
The system also falls short of the vision of full unbundling envisaged in 
the initial FSA proposals in the wake of the Myners report (FSA CP 176, 
April 2003), under which fund managers would have been required to 
pay for research out of their own fees, rather than from clients’ 
commissions. Instead, the … rules required only that fund managers 
provide adequate disclosure of these costs to their clients under 
industry-led guidelines developed by the Investment Management 
Association and the National Association of Pension Funds.  





The FCA concluded, based on consultation and evidence presented by an 
economic consultancy (Oxera, 2009) that the rules had resulted in a 
meaningful improvement in the alignment of incentives and the efficiency of 
the market. Again the yardstick was market efficiency. This status quo 
remained in place for several more years. The consensus among those 
surveyed (in 2010/11) was that the prospects for further action by the regulator 
were not high. Having commissioned Myners’ report, acted on its findings and 
declared itself satisfied with the implementation of the resulting rules, many felt 
that the FSA’s focus would lie elsewhere. In the wake of the crisis, the regulator 
was instead more concerned with issues of financial stability. (CSFI, 2011, 
p18) Given the regulator’s comfort in Oxera’s evaluation, it may be that the 
fund management industry believed that partial compliance had been 
accepted as sufficient. Many organisations were focused on surviving the 
financial crisis and the FSA itself had many other areas of concern. The CSA 
payment device was emulated in the US where the regulator (SEC) introduced 
CSAs (referred to in the US as Client Commission Agreements, or CCAs, 
which are largely equivalent to CSAs) in 2006. Although these arrived almost 
concurrently with UK CSAs, the range of research providers who would accept 
third party payments was limited. This legal point impeded the US application 
of the new market mechanism until 2010 and change was therefore initially 
constrained (Frost Consulting 2014). 
 
MiFID II, which came into effect in January 2018, requires investment 




and to negotiate terms in advance. They can only pass on the cost of research 
to clients if they develop ex-ante budgets and pay via a strictly regulated 
Research Payment Account (RPA); the alternative is to charge an expense to 
their firm’s own profit and loss account.  
 
The new European legislation imposes more stringent rules on the payment, 
procurement and provision of investment research. The directive requires 
investment management firms to separate or ‘unbundle’ payments for external 
investment research from commissions paid for trade execution. The new rules 
seek to prevent brokers from using research to encourage investment 
managers to trade and therefore impose unnecessary costs on end investors. 
Investment managers are now required to absorb research costs from their 
own profit and loss account, alongside their other business expenses or to 
pass on the costs to clients under strict rules via a Research Payment Account 
(RPA). The rules include pre-arranged budgets to control the overall costs and 
transparent information on the payments made to each research provider. 
Investment managers must document an explanation for how each research 
service enables the firm to make better investment decisions. Accounting and 
administration requirements are therefore significantly more onerous post 
MiFIDII, even in the UK where the regulator had tended to be more demanding 
than most regarding research payment rules. 




By treating research which is not paid for as an inducement, MiFIDII changes 
the procurement process. Investment managers must negotiate prices with 
research providers in advance and must not use research that is not paid for. 
This last point is particularly important as buy-side firms need to ensure that 
their staff do not receive research which has not been explicitly purchased. 
Research providers must also desist from attempting to supply research prior 
to payment.  
 
MiFIDII applies to investment managers and investment providers who do 
business in any of the 31 European Economic Area (EEA) countries. The 
impact is therefore global as many non-EEA firms have a presence in the EEA. 
Additionally, the EU directive has important and ongoing ramifications for US 
regulators. This is unusual as it is typical for influence to flow from US 
regulation into the rulebooks for other nations and into compliance manuals for 
global investment firms. In 2017 the SEC has implemented temporary 
regulations to help firms comply with MiFIDII; in November 2019 these were 
extended to 2023 (SEC, 2019). The US regulator has announced ongoing 
work aiming at a more permanent solution. 
  
Feng et al. (2019) also report that US institutional investors are collectively 
urging US regulators to implement MiFIDII-type rules around research 
payment on a permanent basis. Some European end investors have reduced 




this implies that they might be subsiding non-US investors, a disparity which 
will not sit well with the fiduciary duty placed on institutional investors, 
especially some of the best-resourced pension and sovereign wealth funds in 
countries such as US, Canada, Australia and Singapore. Such a call to action 
was predicted in Haig and Scarth (2017). 
    
My key finding is that the procurement mechanism has changed from one 
based on social and relational exchange to one based on a neoclassical 
economic model. I depict five exchange mechanisms which have been used 
in the past four decades. The market-based system adopted via MiFID II is 
replacing the long-established exchange of research (gift) and brokerage 
commission (counter-gift). Participants are now choosing to treat research as 
a cost to their firm, thus marking a significant change in practice.  
 
2.2 PRIOR RESEARCH 
Barker (1998), Healy and Palepu (2003) and Bradshaw (2009) each depict 
information flows connecting analysts, companies and investors but none 
show explicitly who pays for research or how that payment is made. Despite 
calls for the direct study of analysts (Bradshaw, 2011), we know very little 
about how these flows are paid for. Few scholars have investigated the 
payment mechanisms and, even in practice, detailed knowledge of the 






This gap seems odd given that we would expect information flows to be 
important to investors, not least because the scale of the market for analyst 
research was large enough to be cited in reports such as that of Myners (2001). 
Even if the research marketplace has seldom been investigated, prior studies 
have established that investment research is valued by investors. Barker 
(1998) ranks the perceived value of sell-side analysts’ outputs and finds 
advice, such as contextual information and access to management, to be more 
valuable than predictions. Extensive surveys of research on analyst forecasts 
by Ramnath et al. (2008) and Kothari et al. (2015) do not document research 
procurement, nor do surveys of analyst practices such as Block (1999), Imam 
et al. (2008), Pinto et al. (2015) and Brown et al. (2015, 2016). Participants in 
this market have expertise in valuing companies; we will see that many seem 
not to have applied these skills to valuing or pricing analyst research itself.  
 
Additionally, equity valuations, earnings forecasts and trading 
recommendations have been consistently found to be of secondary 
importance to analysts’ investment management clients. Brown et al. (2015, 
2016) echo prior research in finding that analyst access to management is 
prized by buy-side clients, although UK brokers have been prevented from 
charging for direct access to companies since 2005, a point emphatically 
restated in a 2014 FCA clarification. Brown et al. (2016) underline the 
importance of advice relative to predictive accuracy; Imam and Spence (2016) 




is based on the flawed presumption that forecasting accuracy is the main 
objective of analysts. Spence et al. (2019) reinforce the importance of advice 
over summary outputs such as earnings forecasts, target prices and 
investment recommendations (Barker, 1998; Beunza and Garud, 2007). 
Bradshaw et al. (2017) gather together the literature on the role analysts take 
in supplying information to the marketplace. 
 
Imam and Spence (2016) follow Beunza and Garud’s (2007) classification of 
papers into three strands: “mainstream accounting and finance; neo-
institutional and behavioural work; and emerging sociological perspectives on 
financial intermediaries, of which analysts are one group” (Imam and Spence, 
2016, p228). While the breadth of this review is particularly valuable to our 
understanding of the role of analysts, it confirms that prior studies have not 
addressed the marketplace for their products or services.  
 
2.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The relationships between analysts and their investment management clients 
have been shown to be crucial (see, for example, Barker, 1998; Brown et al., 
2015; Spence et al., 2018). We can therefore expect to find relational ties built 
into the exchange mechanism (Granovetter, 1985). It would be useful, 
however, to have a theoretical framework to help us understand the nature of 






2.3.1 Gift exchange systems 
Research services range widely as does their value to each investor. For 
example, a meeting with an analyst to discuss catalysts for a neglected value 
stock could be of no interest to a growth investor; a perceptive inflation report 
might guide a macro-driven investor but be irrelevant to another; quant 
screening could assist a stock-picker but might not suit a thematic process. 
Research is made up of a complex array of services: calls, meetings, tours, 
models and a wide array of written material extending far beyond the “single 
name” research which features in prior studies. Gift exchange has been found 
to be effective in such marketplaces (Offer, 1997). The study of gifts has, 
initiated by Mauss in 1925 and republished at the start of this century (Mauss, 
2002), has become an important theme in economic sociology. Mauss (2002) 
contested the belief that barter predated monetary systems of exchange. 
Instead of barter, gift exchange was the norm: a gift is given, received and 
acknowledged with a counter-gift. Participants in an economy develop 
expectations of the size and nature of the appropriate counter-gift; there may 
also be a hierarchy where gifts are offered to members of society who are 
recognized to have more power. Tribes and their members would therefore not 
consider personal interests, property or freedom; much of the assumptions 
behind a neoclassical model of exchange would seem irrelevant. Counter-gifts 
persist even when fiat money has become well established, e.g. a birthday gift 




remembered. Important aspects of gift exchange can therefore be found in 
modern market systems.  
 
Gift exchange is not barter; rather it is an holistic means of dealing with 
individual transactions; rather, it marks out a system to exchange not only 
goods but also services such as banquets, and military assistance. Even tribe 
members could be exchanged. The exchange has economic, cultural and 
religious meaning. In this system, the size, type and magnitude of a counter-
gift is well known to tribal members. Failure to reciprocate is believed to bring 
misfortune or may even instigate attack by the giver. Mauss points out that 
these characteristics are also found in history, from India to Greece, and that 
it is not coincidental that the Greek words for “poison” and “gift” have the same 
root (Mauss, 2002).   
 
Akerlof (1982) applies Mauss’s theory to show that workers adapt their 
behaviour according to the apparent generosity of their employers. Workers 
respond to extraordinarily high (low) wage levels by exhibiting high (low) 
productivity. Bell (1991) generalizes this using formal economic analysis to 
show that a neoclassical market model is a special case of gift exchange. In 
another attempt to incorporate sociological conceptions of exchange into a 
neoclassical model, Offer (1997) finds that gift exchange is most effective 
where goods and services are unique in nature, costly to produce and have 




valuable. Neoclassical models are likely to be less efficient. We can therefore 
expect to find reciprocation not just in the tribal societies studied by 
anthropologists and historians but also in established market economies. Gift 
exchange theory provides a lens to examine the research marketplace prior to 
the arrival of invoices, contracts and prices. In the following section I employ a 
second theory to study the introduction of a neoclassical market model.  
 
2.3.2 Performativity 
The second key area of theory which I pursue in this chapter is the study of 
performativity which has developed in new economic sociology, and related 
disciplines, known collectively as social studies in finance. MacKenzie et al. 
(2007) define generic performativity as the use of an aspect of economics, 
such as a theory, model, concept or procedure, by participants in the economy. 
For performativity to be effective, the practical application of a given theory 
must have some effect on economic processes. Two special cases of effective 
performativity exist. The first, ‘Barnesian’ performativity, is the subset where 
the “effect is to alter economic processes to make them more like their 
depiction in economics” (MacKenzie et al., 2007, p. 67). The second special 
case, counter-performativity, exists where economic processes become less 
like their depiction in economics. MacKenzie (2008) shows that option pricing 
theory, widely considered to be a key achievement of 20th-century economics, 
was Barnesian performative, and also sometimes counter-performative, in the 




the option markets, allowed contracts to be accurately valued and entered the 
parlance of traders.  
 
The edited work of MacKenzie et al. (2007) collects key debates on the topic. 
In this volume, Michel Callon develops ideas from his earlier work (Callon, 
1998) to argue that our understanding of markets could be improved by taking 
into account the features of the marketplace. These features can be significant 
and institutional details can improve economists’ analysis. In MacKenzie et al. 
(2007), Callon (2007) argues that markets, such as those following rules of 
neoclassical economics, are the norm, which we could think of as being within 
a frame; yet exchange is impacted by social relations which surround this 
frame. In the same volume, Miller (2007) argues for the exact opposite; using 
evidence from an economy in rural India, he argues that social connections 
form the essential mode of exchange, i.e., are within the frame, and are 
complemented by markets. Consumers only a need to go to market when there 
is a shortage; producers need only supply their excess. While a rural village 
seems far from the workplaces of investment professionals, Miller’s argument 
holds some plausibility in our own daily life and in corporate affairs, many of 
our exchanges are based on relations first and the market second.  
 
Another aspect of the present study is that the UK regulator has set out to 
design a neoclassical market to improve the outcomes of investors. Garcia 




physical auction market. The setting, a network of co-operative growers in a 
French region not known for its strawberries, seems far from the modern stock 
exchange, yet we must remember that investment analysts constitute a 
production market even if their work immerses them in exchange markets. 
Garcia’s fieldwork depicts a traditional agricultural region where distribution is 
arranged through a combination of personal relationships and brokers. This 
traditional arrangement discouraged specialist production of strawberries, due 
to suppliers’ expectations and delays in payment. In the early 1980s, the 
region’s local government set out to promote the region’s strawberries. As part 
of this initiative, they sent a young civil servant to act as a consultant. After 
several unsuccessful attempts to modify the behaviours of existing co-
operative members, the consultant applied theory learned from undergraduate 
economics courses. Together they used a model of perfect competition to 
construct an auction market where buyers and sellers could not see each other 
and with both payment and delivery taking place during market hours in 
purpose-built facilities. The consultant and at least the better-informed market 
participants would have been aware of the opening of a new auction market in 
another province which may also have prompted the decision to adopt this 
approach. A minority of relatively knowledgeable growers embraced the 
consultant’s proposal and the market was performed (Callon, 1998) according 
to the textbook image of perfect competition. The social construction of a 
neoclassical market in early 1980s rural France is supported by participants in 
preference to other systems. The research market differs in that participants 








The objective of this study is to explain the market mechanisms used to pay 
for investment research. In 2013, research procurement was considered a 
specialized domain even within practitioner circles. Most investment managers 
relied predominantly on brokers for external research. They understood the 
principle that research commissions are paid by the fund, i.e., by end investors, 
rather than from their employer’s own money, but few were up to date with the 
letter of the regulatory requirements in this area; instead, they would rely on 
dealers or compliance specialists. Some senior investment managers and 
executives had become well versed in the processes. 
 
Participation at events is useful in the study of a complex and dynamic setting. 
The events listed in Table 2.1 usually featured panel sessions through which I 
could follow the debate as the regulations changed.  
 
2.4.1 Participation in industry events 
Event presentations and question-and-answer sessions provided perspectives 
from senior professionals representing investment firms, regulators and 




discussions to conferences with up to 300 delegates. I took the opportunity to 
ask questions both during proceedings and on a one-to-one basis with 
speakers and participants. Participation also served as further reassurance 
that the project was of relevance to stakeholders. Table 2.1 provides a 
schedule of events attended. 
 
Event proceedings were developed from fieldwork notebooks and combined 
with transcripts or summaries prepared by the event organizers. Chatham 
House rules often prevailed, where direct quotes cannot be made without 
permission, thus encouraging candid discourse. Event participation aided 
identification of relevant reports by investment firms, regulators, consultancy 
firms and the financial media. Events also allowed for informal discussions and 
I would often follow up with telephone calls or subsequent face-to-face 
meetings.  
 
2.4.2 Documents and secondary analysis of questionnaires 
 
The first major proposal to reform the economics of investment research was 
that of Myners (2001). In a report on the UK equity market, commissioned by 
the UK government, the former chairman of a large UK investment 
management firm called for the use of dealing commissions to be banned. The 
UK regulator responded with a series of consultation and discussion papers 




are listed in Figure 2.1. These archives are recent, and this provides evidence 
in itself that the market for research was not at the forefront until the mid-2000s 
or later. Taken together with events, these documents served to establish the 
historical timeline of regulatory actions as they represent collective views and 
are based on their own primary research either through surveys, regulatory 
supervision or consultation. The documents were categorized by the type of 
organisation authoring or sponsoring the report. Buy-side and sell-side market 
participants verified the credibility of all sources.  
 
To understand the introduction of a competitive marketplace for investment 
research, I use an interpretive approach, working back and forwards between 
the available data, which expanded considerably during the study, and the 
economic sociology literature on production markets. The epistemological 
approach is designed to maximize understanding. The data is collected and 
analysed in order to describe and explain the changing marketplace. The 
model developed by Barker (1998) served as a starting point. In 2014, two 
papers became available: a summary of how selected research providers are 
responding to a decline in broker commissions (Healy, 2014) and a study of 
the broker votes collected by a single brokerage firm in the mid-2000s (Maber 
et al., 2014). Neither examined the importance or changing nature of payment 
mechanisms. Haig and Rees (2016), however, add payment flows to Barker’s 
model (Barker, 1998); I have expanded this work in the diagrams presented in 





Each document was used to identify features of each mechanism which 
correspond to neoclassical market theory or to relational exchange theory. 
Five exchange mechanisms were identified and a timeline created to chart 
changes in the mechanism employed in the UK. Event participation facilitated 
understanding of the mechanisms and the extent of adoption. Events were 
also helpful in plotting a timeline which is summarised in table 2.3. 
 
2.5 FIVE WAYS OF PAYING FOR RESEARCH 
 
2.5.1 Mechanism 1: Paying on execution (UK prior to 2000) 
The practice of allocating commissions based on broker research was 
commonplace by the 1930s and its history is neatly summarized by Bradshaw 
et al. (2017). Until the deregulation of major stock markets, such as the New 
York and London stock exchanges, in the 1980s, the commission rates 
payable to brokers were fixed by law and so there were limited means for 
brokers to compete for the custom of investors. A broker with renowned 
analysts could attract business and influence buy or sell decisions through the 
distribution of research reports, which also formed a basis for salespeople to 
call clients in the hope that they might trade through the firm: 
(i)nvestment research has traditionally been seen as a cost centre for 
brokers, often un-priced and given away for free in the hope [that] trade 
ideas will generate trading commissions for the research provider 





Fund managers access research without contracts or even prices in this social 
and relational system. Brokerage firms with the best analysts can attract more 
trades and therefore have the highest commission revenue. We can think of 
research as a gift offered by brokers to (many) fund managers, one which is 
received when investment managers use the research. The counter-gift takes 
the form of a commission which, since it is calculated as a percentage with no 
upper limit, can be large. Broker research is designed to incentivize fund 
managers to trade. Brokerage analysts need to balance this tendency to issue 
over-optimistic recommendations with the need to develop a reputation 
(Jackson, 2005). 
 
Suppose a brokerage analyst has just released her latest report, a “buy idea” 
on the company, in which her recommendation has moved from “Hold” to 
“Buy”. A fund manager incorporates some of the new report into his own 
analysis and calls the analyst to discuss some assumptions and details (note 
that he has a duty to have reasonable basis). This process leads him to 
purchase shares in the subject of the report and he instructs his dealer to 
purchase the stock from the broker in recognition. The fund manager has 
accepted the research as a gift and uses brokerage commission to make a 
counter-gift. Note that single-name research is rewarded by trading shares in 











The flow of information (research) is shown in dotted lines. Payment flows 
are in solid lines.  
Panel A shows the flows for on execution and broker vote mechanisms, the 
typical methods used prior to MiFIDII. Brokers supply research to investment 
managers. If the research is useful to investment managers the latter 
reciprocate with dealing commissions which bundle together payement for 
execution and research. The payment for research and dealing is bundled 
together and deducted from the value of the end investor’s fund. 
The broker vote uses the same mechanism as on execution. The broker vote 
is the internal process used to arrange payments each investment 
management firm. Rather than simply making payments each time a trade 
is placed with a broker, the investment firm attempts to pay brokers 
proportionally based on the quality of their research.  
Additionally, investment managers can pay independent research providers 
but this can only be done by incurring an expense. In practice, most research 
is procured from brokers using dealing commission because this reduces 





Following industry norms, there is no contract specifying the amount to be paid 
and so the broker wins all the research commission. The broker will only be 
paid when a trade is allocated. Brokerage firms are playing for a ‘winner takes 
all’ outcome with each fund manager. No payment is made to analysts at other 
brokerage firms who also cover the stock. 
 
Despite being freely available to clients, written research frequently remained 
unread. Not all fund managers use the research and there may be a number 
of reasons for this. They may not be interested in the sector, they may already 
hold a large long position in the company, or they may prefer other analysts 
who cover this sector. Survey evidence (RSRCHXchange, 2017) shows that 
although fund managers read written research regularly and find it to be useful, 
a fund manager can be expected to read up to 5% of the reports made 
available to him. Many competitors will leave the report unopened; the 
automated email is deleted, archived or just ignored. The gift is not 
acknowledged.  
 
During the year, analysts provide research to a list of investment management 
firms. They send research reports by email and, aided by sales colleagues, 
attempt to call and meet clients who are in a position to allocate brokerage 
commissions. Some gifts are acknowledged: clients reply to discuss stocks in 
her sector either by phone or in a meeting; others simply read and consider 




the form of brokerage commission. Counter-gifts range in size because 
research commissions are calculated on an ad valorem basis. The manager 
of a smaller fund will make a smaller payment. It is quite common for the price 
paid for research to be different, primarily because of the size of the trade, a 
function of fund size, market levels and fund turnover. 
 
It is also possible that some buy-siders read and use an analyst’s research, 
but choose not to pay. These firms may view research as part of a bundle of 
services provided by each broker, or an advertisement to encourage trading. 
The industry is divided into participants who are keen to identify and pay for 
research which they believe will improve their investment performance and 
those who view it as a form of advertising. Not all of those who receive the 
research acknowledge receipt by paying commission. The latter may find 
themselves excluded from research services in future (most likely the 
restrictions would apply to analyst time rather than written research) unless 
they can demonstrate payment: in a gift exchange system, “(t)he penalty for 
failure is exclusion” (Offer, 1997, p. 453). 
 
Reciprocation takes place not just at the firm level but also at the individual 
level. Hospitality, such as a good lunch, may prompt a fund manager to 
consider trading; he may feel a personal need to reciprocate by paying 
commission, even though the counter-gift is funded by the end investors rather 




his knowledge of a firm or sector. In the latter case, the end investor may have 
benefited due to the investment managers’ learning process. Gift exchange at 
both the personal and organizational level become entwined. Brokerage 
analysts therefore seek cordial relationships with fund managers to encourage 
reciprocation (Cialdini, 1993). 
 
Traditionally only the executing broker could be paid for research and brokers 
competed for commissions on the strength of their analyst research. The 
analyst with the second-best research on the same company is not rewarded 
at all. Asset management firms can only pay for research by instructing trades 
as shown in Figure 2a While the percentage paid for execution and research 
can be specified (since 2007 this is essential in Europe due to MiFID II 
requirements for ‘best execution’), the payments are said to be bundled. An 
investment management firm needed execution arrangements, specifying 
commission rates but not research quantities, to be in place with each broker 
to pay for research. There exists a one-to-one mapping between research and 
execution. Fund managers often maintain 20 broker arrangements, rather 
more dealing counterparties than the buy-side dealers deem necessary for 
executing trades, in order to tap into a broader selection of research.  
 
A textbook model of perfect competition requires that there are many buyers 
and sellers (atomicity) who take prices as given and can see the supply and 




and freedom for buyers and sellers to enter or exit the market. Paying for 
research on execution is an opaque, relational arrangement conferring 
benefits on both producers and consumers of research; it stretches the 
assumptions of perfect competition. These benefits reflect a theme throughout 
the event participation and document analysis and help to explain the general 
resistance to a transaction-based mechanism. 
 
2.5.2 Mechanism 2: Broker vote (UK 1990s to 2017) 
In a broker vote system, fund managers within a firm rank (vote for) brokerage 
analysts based on the value of research provided in a given period. The fund 
management firm then allocates commissions in proportion to the rankings. 
Although the parties can calculate the percentage share of the commission 
pot, no invoicing exists, and it is unusual to find prices expressed in currency 
units. The absence of explicit prices casts this arrangement in sharp contrast 
to execution commissions which must be carefully measured to minimize the 
cost borne by clients (the adverse effect on fund returns caused by deduction 
of commissions) as part of best execution as mandated by the original version 
of MiFID which took effect in 2007.  
 
Research commissions, aggregated within the buy-side firm and referred to as 
the commission pot, vary from month to month. The size of the commission 
pot depends on several factors which are time varying. The first is portfolio 




assets under management, in turn depends on the value of the shares in the 
fund, and cash flows, such as investments and redemptions, made by end 
investors.  
 
Commissions are awarded to brokers by the buy-side firm based on feedback 
from dealers, for efficient execution of trades, and investment managers, to 
pay for research. Investment managers within a firm might each rank three 
analysts per sector. This information is then aggregated to form the broker 
vote. The process is also designed to capture not only recommendations but 
also the wider range of research services, including strategy, economics, 
customized projects and quantitative analysis (Maber et al., 2014). These 
services are not easily accounted for when paying on execution.  
 
The vote is recorded in a spreadsheet and then presented at a broker review 
meeting. The buy-side dealing desk then endeavours to allocate trades to 
brokerage firms according to the votes in the coming period, e.g., calendar 
quarter. Note also that actual payment takes place at the time of the trade, 
which might be some months after the broker vote or review meeting. There is 
no means for research commissions to be accrued beyond the period for this 
vote. For example, suppose there is a year in which a fund manager is busy 
buying shares because investors are placing fresh money into his fund. The 
commission pot will be large and can be used to pay for an abundant supply 




following year and might afford only limited research. This direct linkage 
between research and dealing provides fund managers with an incentive to 
trade in order to buy research rather than to meet portfolio objectives. 
Consequently, the system may be inefficient for the end investors who bear 
the cost of transactions.  
Figure 2b: Broker vote payment mechanism 
 
Notes  
The flow of information (research) is shown in dotted lines. Payment flows 
are in solid lines.  
The broker vote uses the same mechanism as on execution. The broker vote 
is the internal process used to arrange payments each investment 
management firm. Rather than simply making payments each time a trade 
is placed with a broker, the investment firm attempts to pay brokers 
proportionally based on the quality of their research.  
Additionally, investment managers can pay independent research providers 
but this can only be done by incurring an expense. In practice, most research 
is procured from brokers using dealing commission because this reduces 





While the arrangement adds some structure and formality, no contract is in 
place. The process is more organized, but it is important to note the amount 
paid is still expressed as a percentage of the ‘commission pot’, i.e. the total 
research commission paid in a single quarter or year. The actual value of 
shares traded could turn out to be much larger or smaller, and different 
payment amounts could be made in different periods for a similar research 
service. One investment management firm could multiply its assets under 
management in a single year; another could fail and close for business. 
 
Compared to trading on execution, the broker vote conveys more information 
about what research has been accepted in the past period, and might be 
extrapolated to indicate what research is expected to be accepted in future. By 
citing examples of useful service, a fund manager can signal information on 
demand: not the demand curve of an economics textbook but rather a demand 
schedule (White, 1981) and therefore obtains some basic management 
information which can be used to compare payments made to different brokers 
and analysts. In turn, this could inform negotiations and demonstrate to clients 
that there is a process for commission payment. The investment manager can 
compare the payments made to different brokers and even the analysts within 
each brokerage. 
 
The lack of price information does, however, lead to a number of limitations. 




to each broker, it may be difficult to refine this to determine exactly how much 
is paid to each analyst. It would be difficult to establish how much was paid for 
different types of service such as reports, meetings or customized projects. 
Even if this is possible, the actual price is not known until next year’s dealing 
is performed. Neither the buyer (fund manager) nor the seller (broker) have a 
way to price research on an ex-ante basis; both can make a calculation of the 
price if they wish, but with no regulatory requirement or client pressure there 
are likely to be other more pressing matters to deal with. The accountant 
seeking information about the value of research services would find no 
invoices or contracts; instead, they will only find an empty box. 
 
Three adverse consequences result from these limitations (CFA, 2014). First, 
because the vote arrives at percentages, the price of a certain service in dollar 
terms can fluctuate from year to year due to changes in funds under 
management. An investment manager requiring exactly the same research 
would be charged more, and the total payment is entirely determined by 
changes in stock prices or fund inflows. Second, the investment manager 
needs to trade in order to pay commissions to the broker, which creates the 
incentive to trade even if transactions are not required. Third, broker votes 
have often failed to provide useful feedback to brokers regarding the services 
required. For these reasons, the UK regulator pronounced that the broker vote 
was ‘inherently flawed’ (FCA, 2014). A large survey of UK sell-side firms 
revealed that the broker vote system provides feedback which is lacking in 




managers may well have breached their fiduciary duty to act in their clients’ 
best interest.  
 
The broker has some incentives to maintain this form of exchange. If a strong 
relationship can be established, then there is a greater chance of commission 
payments in future. If stock markets increase in value, or if the buy-side firm 
attracts clients, brokers will earn higher commissions due to the percentage 
system: an asymmetric, option-like payoff with very large upside and limited 
downside (zero payment). 
 
The investment management group might also benefit from this arrangement. 
The buy-side firms, and the fund managers who use research to inform 
decisions which will define their career success, continue to benefit from 
research at the expense of their end investor clients. The process allows 
research to be consumed before deciding how much, if anything, should be 
paid. The fund manager can request access to research then decide how much 
to pay. Fund managers can find themselves in a position of power (Imam and 
Spence, 2016).  
 
The broker vote introduces some formality to the ritual by determining the 
frequency of exchange and appropriate size of counter-gift to each broker. If 
research commission is not forthcoming, the fund manager is likely to be 




the near future, reminding the asset management group that the counter-gift 
is expected. Ultimately, if commission is not allocated according to the vote, 
the broker may choose to suspend provision of research services, e.g. by 
ceasing to provide analyst time, or at the extreme by stopping sending written 
research. The latter approach would be quite uncommon as it reduces the 
potential for incoming counter-gifts in future. 
 
The dominance of a social and relational mechanism over one aimed at 
revealing prices also stands in sharp contrast to the stock markets which form 
the topic and motivation for most investment analysis. Fund managers and 
analysts exist by virtue of competitive markets with transparent prices.  
 
In summary, the broker vote regularizes the ritual of exchange. It improves 
orderliness but maintains an opaque, relational system. It facilitates 
negotiation of payments made by a single fund management firm to multiple 
brokers for analyst services. It makes the time interval between provision of 
research and payment more explicit. It introduces order and helps to organize 
the payment to brokers from the commission pot. The vote is, however, only a 
crude form of accounting based on percentages. There are no contracts, 
invoices or explicit prices. Votes do not remove the incentives for brokers to 
produce a large volume of research or for fund managers to trade more and 




itself does not allow the fund manager access to research which was 
previously unavailable.  
 
2.5.3 Mechanism 3: Commission sharing agreements (UK 
2005–2017) 
Prior to the introduction of Commission Sharing Agreements (CSAs), research 
and execution commissions were bundled together whenever an investment 
management firm made trades. In the mid 2000s, regulators in the UK, US and 
some other markets created a mechanism allowing buy-side firms to place 
research commissions in an account from which they can pay any research 
provider who will accept a CSA payment; this includes not only brokers but 
also independent research providers. The broker who executes the trade 
earns all of the execution component, but the research component can be 
redirected to one or more other parties as shown in Figure 2c. For example, 
trade execution could be provided by a given broker with the research 
component paid away to other parties to pay for provide research. CSAs 
therefore enable the “unbundling” of execution and research components. 
Indirectly they also reveal prices because payments from the CSA account 
require an invoice showing the price to be paid in currency units rather than as 
a percentage of the commission pot. No ex-ante budgeting is required. Since 
CSAs are voluntary, it is common to find a hybrid approach which utilizes CSAs 










The flow of information (research) is shown in dotted lines. Payment flows 
are in solid lines.  
Left panel shows the mechanism underlying both execution and broker vote 
mechanisms which we have seen in the previous two sections. 
A CSA (right panel) allows an investment manager to use a given broker for 
execution and make payments to a separate account to pay for research. 
The investment manager retains discretion as to how the CSA account 
balance is used to pay for research from other research providers, including 
independent (non-brokerage) firms. The process allows the investment 
manager to maintain fewer brokerage counterparties while accessing a 
wider range of research suppliers. CSAs require invoices to be issued this 
placing a monetary value on each research service. This contrasts with 
broker vote allocations which are expressed in percentage terms and 
therefore vary through time with the investment management firm’s assets 
under management. 
CSAs became available in 2006 in the UK, US and some other markets. 
CSAs were optional and, although initial adoption was slow, by 2015 many 





The CSA system contrasts with the broker vote in a number of ways. First, the 
range of available research becomes wider. Fund managers can use CSAs to 
pay for research from non-execution counterparties, bolstering independent 
research firms of various shapes and sizes. Second, invoices specify prices in 
finite currency values rather than percentage votes. CSAs make prices explicit 
in invoices which are formatted just like any other commercial invoice. Third, 
research need no longer be purchased at/near the time of the trade. Fourth, 
the invoices require monetary values, and the cost of research becomes less 
dependent on the size of the fund. 
 
A key driver for CSAs was the UK regulator’s competition logic. Having 
motioned a ban on research commissions in 2003, the UK regulator chose 
instead to provide the option of a cost-based system. In the words of the 
leading UK-based consultancy in this area this allowed investment 
management firms to:  
to use commissions to purchase both execution and research services 
and charge this back to the client... (t)he execution fee would remain 
with the executing broker, while the non-execution fee would be placed 
in a CSA – an account from which the asset manager could pay any 
type of research producer, not just brokers  





The CSA was designed as a device to promote competition and improve 
efficiency by separating research and execution payments. The introduction of 
CSAs has allowed fund managers to obtain a higher degree of independence 
in the advice they purchase, a wider choice of inputs and better value for 
money (Haig and Rees, 2015).  
 
Despite these benefits, CSA adoption was slow. Even in 2013 it was estimated 
that CSAs accounted for less than half of the total market for research (Haig 
and Rees, 2016). Many firms maintained hybrid approaches, with CSAs 
complementing a conventional broker vote. Some asset management firms 
were, however, quick to try the new system. Evidence from agency brokers 
confirms that these early adopters were typically mid-sized UK firms who might 
not have been premium clients with top-tier brokerages. They may, as a result, 
have faced limited access to the more valuable parts of broker research.  
 
Despite the requirements for careful monitoring of dealing commissions, FSA 
supervisory activity in 2011 found unacceptable compliance at 13 of 15 firms 
investigated. The FSA then reminded fund managers of the regulations and, 
after the FCA emerged from the FSA as a separate entity in 2013, entered a 
consultation process and review to take into account the views of stakeholders. 
In May 2014 the FCA consultation concluded with a clarification that client 
commissions should only be used for substantive research. The term 




is a clarification. It is a clarification in the same way a dog shows its teeth when 
it does not want you to enter a house.’ (IMA Director of Legal and Compliance 
quoted in the Financial Times, 11 May 2014). In addition to the clarification, 
the CEOs of the largest 200 UK asset managers were required to personally 
attest that commissions have been spent with at least as much care as 
spending the firm’s own money. This attestation has global ramifications given 
that many of the CEOs are based outside the UK and is therefore encouraged 
global adoption (CFA event, June 2014). We can see that the institutional 
changes in the UK aimed for value for money for the end investor. This 
contrasts with the US regulations which sought to curb misbehaviour. Even so, 
the changes envisaged in the UK will surely change analysts’ incentives and 
may well be expected to subsequently affect behaviour.  
 
By 2016 it had become the norm (Unbundling Uncovered Event, 2016). 
Despite the likelihood that MiFID II would either prohibit or at best modify the 
CSA rules, some investment management firms strived towards 100% CSA 
adoption; several executives noted that adoption allowed them to document 
prices for research which had been less explicit in a traditional, percentage-
based broker vote. The adoption of an invoice-based system created price 
records which could be presented to regulators or end investors to 
demonstrate orderliness. The invoices also provided management 
information. Analysis of ex-post prices could be useful in preparing to negotiate 
ex-ante prices. While many firms grappled with unbundling, one (buy-side) 




task because his firm had been an early adopter of CSAs (CFA Event, October 
2016). 
 
2.5.4 Mechanism 4: Research payment account (UK 2016 to 
present) 
In 2016, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) introduced the concept of the 
Research Payment Account (RPA) (FCA, 2016). Under this system, buy-side 
firms can continue to use dealing commissions to pay for research, but an ex-
ante research budget must be agreed with clients. The research budget and 
the account (RPA) which is used to disburse budget payments are 
independent of trading and therefore break the link between execution and 
research payments as shown in Figure 2d The RPA system requires the 
investment manager not only to be invoiced for research, as was the case with 






Figure 2d: Research Payment Account (RPA) Mechanism 
 
Panel A: CSA Panel B: RPA 
  
Notes  
The flow of information (research) is shown in dotted lines. Payment flows 
are in solid lines. 
Panel A (left) recaps the method seen in the previous section.  
Panel B (right) shows the Research Payment Account (RPA) where the 
investment manager negotiates a payment for research with brokers and 
research providers in the same way. This method was initially proposed by 
the FCA in 2015 and defined in subsequent statements in 2016 and 2017. 
Strict rules apply to the communication of RPA costs to end investors. 
In practice, most UK investment managers and many other MiFIDII 
regulated firms have chosen to adopt the P&L system described in the 
following section. 
 
Any investment management firm wishing to charge clients for research must 
disclose a budget to each client before receiving any research. The budget 
should reflect the volume, quality and cost of research required to meet the 
client’s return objectives. In order for this budget to withstand the scrutiny of 




management. It must also be used to provide a regular summary of the 
research purchased and follow a clear audit trail. To meet the budgeted 
payments, an RPA must be created and funded by an explicit charge made to 
the end investor, thus ensuring that the research payment is not linked to 
trading activity in any way. RPAs can be funded by an explicit research charge 
to the end investor or by a CSA. In the event that less research is purchased 
than anticipated in the budget, the end investor must be reimbursed, or, if 
agreed, the balance could be used against the research budget in a 
subsequent period. Finally, the process to arrange these payments must be 
fully documented. Use of research with no explicit payment constitutes an 
inducement to trade under MiFID II. The wording of the directive prohibits the 
offering of gifts as the counter-gifts may reduce end investors’ welfare. 
 
RPAs also present the sell-side with considerable strategic and operational 
challenges (Quinlan, 2017). Strategic considerations include the type of 
products and services to be delivered, the industries and stocks to cover, the 
means of segmenting clients based on the amount they pay, and the provision 
of research to clients who are, or are not, subject to MiFID II. Operational 
concerns include contracts, billing and compliance; brokers need to be able to 
switch off the supply of research where it has not been requested. Participants 
report that MiFID II created confusion (RSRCHXchange, 2017, Figure 2.1). 
Unlike the classic strawberry market, which was seen as an opportunity to 
bring orderliness to the exchange process (Garcia, 2007), the introduction of 




regulators, a theme in all practitioner events I attended, persist even at the 
time of writing.  
 
2.5.5 Mechanism 5: Profit and loss (P&L; UK 2016 to present) 
Although MiFID II requires investment management firms to pay for research 
using a transaction-based system, RPAs are not the only option. Buy-side 
firms can instead bear the cost of research alongside other outgoings such as 
salaries, travel and data. The latter approach, recommended to the FCA in the 
early 2000s (Myners, 2001, Figure 2.1), has been most uncommon throughout 
the long history of analyst research. 
 
During 2017 the majority of firms decided to pay for research using the P&L 
method. While this will reduce a firm’s profit, it was seen to reduce regulatory 






Figure 2e: Profit and Loss Payment Mechanism  




The flow of information (research) is shown in dotted lines. Payment flows 
are in solid lines.  
Panel A (left) shows the simplest method where investment management 
firms pay for their own research. The end investor makes no additional 
payment, although some investment management firms have sought to 
increase the fees they charge, i.e., incorporating the cost of research into 
the overall fee. This approach was uncommon prior to 2017. 
Panel B (right) shows the Research Payment Account (RPA) where the 
investment manager negotiates a payment for research with brokers and 
research providers in the same way. This method was initially proposed by 
the FCA in 2015 and defined in subsequent statements in 2016 and 2017. 
Strict rules apply to the communication of RPA costs to end investors. 
In practice, most UK investment managers and many other MiFIDII 
regulated firms have chosen to adopt the P&L system depicted in Panel A. 
 
 
Myners (2001) called upon the UK investment management industry to bear 




costs to end investors. Such a system would encourage the buy-side to use 
research efficiently and prompt the sell-side to offer a wider set of research 
services. This outcome appears to have been achieved indirectly, and rather 
abruptly, if belatedly, in the second half of 2017.  
 
The neoclassical economic market model for investment research introduced 
by the UK regulator, as part of MiFID II, had a performative effect on the 
payment for research in the investment management industry. Since the effect 
has been to make the marketplace more like the economic model envisaged, 
we can say that this instance of performativity is of a Barnesian nature 
(MacKenzie, 2008). 
 
It seems unlikely, however, that the investment management industry will 
entirely abandon its deeply engrained reciprocal system. The non-
standardized, trust-based and relational nature of research suits a gift 
exchange system (Offer, 1997). Thus, it is likely that aspects of gift exchange 
will be retained. Buy-side firms with no client business in Europe need not 
comply with MiFID II and may choose to retain broker vote systems. This might 
include many hedge funds. An additional reason to expect less than universal 
adoption of new systems is simply that compliance by UK fund management 
and brokerage firms in this area seems to have been poor (CFA, 2014). The 
FCA has noted improvement in practice (Unbundling Uncovered, 2016). Over 









Using data collected from specialist industry events and documents, this paper 
identifies five market mechanisms used to pay for investment research in the 
past four decades. The characteristics of each mechanism are classified 
according to their orientation towards neoclassical market or gift exchange 
systems. The first two mechanisms feature no contracts or invoices. Here the 
price of research is not just opaque but often unknown both to supplier and 
consumer; the reciprocal mechanism exhibits characteristics of gift exchange. 
It is not, however, a free good. These systems prevailed throughout the 
present decade, often until 2017, and are still used in some firms outside the 
EU. A third system (CSA), which is invoice based, was made available in many 
markets between 2006 and 2017. Investment managers could elect to use this 
system to unbundle research payments from execution commissions. The third 
system revealed prices and removed the need to maintain a trading 
relationship with every research provider and afforded a wider selection of 
research, access to analysis from independent, non-brokerage firms and 
better value for money. Despite these benefits, the adoption of such methods 





The fourth and fifth systems, almost unheard of until 2017, both require prices 
to be agreed and largely replace gift exchange systems. The key difference 
between these two current methods is whether the cost is charged to the end 
investor or the investment management firm. In 2016, buy-side firms were 
presented with the choice between some combination of RPA and P&L 
payment methods. Both systems require explicit prices to be negotiated and 
facilitate a market styled on neoclassical economic models. The majority of UK 
fund managers chose to change their approach and now pay for analyst 
research in the same way that most businesses would pay external 
consultants. Motivated more by uncertainty than by cost, investment managers 
have chosen to pay from their firms’ own pockets; in doing so, they reduce, but 
do not eliminate, regulatory risks associated with the introduction of MiFID II. 
The end result is very similar to what might have been achieved by simply 
banning the use of commissions, as was proposed by the UK regulator in the 
early 2000s.   
 
This shift in practice contrasts with a deeply engrained gift exchange system 
where investment managers recognize research in a similar way to the receipt 
of a gift and reciprocate with a counter-gift in the form of commission allocation. 
The counter-gift is proportional to trade size and therefore grows proportionally 
with assets under management. The relaxation of commission rules in the US 
and UK in the 1980s prompted no change in the marketplace design. In the 
immediate aftermath of the late 1990s dot.com bubble, the UK became known 




little change in practice. Broker votes persisted beyond the FCA’s 2014 
decision to support more demanding rules on research payment as part of 
MiFID II. By 2016, it had become clear that the gift exchange system would no 
longer be compliant after the introduction of the new directive from the start of 
2018. 
The change has important ramifications. Investment managers must now 
evaluate the cost of research alongside their other costs incurred to run the 
business, allowing managers to directly compare external and internal 
research costs such as analyst compensation. Greater scrutiny can be 
expected than was typical in many broker vote systems. Research which is not 
perceived to add value will be removed from future research budgets. In many 
cases the overall budget for research will be lower than it was prior to 2018. 
Research providers must negotiate the price of research in monetary terms 
rather than percentage points and in advance of use. For many firms this will 
be a significant change. Providers will have a clearer view of their demand 
schedule. Few brokers now attempt to provide full coverage of listed stocks in 
all sectors or countries; instead, most specialize. End investors have greater 
transparency regarding the costs of investing. Since fund managers have a 
regulatory requirement to avoid paying for underutilized research, we can 
expect less duplication. Competition should result in greater value for money. 
It may be harder for investors to find and evaluate research but entrepreneurs 






Table 2.1: Schedule of events attended 
 




CFA UK May 2013 Presentation by Frost Consulting on the economics of research based on 





IMA July 2013 Launch of IMA report in response to FCA thematic review on paying for 
research  
  
The Future of 
Equity 
Research 
CFA UK September 
2013 
Panel discussions on challenges facing the existing model of research, 




CFA UK April 2013 Presentations by fund management and FCA leaders on conflicts of interest, 







CFA UK October 
2014 











Substantive Research November 
2015 
Full-day conference attended by over 200 buy-side, sell-side and 




Paying for  
Research 
CISI  February 
2015 




CFA UK October 
2016 
100 investment professionals, staff and students 
Research 
Marketplace 




20 law firm partners, competition economists and University of Edinburgh 
School of Law academics 
Fixed Income 
Research 
Unbundling Uncovered October 
2016 
 
280 fund management/investment bank executives 
Paying for 
Research 





(Sydney) 30 staff (plus 12 more via video link to Melbourne, Perth, Adelaide, 




Substantive Research November 
2016 
Full-day conference attended by over 250 buy-side, sell-side and 
independent research specialists 
Investment 
Research 
Institutional Investor Fixed 
Income Forum 
 




Institutional Investor Nordic 
Forum 





Substantive Research November 
2018 
Full-day conference attended by over 330 buy-side, sell-side and 
independent research specialists 
This table reports conferences and debates attended by the author. In most instances, these were organized by professional bodies representing 




Figure 2.1: Industry and professional documents 
 
CFA UK (2013) The Future of Equity Research (event summary made 
available in Professional Investor) October 2013. Author’s copy. Available to 
CFA UK members. 
 
CFA UK (2014) Response to FCA Consultation CP13-17: Consultation on the 
use of dealing commission rules. 
http://www.frostconsulting.co.uk/futureofresearch.php 
 
CSFI (2017) A Level Playing Field for Investment Research? Challenges 
facing the buy-side, sell-side and independents 
http://www.csfi.org/20171024-a-level-playing-field-for-investment-research 
 




Extel (2011) Buy-side Broker Reviews: Commission or Omission 
http://www.extelsurvey.com/ (last accessed 15/12/2013)  
FCA (2013) Consultation Paper 13/17: Consultation on the use of dealing 
commission rules  
http://fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/consultation-papers/cp13-17 
 
FCA (2014) Discussion Paper 14/3: Discussion on the use of dealing 
commission regime  
http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/discussion-papers/dp14-03.pdf 
 
FCA (2016) Consultation Paper 16/29: Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive II Implementation – Consultation Paper III 
https://www.fca.org.uk/sites/default/files/cp16-29.pdf 
 
Frost Consulting (2012) Commission Sharing Arrangements: The changing 
face of research procurement  
http://www.frostconsulting.co.uk/publications.php 
 
Frost Consulting (2012) Introduction to Commission Unbundling 
http://www.frostconsulting.co.uk/publications.php 
 








Investment Association (then known as IMA) (2013) The Use of Dealing 
Commission to Purchase Investment Research 
https://www.theia.org/industry-policy 
 
Investment Association (2014) Response to FCA Consultation CP13-17: on 
use of dealing commission rules  
https://www.theia.org/industry-policy 
 
Kay, J. (2012) The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term 




Myners, P. (2001) Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review 




Oxera (2009) The impact of the new regime for use of dealing commission: 
post-implementation review  
http://www.oxera.com/Oxera/media/ 
 
Quinlan (2016) Research in an unbundled world 
https://www.quinlanandassociates.com/insights/ 
 

















CSA RPA P&L 
1920–1949 Yes    Yes* 
1950–1975 Yes    Yes* 
1975–1999 Yes    Yes* 
2000–2005 Yes Yes   Yes* 
2006–2015 Yes Yes Yes  Yes* 





   Yes Yes 
 
The typical use of payment methods in the UK and US stock markets since the 
brokerage industry and the financial analyst emerged in the 1920s are shown 
in five columns. 
All methods could be adopted during calendar years 2016 and 2017. The RPA 
was not fully defined until later in 2016. Consequently, there was a short 
window in which buy-side firms could decide which approach to adopt. 
Recently, a short period existed in which all methods were allowed: 2016–
2017. In 2017 the majority of UK fund managers announced adoption of P&L 
for equity funds. 










Mind versus machine: analyst and machine 
















In this paper, we investigate the ability of machine learning (ML) to mimic 
analysts’ equity valuations. Specifically, we compare the information content 
of analyst and ML valuations. The adoption of ML algorithms which can 
automatically re-estimate relationships in large, high dimensional datasets 
have become a major theme in investment management. For example, a 
search of the Financial Times website reveals over 1,000 articles relating to 
ML. Given the profound impact this technology is expected to have on the 
industry, this level of attention is understandable. Many articles advocate 
awareness, or adoption, of ML in investment management but few evaluate its 
effectiveness. Our paper takes a step towards spanning this gap in the 
literature, specifically by examining the potential for ML to perform analyst 
research.  
 
Several important debates motivate our study. Although analysts have been 
shown to have an important role in supporting the informational environment 
(Brown et al., 2015), their ability to make accurate predictions remains 
questionable (Bradshaw et al., 2017). Sell-side analysts, for many decades the 
most typical and available analyst category, face adverse incentives, which 
result in optimism bias which interferes with accuracy.  All brokerage analysts, 
whether affiliated to an investment bank or not, can be expected to face a 




predictive accuracy, and encouraging institutional investors to trade, e.g., 
through overoptimistic buy recommendations. Recent regulation has required 
unprecedented change in the supply of investment research for investment 
firms operating in 31 European Economic Area countries. Since January 2018, 
MiFIDII has mandated that research must be invoiced separately from dealing 
and that investment managers cannot use research which they have not 
explicitly paid for. Brokerage firms must now sell research in a similar way to 
independent research providers (IRPs), e.g. through quarterly subscriptions. 
Prior empirical evidence on analyst bias and incentive has become less 
relevant. 
 
Firms providing analyst research are responding to MiFIDII amidst a shift 
towards passive investing, which requires little or no research, and falling 
commission rates, which reduce brokerage revenues. The demand and 
revenue for research has therefore been under pressure due to structural 
change in the last decade. While media reports of “bloodbath” and “exodus” 
(Gordon, 2017) in sell-side roles may contain a modicum of hype the scale and 
stature of sell-side research has diminished (Guan et al., 2013; Groysberg and 
Healy, 2013; Haig and Rees, 2016). The use of ML is becoming more common 
in knowledge industries and it would not be surprising to find analysts in some 
firms making more use of ML, and in other firms there may even be attempts 





Our setting provides a rare opportunity to compare the forecasting ability of 
analysts versus ML. Such opportunities are unusual because investment firms, 
whether buy-side, sell-side or independent, seek to use the technology for their 
private advantage. Our sample comprises some 100 analysts at a well-
established firm which supplies investment managers with analyst outputs on 
a subscription fee basis. Since the research they produce is used only by 
external investors, and is paid for by fees rather than brokerage commissions, 
they are free from important adverse incentives which can impede the 
objectivity of their sell-side counterparts. This setting is unlike most prior 
studies, which use brokerage analysts, yet is similar to the post-MiFIDII 
landscape for analysts. It therefore gives us a timely preview of research in the 
years to come.  
 
Regressions on valuations of US and international firms show that analyst 
valuations contain information which is not fully encapsulated by valuation 
multiples, size, risk, momentum, profitability and the I/B/E/S consensus target 
price but with minimal explanatory power when used alone. ML does not mimic 
analysts but instead acts as a significant contrarian signal. Investors could use 
a combined signal augmented with price momentum but they are unlikely to 
invest on the basis of a contrarian signal without a compelling explanation. 
More importantly, our analysis points to how ML might be adapted into a 
reliable non-contrarian indicator, for example by including a momentum factor, 





Our primary contribution is evidence on the efficacy of ML in investment 
analysis. This evidence is timely given the current focus on financial 
technology known as FinTech. Additionally, we contribute to the narrow strand 
of literature on independent investment research. This is especially important 
because, as chapter 2 explains, MiFIDII requires most brokerage firms to 
charge for research separately from dealing commissions. Since our sample 
analysts make unbiased predictions, we have a near-ideal setting in which to 
examine independent analysts’ valuations, and this provides a preview of what 
to expect since MiFIDII took effect in 2018. Finally, since our sample is global, 
yet contains a sizeable US sample, we provide new evidence of both ML 
adoption and independent research in global markets, yet still allows us to 
make comparisons with existing research which tends to be set in the US. We 
expect to see more research on these themes. 
 
3.2 BACKGROUND 
3.2.1 THE USE OF MACHINE LEARNING IN SYSTEMATIC 
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 
 
Active investment management firms come in a variety of forms. Equity 
investment funds have historically been classified as fundamental or 
quantitative. These labels can easily be contested as quantitative funds often 
use fundamental data as inputs (and are sometimes labelled “quantamental”); 




Fundamental managers may also object to being labelled as “traditional” and 
see their approach as innovative. Lopez de Prado (2018) classifies strategies 
into discretionary, where investment managers make decisions based on 
judgement and experience, and systematic approaches, where decisions are 
algorithmic. We follow this distinction.  
 
3.2.2 MACHINE LEARNING 
ML can be used in discretionary and systematic investment strategies and take 
on different meanings depending on the domain of use. Empirical analysis in 
finance has tended to use econometric approaches which predate ML and 
require the analyst to estimate a model to measure the relationship between 
variables. Investors can update this model when new data arrives or at periodic 
intervals in order to make investment decisions (systematic investment 
managers), and academics often simulate such strategies, for example by 
testing the performance of portfolios representing company characteristics. ML 
can also support such decisions (discretionary investment managers), for 
example by processing unstructured text and image data to provide business 
analysis to investment managers. ML differs in that the algorithm, rather than 
the analyst, determines the model. Data scientists tend to refer to this as 
“training” rather than estimation. For more detail, and specifically for readers 
with a background including economics, Athey and Imbens (2019) provide a 





Gu et al. (2019) define machine learning in the asset pricing domain to capture 
approaches which firstly, offer the flexibility to analyse large datasets; 
secondly, guard against overfitting and thus reaching stable out-of-sample 
prediction; and thirdly, where there is a practical method to reach the best 
model among multiple near-optimal solutions where the optimal model is 
unknown or may be impractical to reach. On this last point, the issue is that it 
may not be feasible to compute the exact optimum due to cost or time required 
to evaluate every possible model generated by the algorithm. ML can be 
classified as supervised, where a set of variables or features are provided 
(such as random forest and neural networks), and unsupervised ML where the 
algorithm determines relationships between observations (e.g. cluster 
analysis). The ML in our setting takes the former approach, i.e., it is 
supervised. 
 
The type of ML chosen by the firm in out setting is called random forest, which 
is built on the concept of decision trees. A decision tree plots a sequence of 
steps. Decision trees can be used for classification or prediction; in our setting 
the latter is the goal. Data scientists call such trees regression trees. This can 
be confusing in finance as the approach is quite different from regression 
analysis in standard econometrics.  
 
In the first step of a decision tree, observations are partitioned into two bins 




probability of a random observation being classified in the wrong bin. The 
partition is made using a threshold value of one of the explanatory variables 
(features). There are now two bins. (It is also possible to have more than two 
but two is simpler to start with two). The second step is to partition the data in 
each of the new bins, again using the objective function to each bin. These two 
new decisions are most likely based on threshold values of different variables. 
We now have a second level of the tree featuring four bins. We could continue 
to “grow” the tree down the page; the graphical representation can be likened 
to an upside-down tree with branches reaching downwards. At some stage we 
can decide to stop adding levels. The number of levels is referred to as the 
depth of the tree. Suppose we stop with the two levels described above, i.e., 
at a depth of two. This means we have four buckets. The average value of the 
MVP in each bucket would be the predicted value for any stock falling into that 
bucket, i.e., with characteristics which meet the threshold requirements to end 
up in that bucket. The decision tree now serves as a model which we could 
apply to firms which were not included in the original sample. 
 
We could stop here and use the outcome of the decision tree as the forecast. 
One sell-side firm supplied such a model to investment managers in the 1990s. 
To improve the prediction accuracy Breiman (2001) proposes the use of a 
large number of trees, i.e., an ensemble, which is typically known as a random 
forest. Ensemble approaches are helpful when there is a low signal to noise 
ratio resulting in marginal predictive power for any single tree. Using a 




dataset. The firm in our setting generates 500 decision trees and the ML 
market valuation to price is the average of these valuations for any gives share. 
Random forest has become something of a standard method in finance. 
Informal conversations with practitioners working in this area indicate that the 
method is suitable because it is relatively simple and transparent. Gu et al. 
(2019) include it in their comparisons and find that ML simpler methods with 
few levels (shallow) tend to outperform complicated with many levels (deep), 
such as deep neural networks. 
 
3.2.3 SYSTEMATIC EQUITY STRATEGIES 
Systematic use of reported accounting information has been shown to 
outperform analyst consensus forecasts. Financial statement analysis of value 
and growth firms can be used to devise compelling investment strategies (such 
as Ou and Penman (1989), Frankel and Lee, (1998) Piotroski (2000) and 
Mohanram (2005). Wahlen and Wieland (2011) use simple financial ratios to 
predict earnings with greater accuracy than the sell-side analysts’ consensus. 
Importantly, the models do not rely on forecasts. To provide some concrete 
examples, Piotroski (2000) predicts the returns of value (high book to market) 
stocks using the variables such as cash flow from operations, debt to total 
assets, gross margin, asset turnover and return on assets; this strategy was 
adopted, for example, by the brokerage arm of Societe Generale. Wahlen and 
Wieland (2011) build a simple model using a similar selection of variables to 




consensus. Importantly, the model does not rely on forecasts. As such, these 
approaches present a systematic alternative to analyst-based approaches. 
 
Systematic equity strategies have typically relied upon factors such as book to 
price, past returns, firm size and earnings quality; the models apply and extend 
well-cited asset pricing models such as Fama and French (1992) and Carhart 
(1997). 
 
Quantitative analysts estimate models on as many prior periods as possible in 
the design and testing phases. Once live, the data inputs to the model are 
updated regularly, usually at daily or monthly intervals. Estimation of the model 
is typically infrequent due to the scale of effort required. Quantitative analysts 
might re-estimate the model from time to time, for example to incorporate a 
new variable or simply because investment performance has been 
unsatisfactory. Systematic investing has tended to use models which are static 
in the sense that there is no systematic schedule for re-estimation. Examples 
of firms established in such approaches are AQR, LSV and the Barclays Global 
Investors business acquired by Blackrock in the late 2000s (Fabozzi et al., 
2010). 
 
In the past decade, systematic investing has shifted from static processes to 
dynamic models. In a survey of investment managers (Fabozzi et al., 2010), 




models. More recent approaches seek to use ML to forecast earnings (Ball 
and Ghysels, 2017), target prices and valuations (Morningstar, 2013) or to 
forecast stock prices directly (Fabozzi et al., 2010). Even if ML seems not to 
have become dominant in mainstream quantitative investing (Kahn, 2018), a 
recent study shows signs of significant innovation in investment research 
(Grennan and Michaely, 2018). While such innovation might be seen as a 
contest between “mind” and “machine”, one recent study (Ball and Ghysels, 
2017) moves beyond direct comparison and demonstrates that a blend of ML 
and analyst approaches is optimal. 
 
Our search for prior studies of ML in investment research therefore reveals 
that while practitioners invest heavily to forge ahead with ML applications, 
there is an important gap in the literature. Fortunately our dataset provides a 
near-ideal setting. Our data comprises valuations made by over 100 analysts 
at a well-established IRP. These valuations are expressed relative to the 
current share price. We label the analyst valuation to price ratio AVP. The 
same firm employed ML to mimic AVP and we label this ML valuation to price 
ratio MVP. Both valuations were made available to Morningstar’s global client 
base comprising thousands of buy-side firms and therefore provide an 
opportunity to evaluate an early adopter of ML-based investment research.  
 
Analysts have been shown to play an important role as information 





3.2.4 Target prices and discretionary investing 
Analysts’ target price forecasts have been shown to be more informative than 
earnings estimates or recommendations (Brav and Lehavy, 2003). Even so, 
the literature has developed to show that they are “optimistic, inaccurate, and 
of little long-run investment value” (Joos et al., 2016, p. 645). Analyst target 
price accuracy is greater where valuation approaches such as discounted cash 
flow (DCF) models are chosen (Demirakos et al., 2010; Gleason et al., 2013). 
 
Sell-side analysts seek to influence discretionary investment managers in 
order to attract brokerage commissions. Prior studies have examined the 
accuracy of analysts’ predictions; the large literature on earnings forecasts and 
stock recommendations has been complimented by other key ouputs such as 
target prices. Target price can be the analyst’s expectation of a given firm’s 
stock price, i.e. valuation, in 12 months’ time. In this chapter, we examine 
valuations made by analysts for each stock in their coverage list. In short, while 
there is evidence that analyst target prices have some information, in practice 
it is difficult to extract this using systematic investment strategies. 
 
Several studies have compared independent research provider (IRP) analysts 
to sell-side analysts. Many of these studies compare the bias or accuracy of 
independent analysts who are not subject to conflicts between the best 




department (Mehran and Stulz, 2007). Such conflicts were common the Global 
Settlement which, in 2003, restricted the links between analysts and 
investment banking activities (Bradshaw et al., 2017). A long line of research 
stems from this: for example, Jacob et al. (2008) and Ertimur et al. (2007) are 
among those to find earnings forecast accuracy to be positively related to the 
profit made by the brokerage if the analyst is not incentivised by investment 
banking. These studies were timely in the aftermath of the 2003 Global 
Analysts Research Settlement.  
 
There is, however, a more fundamental conflict which the literature tends not 
to address. Brokerage firms generate their revenue in the form of commissions 
and so their analysts remain incentivized to induce trading and this stands 
regardless of whether investment bank affiliations exist. Analysts can only be 
expected to be objective if they do not face incentives to encourage investment 
managers to change their view and therefore make trades.  
 
Prior studies have often muddied waters by including unaffiliated brokers who 
still face important conflicts: Barber et al. (2007) are forced to blend unaffiliated 
analysts with IRPs due to the paucity of truly independent firms. MiFID II has 
increased attention on inducements to trade. This makes our study timely. 
  
IRP studies have tended to focus on recommendations and as a result we 




convey incremental information, i.e. not contained in earnings forecasts or 
recommendations, for medium-term investment horizons (Brav and Lehavy, 
2003) even if substantial optimism bias persists (Bradshaw et al., 2013) long 
after the Global Settlement. Allee et al. (2017) document that US analyst 
recommendations made by a large IRP could have been used to generate 
positive alpha. Our study extends this work by providing international evidence 
and comparing analyst valuations with ML counterparts. Our work differs in 
that we focus on analysts’ valuations, a more granular output which has 
potential to convey more detailed information such as level of conviction. 
 
Analyst predictions and recommendations may be most valuable for small cap 
firms, which have been shown to be more responsive to new 
recommendations (Womack, 1996); most likely because of the public 
information available to small cap investors is less complete (Stickel, 1995).  
Analysts can therefore play a larger role in the dissemination, especially in the 
case of analysts at larger brokers. Barber et al. (2001) compare portfolios of 
stocks with buy and sell recommendations; the abnormal returns generated on 
small-cap portfolios is largest which adds further evidence to the enhanced 
role of analyst information on smaller companies. 
 
The type of ML chosen by the firm in our setting is called random forest, which 
is built on the concept of decision trees. A decision tree plots a sequence of 




the latter is the goal. Data scientists call such trees regression trees. This can 
be confusing in finance as the approach is quite different from regression 
analysis in standard econometrics.  
 
In the first step of a decision tree, observations are partitioned into two bins 
(also called nodes or leaves) using an objective function which minimises the 
probability of a random observation being classified incorrectly The partition is 
made using a threshold value of one of the explanatory variables (features). 
There are now two bins. (It is also possible to have more than two, but it is 
simpler to start with two.) The second step is to partition the data in each of 
the new bins, again using the objective function. These two new decisions are 
most likely based on threshold values of different variables. We now have a 
second level of the tree, featuring four bins. We could continue to ‘grow’ the 
tree down the page; the graphical representation can be likened to an upside-
down tree, with branches reaching downwards. At some stage we can decide 
to stop adding levels. The number of levels is referred to as the depth of the 
tree. Suppose we stop with the two levels described above, i.e., at a depth of 
two. This means we have four buckets. The average ML valuation in each 
bucket would be the predicted value for any stock falling into that bucket, i.e., 
with characteristics which meet the threshold requirements to end up in that 
bucket. The decision tree now serves as a model which we could apply to firms 





We could stop here and use the outcome of the decision tree as the forecast. 
One sell-side firm supplied such a model to investment managers in the 1990s. 
To improve prediction accuracy, Breiman (2001) proposes the use of a large 
number of trees, i.e., an ensemble, which is typically known as a random 
forest. Ensemble approaches are helpful when there is a low signal to noise 
ratio, resulting in marginal predictive power for any single tree. Using a 
bootstrapping approach, trees can be grown from random subsamples of the 
dataset. The firm in our setting generates 500 decision trees, and the ML 
market valuation to price is the average of these valuations for any given share. 
Random forest has become something of a standard method in finance. 
Informal conversations with practitioners working in this area indicate that the 
method is suitable because it is relatively simple and transparent. Gu et al. 
(2019) include it in their comparisons and find that simpler ML methods, with 
few levels (shallow), tend to outperform complicated methods with many levels 
(deep), such as deep neural networks. 
 
ML has been of interest to researchers for many years. Early studies proposing 
the use of neural networks (see, for example, Swales and Yoon, 1992; 
Kryzanowski et al. 1993) show that this topic was of interest to investment 
professionals even in the early days of vendor data on analyst forecasts. 
Bouwman et al (1987) is an example of multidisciplinary research on expert 
systems, where the authors seek to design an expert system based on 
qualitative data from structured interviews with financial analysts. To our 




reflected in practice. Surveys of investment approaches such as Fabozzi et al. 
(2010) and, more recently, Kahn (2018) reveal few instances of ML and none 
which obviously seek to replicate analysts outputs or to extend analyst 
coverage. This situation seems to have changed in the last few years, when 
many investment management and research firms published white papers, 
albeit with sparse if any empirical evidence to support the merits of the new 
technology adoption. The proprietary nature of the data has prevented 
scholarly research except where researchers attempt to develop their own ML 
methods to predict earnings (see for example Ball and Ghysels, 2017) or stock 
returns (Gu et al. 2019).  
 
3.3 HYPOTHESES 
Our study compares the informativeness of analyst and ML equity valuations. 
We do this using valuation estimates as target prices, thought to be the most 
valuable summary of an analyst’s research on a given company (Dechow and 
You, 2017). Although target prices contain information which is not impounded 
in earnings forecasts or recommendations (Brav and Lehavy, 2003), it is 
difficult for investors to create systematic investment strategies based on these 
alone (Bradshaw et al., 2017). This is not surprising as the efficient market 
hypothesis tells us that we cannot expect analysts to forecast share prices with 
ease. There is, however, some evidence that independent, unbiased or 
experienced analysts may have some advantages in the search for alpha. 
Barber et al. (2007) confirm that the buy recommendations of affiliated brokers 




analysts. Independent analysts may, however, have less experience and more 
limited access to resources and may in fact have similar optimism bias to sell-
side analysts (Bradshaw et al., 2017).  
 
It is, therefore, important for us to consider the experience, bias and valuation 
approach of our sample analysts. Taking experience first, our sample analysts 
are experienced and work in an established franchise. Second, and perhaps 
more importantly, they produce a near-symmetrical distribution of 
recommendations which is evidence of minimal, if any, bias. Analysts with 
unbiased recommendation distributions have been found to be more accurate 
(Barber et al., 2006). Finally, their use a systematic valuation methodology 
(Brown et al., 2015) improves their chances of accuracy compared to analysts 
who rely on multiples (Gleason et al., 2013).  
 
Around one third of the firms analysts are CFA charter holders, a designation 
which requiring training, experience and adherence to a code of ethics. Kang 
et al. (2018) find analysts who have earnt this designation to make more 





3.4.1 First hypothesis: incremental information in analysts’ 
valuations 
Bradshaw et al. (2013) establish that target prices are more informative than 
earnings forecasts or recommendations. This evidence is, however, made 
from sell-side analyst samples. Independent analysts may be more accurate, 
since they do not face incentives to generate trades. Alternatively, they have 
sometimes been found to have less experience and access to resources and 
so may be less accurate. Our key variable of interest is the forecast fair value 
to price ratio issued by analysts and the ML algorithm and functions as a target 
price (for example, it is presented as such to I/B/E/S). Morningstar analysts are 
free from the conflicts inherent in brokerage firms and so can focus on 
accuracy. Any bias in their predictions is most likely to be due to behavioural 
traits. 
 
The distribution of recommendations and target prices issued by the firm are 
also remarkably symmetrical compared to the typical buy-oriented distribution. 
Barber et al. (2006) find that analysts at firms with more evenly distributed 
recommendations tend to be more accurate. Allee et al. (2017) document the 
positive predictive ability of Morningstar analysts. Our first hypothesis is: 
H1: Independent analysts’ valuations contain incremental 





3.4.2 Second hypothesis: incremental information in ML 
valuations 
The extant literature provides some evidence that accounting variables can 
produce abnormal returns (see, for example, Piotroski, 2000) which are 
superior to returns based on analysts’ consensus recommendations (Wahlen 
and Wieland, 2011). ML developed by a well-regarded supplier might be able 
to improve upon such simple models. We hypothesize that ML will show some 
ability to predict stock returns. Our second hypothesis is: 
H2: ML valuations contain incremental information about 
subsequent stock returns 
 
Given the range of prior evidence on target price accuracy, it is also reasonable 
for us to expect differential predictive power for both sources of forecasts. Prior 
evidence on ML and analysts’ earnings predictions indicates that there may be 
complementarity between the two (Ball and Ghysels, 2017). A combination of 
analyst and ML valuations might be most effective in our setting too. 
 
3.5 RESEARCH SETTING, DESIGN AND DATA 
3.5.1 Morningstar analyst outputs 
Morningstar analysts follow a structured approach to fundamental analysis. 
Morningstar requires analysts to score each company on a list of criteria: 
competitive positioning, financial health, stewardship and fundamental risk. 




plugged into a proprietary DCF model which is adjusted for industry- and 
company-level assumptions; such an approach is associated with superior 
analyst forecasts (Gleason et al., 2013). Analysts have some discretion to 
triangulate the DCF valuations using multiples but are required to use the DCF. 
Even so, the process is more standardized than many brokerage firms, both 
geographically and across industries, and places an emphasis on detailed 
valuations rather than the more common approach of selecting multiples 
(Brown et al., 2015; Pinto et al., 2015).  
 
Our sample has two unusual qualities. First, analysts are free from many of 
the incentive misalignments which are typical in brokerage firms (unlike the 
sample of Barber et al., 2007). We can therefore expect any bias or systematic 
error to be down to traits of human behaviour. Second, they generate a 
balanced distribution of valuations and recommendations, with approximately 
the same number of buy and sell recommendations, and an even greater 
proportion of neutral views. Any bias should therefore be due to human 
behaviour rather than incentives. This makes our sample ideal for studying 
analyst behaviour.  
 
3.5.2 Morningstar ML outputs 
Morningstar’s ML process is explicitly designed to expand coverage. By 2017 
the firm claimed to value over 50,000 stocks using the algorithm. The 




analogous to the analyst fair value estimate. Rather than replicate the 
processes used by analysts, the algorithm is designed to forecast valuation 
using the characteristics of overvalued or undervalued firms. By measuring the 
impact of these characteristics on analysts’ valuations, the algorithm attempts 
to value stocks regardless of analyst coverage. ML inputs are based on 
financial statements and market data, not forecasts made by analysts. The 
model is updated and re-estimated on a daily basis. More detail can be found 
in Morningstar (2013). 
 
The ML algorithm is supervised using a predetermined input set comprising a 
typical set of accounting variables such as (return on assets, earnings yield, 
sales yield, book yield and revenue), market variables (volume, market 
capitalization and the largest peak-to-trough drawdown in each trailing 12-











Return on assets Trailing 12 months 
Earnings to price Trailing 12 months 
Sales to price Trailing 12 months 
Book value to price Most recent 
Equity (share price) volatility Trailing 12 months 
Maximum drawdown (maximum fall from peak to trough) Trailing 12 months 
Total revenue Trailing 12 months 
Market capitalization  Most recent 
Enterprise value Most recent 
Average daily volume Trailing 12 months 
Enterprise value to market value Trailing 12 months 
Sector Most recent 
 
Source: Morningstar (2013). Data sources are not disclosed; we assume the 
data is sourced from Morningstar’s own database. Our own specifications of 
these variables are shown in table 4.2. 
 
The ML valuation is the mean of 500 estimates of the relationship between 
input variables and analyst valuation to price estimates. Each iteration uses a 
random subset of the available input observations. This process, which is 
known as a random forest, is designed to mimic analyst valuations. It updates 
both the data and the estimation automatically on a daily basis. It learns based 






Prior research on target prices has tended to use a cross-section of sell-side 
firms rather than a single-firm study (see, for example, Bilinski et al., 2012). 
Some studies, particularly those which compare buy-side analysts with their 
brokerage counterparts, delve into a single-firm case study (the appendix to 
this chapter contains a table of related studies). Our setting allows us to make 
a direct comparison between the valuation to price forecasts of Morningstar’s 
analysts and ML algorithm; for this reason, we also use a single-firm study. 
First we examine the determinants of each valuation measure by performing 
the regression shown in Equations 1A and 1B. 
 
3.6.1 Determinants of analyst fair value to price 
Morningstar discloses the accounting and market-based inputs to their ML 
algorithm (Table 3.1). Although we do not know the relative weighting given to 
each, which will change daily as the ML is re-estimated, we can expect MVP 
to be empirically determined by these factors. To understand determinants of 
AVP and MVP we use the following regressions: 
Equation 1A: 
AVPi,t = α + β1RETURNi,t-1 + β2IBES_TPP + β3MVPi,t + β4ROAi,t + 
β5BTMi,t + β6FIRMSIZEi,t + β7VOLUMEi,t + β8LEVERAGEi,t + β9BETAi,t 
+ β10VOLATILITYi,t + εi,t 
Equation 1B: 
MVPi,t = α + β1RETURNi,t-1 + β2IBES_TPP +β3AVPi,t + β4ROAi,t + 
β5BTMi,t + β6FIRMSIZEi,t + β7VOLUMEi,t + β8LEVERAGEi,t + β9BETAi,t 






We obtain the complete set of Morningstar analyst and ML valuation estimates, 
AVP and MVP respectively. After merging with Worldscope and Datastream 
variables, our dataset comprises some 17,000 firm/quarters of analyst and ML 
forecasts, both provided by Morningstar. This sample is somewhat larger than 
the single-firm studies listed in the Appendix.  
 
Table 3.2: Variable definitions  
Name Definition Source 
AVP Analyst valuation estimate divided by latest price Morningstar  
MVP Machine learning (ML) algorithm valuation estimate divided 




I/B/E/S consensus target price for each firm divided by current 
price at the end of each quarter 
Datastream 
RETURN Total return calculated as the change in return index (RI) Datastream 
BETA Bayesian adjusted beta = 0.4 + 0.6 * beta estimated from 5 
prior years of monthly data. Estimates below zero or above 
2.25 are set to missing. We use S&P1500 index for US firms, 
otherwise AC World ex-US index 
Datastream 
FIRMSIZE Firm capitalization measured by market capitalization of 
equity in US dollars 
Datastream 
LEVERAGE Leverage is measured as total debt to market capitalization of 
equity at quarter end. Estimates above 3 are set to missing 
Worldscope 
BTM Book to market is book value of equity divided by market 
capitalization of equity at quarter end. Estimates below -0.5 
or above 4 are set to missing 
Worldscope 
INDUSTRY GICS level 2 industry classification Datastream  
COUNTRY Country of listing Morningstar 
ROA Worldscope total assets and Datastream market value Datastream 
VOLATILITY Volatility is the standard deviation of 13 trailing weekly 
returns, including dividends, in local currency and annualized 
by multiplying by the square root of 52. Estimates below 0.1 
or above 0.75 are set to missing 
Datastream 
SP Revenue divided by market value Datastream 
BP Book value of equity divided by market value Datastream 
REVENUE Total sales Datastream 
EV Book value of total debt plus market value Datastream 
EV/MV EV divided by market value Datastream 






RETURN is the percentage change in Datastream total return index over each 
calendar quarter. Datastream is recognized as one of the most reliable 
providers of total returns data for international samples. To handle extreme 
values, we follow the approach of Ince and Porter (2006) and remove returns 
exceeding 300%. Our sample of firms is determined by Morningstar analyst 
coverage and all firms entering our sample are listed. This mitigates the 
likelihood of extreme returns, which are often associated with small 
companies. Return is the dependent variable in our regressions; we also 
include lagged return as momentum factor as is typical in the asset pricing 
literature and in practice.  
 
Morningstar’s ML is unusual as it does not contain momentum but does include 
a drawdown measure representing the greatest change from peak to trough 
based on the 12 month-end prices in each preceding quarter. We choose 
three-month realized returns as this is a more complete momentum measure 
and one commonly used by scholars and practitioners; replacing this with a 
12-month version makes little difference to our results.  
 
AVP is the valuation estimate made by the Morningstar analyst divided by the 





MVP is the ML valuation to price estimate made by ML at the end of each 
quarter.  
 
We also include a range of control variables, most of which are typical when 
examining the cross-section of stock returns. Reported financial statements 
are used to compute accounting variables. We use data from annual financial 
statements and, lagged by one quarter, and market prices. Since we are 
dealing with an international sample we use Datastream, a commonly used 
source for academics and practitioners. These variables are listed below. 
 
IBES_TPP is the mean I/B/E/S target price for each firm divided by current 
price at the end of the previous quarter. This variable represents the 
consensus of forecasts made by each analyst covering a given firm; prior 
studies have compared individual analysts to consensus target price, earnings 
or recommendation score. IBES_TPP therefore provides a benchmark for AVP 
and MVP. Morningstar provides AVP to archives such as I/B/E/S; most other 
contributors are sell-side analysts. The fourth study discusses limitations of 
data such as I/B/E/S. 
 
ROA is net income divided by total assets, both collected from Datastream at 
the end of the previous quarter. Since it can be calculated for most firms, it 
serves as a popular measure of quality (Piotroski, 2000). ROA is in the training 





BTM is the ratio of shareholders’ equity to market capitalization at the end of 
the previous quarter. This measure of firm value is typically used in equity 
valuation and asset pricing models. It is included in Morningstar’s training set 
alongside several other value multiples (e.g. earnings yield, sales yield, book 
yield, EV to market value). Since these are highly correlated, we opt for a 
simple structure by choosing only one valuation ratio, book to market, in our 
analysis in order to reduce multicollinearity. 
 
FIRMSIZE is the natural log of firm capitalization measured by market 
capitalization of equity in US dollars. 
 
Next, we include three variables based on market data only: 
 
BETA is estimated from 60 monthly returns versus a market index, specifically 
S&P1500 for US firms or FTSE All Countries World ex-US Index for non-US 
firms. Since stock betas are notoriously unstable we multiply the estimate by 
0.6 and add a constant 0.4 as a Bayesian adjustment. This approach is fairly 
standard in practice as it reduces the incidence of outliers, i.e., betas which 
are much higher or lower than one. The calculation is similar to the approach 





VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of the prior 52 weekly (Datastream) 
total return observations.  
 
VOLUME is the average number of shares traded in the past quarter obtained 
from Datastream. Volume is less typical in prior studies but is included in 
Morningstar’s training set. 
 
Finally we control for industry: 
 
INDUSTRY is a dummy variable identifying the Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS) level 2 membership for each firm. 
 
Our control variables replicate, as far as possible, the definitions provided by 
Morningstar. FIRMSIZEi,t is the log of US dollar market capitalization; 
VOLATILITYi,t is the standard deviation of the prior 52 weekly return 
observations.  
 
Next, to test our hypotheses, we use cross-sectional regressions to examine 
the relationship between valuations made by analysts or ML and next quarter 
returns where the latter is the dependent variable. A panel regression 
approach would estimate the relationship over all quarters. We choose the 




cross-sectional regression in each period. The second step is to provide a 
summary of these regressions and this is done by averaging the beta 
coefficients. Since there may be autocorrelation in standard errors, we use the 
Newey–West approach (Newey and West, 1987) with two lags. Equation 2 
sets out our specification. 
 
Equation 2: 
RETURNi,t = α + β1AVPi,t + β2MVPi,t + β3RETURNi,t-1 + β4 IBES_TPPi,t + 
β5ROAi,t + β6BTMi,t + β7VOLATILITY,t + β8LEVERAGEi,t +β9BETAi,t + εi,t 
 
We run cross-sectional regressions using the Fama–MacBeth procedure. This 
design allows us to test all three hypotheses. If the coefficients on AVP or MVP 
are each positive, and statistically significant, we could conclude that both 
valuations contain investment value.   
 
3.6.3 Data 
Table 3.3 presents descriptive evidence on the characteristics of the firms in 
our sample. AVP and MVP each have means close to one. This confirms that 
the analysts are not biased towards high valuations. In contrast, the sell-side 






AVP and MVP have close to zero correlation with BTM. This might be 
explained by Morningstar’s standardized DCF approach. Surveys of sell-side 
analysts’ practice report that DCF is less widely used than multiples (Brown et 
al., 2015). Closer correspondence can be observed between various risk 
measures. Volatility, beta and leverage all measure different aspects of risk 
but are positively related. As expected, ROA and FIRMSIZE are negatively 
related. None of the correlations are of concern when considering use in 
multivariate regression. 
 
We also substitute AVP with MVP as the dependent variable and repeat the 
analysis, alternating AVP and MVP as independent variables to determine the 
relative importance of each as an empirical determinant of the other. 
Descriptive statistics of these variables are set out in Table 4.3 and correlations 
in Table 3.4. 
 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 set out the sectors and countries covered by analyst and 
the ML process. Many IRPs specialize in specific sectors. Table 4 shows that 
Morningstar’s analysts cover firms in each sector without obvious 
concentration in any particular area. Morningstar has a long history of US 
equity research. The firm branched out into international coverage in 2012. 
Table 3.6 shows that over 53% of the sample is US. Outside the US, coverage 




analysts do also cover stocks in many European and Asian markets and some 
emerging markets such as Brazil. 
 
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable definition can be found in table 3.2 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
VOLATILITYt+1 19,839 0.03 0.13 -0.64 1.58 
BETA (XUS) 19,384 0.85 0.25 0.40 1.60 
BETA 19,839 0.99 0.33 0.01 2.37 
VOLUME (M) 19,741 0.45 1.69  0.08  84.81 
IBES_TPP 18,447 1.09 0.26 0.01 11.01 
MVP 18,501 1.01 0.14 0.37 1.88 
AVP 18,501 1.03 0.20 0.19 2.00 
ROA 18,211 0.06 0.07 -0.74 0.58 
BTM 18,501 0.53 0.42 -0.50 3.98 
FIRM_SIZE 17,591 16.57 1.64 10.49 26.25 
VOLATILITYt-4 18,501 0.26 0.11 0.00 1.22 
LEVERAGE 18,501 0.42 0.47 0.00 2.99 
 
 





















AVP   -0.303 
           
MVP 0.061 0.639 
          
IBES_TPP 0.021 0.146 0.173 
         
ROA 0.073 -0.211 -0.113 -0.115 
        
BTM -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.014 0.002 
       
EQUITY 0.002 0.030 0.013 -0.065 -0.002 0.039 
      
FIRM_SIZE 0.039 0.050 0.051 -0.006 0.084 0.071 0.267 
     
VOLATILITYt-1 0.026 0.172 0.149 0.133 -0.257 0.013 0.003 -0.210 
    
LEVERAGE -0.001 0.007 0.007 -0.011 -0.004 0.999 0.040 0.077 0.019 
   
BETA XUS -0.009 0.186 0.132 0.134 -0.176 0.004 -0.014 -0.040 0.471 0.012 
  
BETA US 0.010 0.163 0.116 0.140 -0.146 0.003 -0.025 -0.053 0.419 0.010 0.942 
 





Table 3.5: Industries 
 
Industry N % 
Automobiles and Components  457 2.31 
Banks  1,146 5.8 
Capital Goods  1,295 6.55 
Commercial and Professional Services  434 2.2 
Consumer Durables and Apparel  541 2.74 
Consumer Services  600 3.04 
Diversified Financials  1,047 5.3 
Energy  1,459 7.38 
Food and Staples Retailing  344 1.74 
Food, Beverage and Tobacco  778 3.94 
Health Care Equipment and Services  1,001 5.07 
Household and Personal Products  252 1.28 
Insurance  622 3.15 
Materials  1,827 9.25 
Media  440 2.23 
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology and Life Science 1,052 5.32 
Real Estate  901 4.56 
Retailing  935 4.73 
Semiconductors and Semiconductor Equipment  405 2.05 
Software and Services  1,120 5.67 
Technology Hardware and Equipment  440 2.23 
Telecommunication Services  564 2.85 
Transportation  806 4.08 
Utilities  1,294 6.55 




Table 3.6: Geographic markets 
 
Country N % 
US 10,603 53.45 
Australia 2,379 11.99 
Canada 1,144 5.77 
Hong Kong 1,102 5.55 
United Kingdom 839 4.23 
France 684 3.45 
Germany 487 2.45 
New Zealand 353 1.78 
Switzerland 331 1.67 
Japan 307 1.55 
Netherlands 254 1.28 
Singapore 219 1.10 
China 178 0.90 
Italy 157 0.79 
Spain 151 0.76 
Sweden 120 0.60 
Denmark 118 0.59 
Belgium 97 0.49 
India 86 0.43 
Norway 60 0.30 
Finland 58 0.29 
South Korea 33 0.17 
South Africa 31 0.16 
Portugal 20 0.10 
Taiwan 17 0.09 
Brazil 11 0.06 






Tables 3.5 and 3.6 report the distribution of observations by industry (GICS 








Table 3.7 presents relationships between AVP (odd columns) and MVP (even 
columns) with key variables and controls. The first two columns show both 
valuations to be positively related to IBES_TPP, FIRMSIZE, VOLUME and 
BTM. Both sources of valuation are also positively related to volatility but not 
to beta. It may be that more volatile stocks provide opportunities for analysts 
to identify ideas to their stock-picking clients. Each valuation also has a 
negative relationship with ROA, but this is only statistically significant at 5% or 






Table 3.7: Determinants of next quarter returns (Global) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 AVP MVP AVP MVP 
RETURNt-1 -0.0177 -0.167*** 0.168*** -0.159*** 
 (-1.23) (-10.88) (15.34) (-12.33) 
     
IBES_TPP 0.151*** 0.0527*** 0.0911*** -0.0108 
 (7.83) (3.83) (11.03) (-1.60) 
     
ROA -0.0850* -0.134** 0.0826** -0.100** 
 (-1.83) (-2.30) (2.17) (-2.37) 
     
FIRM_SIZE 0.0108*** 0.00960*** -0.000823 0.00517** 
 (3.39) (3.06) (-0.52) (2.63) 
     
VOLUME 1.49e-08*** 1.28e-08*** -2.17e-10 6.73e-09*** 
 (4.15) (4.48) (-0.08) (3.13) 
     
BTM -0.0191** -0.00170 -0.0160*** 0.00597*** 
 (-2.42) (-0.52) (-3.62) (4.83) 
     
BETA 0.00233 0.0200 -0.0166* 0.0188 
 (0.12) (1.12) (-1.76) (1.58) 
     
VOLATILITY 0.207*** 0.168** 0.0213 0.0852** 
 (3.22) (2.83) (1.12) (2.41) 
     
LEVERAGE 0.0781*** 0.0578*** 0.0101** 0.0253*** 
 (5.33) (5.10) (2.17) (4.03) 
     
MVP   1.162***  
   (27.90)  
     
AVP    0.414*** 
    (52.97) 
     
CONSTANT 0.655*** 0.903*** -0.385*** 0.632*** 
 (9.86) (15.42) (-10.02) (18.12) 
N 16,961 16,961 16,961 16,961 
avg. R2 0.1083 0.1886 0.4981 0.5464 
t-statistics in parentheses 








Columns (1) and (3) report results for various specifications of equation 1A where analyst valuation (AVP) is the independent variable: 
AVPi,t = α + β1RETURNi,t-1 + β1IBES_TPPi,t +β1AVPi,t + β2MVPi,t + β3ROAi,t + β4BTMi,t + β5FIRMSIZEi,t + β6VOLUMEi,t + 
β7LEVERAGEi,t + β8BETAi,t + β9VOLATILITYi,t + εi, 
Where AVP is analyst valuation, MVP is ML valuation, IBES_TPP is the consensus target price collected from I/B/E/S, ROA is 
profitability measured using return on assets, BTM is firm value represented by book-to-market, volume is is the average number of 
shares traded in the past quarter, leverage is total debt to total assets, BETA and VOLATILITY are calculated using historic returns. 
 
Columns (2) and (4) report results for various specifications of equation 1B: 
MVPi,t = α + β1RETURNi,t-1 + β1IBES_TPPi,t +β1AVPi,t + β2MVPi,t + β3ROAi,t + β4BTMi,t + β5FIRMSIZEi,t + β6VOLUMEi,t + 
β7LEVERAGEi,t + β8BETAi,t + β9VOLATILITYi,t + εi, 







Where the determinants of AVP and MVP differ most is lagged returns, often referred 
to as momentum. Analyst valuations appear to be unrelated to past returns. Since 
Morningstar analysts use a standardized DCF model, and adjust valuations relatively 
infrequently, valuations are not closely related to historic returns. In contrast, MVP is 
automatically re-estimated on a daily basis. The input data used to train the algorithm 
draws on three main sources: reported financial statements which update two or four 
times each year, market data (price and volume) which update daily, and 
characteristics which seldom change (industry). The ML valuation is therefore much 
more sensitive to price changes than the analyst equivalent.  
 
Columns 3 and 4 show the incremental effect of including MVP to explain AVP and 
vice versa. Each becomes the most significant determinant of the other and results in 
R-squared greater than 0.5, substantially higher than columns 1 and 2. 
 
The significance of consensus target price persists in column 3, where MVP is used 
to explain AVP. This is not the case in column 4. Consensus information feeds into 
analyst valuations but is not used to train the ML algorithm. It seems that the 
independent analysts in our sample are suitably differentiated from the I/B/E/S 
consensus. This difference can at least partly be explained by the unbiased distribution 




documented. Repeating the analysis on a subsample of US firms produces a similar 
pattern of determinants (not shown).  
 
3.7.2 Information content of analysts’ valuations 
We hypothesize that independent analysts (hypothesis 1) and ML (hypothesis 2) each 
have some ability to predict returns. The first hypothesis is bold but informed by prior 
research by Allee et al. (2017), who find Morningstar’s US analysts to have some 
predictive ability in an earlier period; the second has, to our knowledge, not been 
tested elsewhere. The outcome variable is next quarter return. We use the Fama–
MacBeth procedure to estimate return using various combinations of AVP, MVP and 





Table 3.8: Predictors of next quarter returns (Global) 
LHS:RETURNi,t+1  1 2 3 4 5 6 
AVP  0.0366*** 
  



























RETURNt-1   




    
(18.41) (21.98) 
ROA  




     
(0.36) 
BTM  




     
(0.04) 
VOLATILITY  




     
(1.25) 
BETA  




     
(0.58) 
FIRM_SIZE  








0.00484 0.275*** 0.0207*** 0.263*** -0.0164 -0.0747*** 
 
 (0.60) (13.16) (3.19) (16.08) (0.99) (3.72) 
N  19,839 19,839 18,447 19,839 18,439 16,961 
avg. R2  0.0133 0.0928 0.0063 0.2028 0.3197 0.3751 
t-statistics in parentheses 






Table 4.8 displays results for various specifications of equation 2 
 
RETURNi,t = α + β1AVPi,t + β2MVPi,t + β3RETURNi,t-1 + β4 IBES_TPPi,t + β5ROAi,t + 
β6BTMi,t + β7VOLATILITY,t + β8i,t +β9BETAi,t + εi,t 
ROA is profitability measured using return on assets, BTM is firm value represented 
by book-to-market, , leverage is total debt to total assets, BETA is the Bayesian 
adjusted beta = 0.4 + 0.6 * beta estimated from 5 prior years of monthly data vs 






Results for the full global sample are presented in Table 3.8. Columns 1 and 2 show 
AVP to be positively related to next quarter returns and MVP to be negatively related. 
The relationship with MVP is more significant and produces a higher R-squared of 
0.09; although low, this is substantially higher than the R-squared of 0.01 attributed to 
AVP alone. Of particular note is the contrarian nature of MVP. How can this odd result 
be explained? Analysts are mindful that their investment management clients seek 
forward-looking (ex-ante) analysis. They change their valuation of any firm only 
occasionally, revisiting their DCF valuation when there has been an important change 
to the inputs or assumptions. The most obvious occasions would be the 
announcement of financial statements, guidance or industry news. The analyst may 
also revise valuations after conducting a detailed study of the firm, sometimes known 
in the industry as a “deep dive”. If a stock price falls 5%, the analyst is unlikely to 
respond by lowering the valuation; such a move would be poorly received by clients 
who seek analysts who lead rather than lag..  
 
ML estimates AVPi,t+1 on a daily basis in order to obtain MVPi,t. Although valuation 
changes infrequently, prices adjust each day. MVPi,t changes frequently in response 
to price changes. The result is therefore consistent with its greater sensitivity to price 
changes due to automated re-estimation. It should be possible to deal with this by 
including a momentum variable or, more directly, by amending the ML to target 





Consensus target price, IBES_TPP, represents a widely available alternative to 
Morningstar’s analyst and ML valuations and serves as a benchmark for our study. It 
does not add incremental information (column 3), nor is it significant when used as a 
single determinant of returns (not tabulated). Some prior studies have found some 
evidence that analyst target prices could help predict returns in the US (Brav and 
Lehavy, 2003) and Italy (Bonini et al., 2010) and in some other markets (Bilinski et al., 
2012).  
 
Next, we use both AVP and MVP to estimate returns (column 4) and find valuations 
are positively associated while ML valuations are contrarian. Despite this opposing 
direction of association, the R-squared increases substantially to 0.20.  
 
Lagged return (column 5) is significant, confirming the importance of momentum in 
conjunction with AVP and MVP; R-squared jumps to 0.32. In columns 6 (AVP) and 7 
(MVP), we introduce ROA, VOLATILITY and BETA, none of which are highly 
significant. FIRMSIZE is, however, significant. The R-squared of these models fail to 
match the simple combination of AVP and MVP in column 4. The most extensive 
model (rightmost column) achieves higher R-squared than the simple combination of 
AVP, MVP and lagged returns. When complemented by a momentum measure, 
analyst and ML valuations constitute a parsimonious means for informed stock 
selection. We repeat the analysis on US firms and find a very similar pattern of 





The Fama–MacBeth procedure relies on cross-sectional regressions. We examined 
the underlying cross-sections to check that the overall results presented in this chapter 
are not driven by particularly strong relationships in certain quarters. This provides 
some comfort that average R-squareds are reliable. This review reduces the possibility 
that our results are influenced by a particularly strong relationship in some periods but 
not in others.  
 
3.8 LIMITATIONS 
While our study adds to the existing literature in several important ways, it has 
limitations. First, we use a single-firm study. This is necessary due to data limitations. 
Morningstar is, to our knowledge, the only firm to use ML to imitate analyst valuations 
and to have made these widely available. Second, since our analysis is quarterly, ML 
valuations are fresh and analyst valuation changes may be stale. Since analyst 
valuations appear to be more informative this does not appear to be a major problem. 
Third, we are unable to identify individual analysts (the firm does not provide a 
mapping of historic coverage). Analyst dummy variables are likely to be correlated to 
sector, which we include. Fourth, we have no descriptive information about analysts. 
The latter issue could partially be addressed using public online information such as 
Linkedin. Finally, Morningstar do not state how they address countries and regions. 
No mention of a country variable is given. 
 
Further research might train the ML based on different inputs, for example including 
price momentum, and considering alternative dependent variables such as valuation, 




be interesting to test whether analysts learn from ML. This could be done by 
researchers who have built their own ML models. 
 
A final limitation is that if analyst’s predictions may not be especially valuable to 
investors. Imam and Spence (2016) document an emerging line of research on the 
broader role of analysts. Summary outputs, in our case valuations, are now thought to 
be less important than other aspects of analysts’ work. In the following chapter we 
complement valuations with other outputs: risk assessments. Thus I take a step 
towards a more holistic examination of ML applications in investment research.  
 
3.9 CONCLUSIONS 
Firms are employing ML to produce investment research. This study contributes 
evidence from an early adopter of ML in investment research. Using the Fama–
MacBeth procedure, we compare the informativeness of valuations made by 
independent analysts and by an ML algorithm designed to mimic their outputs. Our 
sample is particularly useful because the analysts produce an unbiased distribution of 
forecasts. 
 
Analysts’ ability to predict next quarter returns is insufficient for investment purposes. 
In contrast, ML valuations are significant but contrarian. Automated daily re-estimation 
makes ML valuations substantially more sensitive to stock returns. When used 
together, analyst and ML valuations explain some 20% of variation in next quarter 




I/B/E/S consensus target price is unrelated to future returns. We confirm our findings 
on a US subsample representing 62% of our dataset.  
 
International studies of target prices draw upon archives, datasets which are 
dominated by brokerage analysts. This chapter provides evidence from independent 
analysts, an important, if less documented, category of agent.  
 
For investors, the key implication of our study is that a combination of analyst and ML 
might be superior to using either input alone. For analysts in our sample firm, the first 
lessons would be to consider the importance of momentum, and sentiment more 
generally, in reaching their valuation, and the second lesson would be to consider 
using ML to identify improvements. For ML developers, the selection of input variables, 





Appendix – Key papers on analyst target prices and non-brokerage 
analysts 
Panel A: Target price studies  
Paper Data 
source 






Target price revisions generate short term 
price reaction which is not explained by 
changes to recommendation and earnings 
forecasts, and longer term (up to six month) 










Target prices supply incremental information 
which is not fully encapsulated in earnings 
forecasts or recommendations. 








Analysts exhibit ability to forecast prices. 
Forecast error increases with growth 
predictions, size, negative earnings, 
research intensity (analysts covering more 










Four methods are used to test the accuracy 
of analysts’ target prices. Multiples (PE) 
outperform discounted cash flow (DCF) 
models where the target price is met during 
the 12-month forecast horizon but not in 
other tests, e.g., where target price is not met 







Target price accuracy is higher for analysts 
who use rigorous valuation methods such as 
residual income or discounted cash flow, and 












Significant variation in average target price 
accuracy across countries is explained by 
accounting disclosure quality, the legal 
system type, cultural characteristics and 
IFRS. Some analysts demonstrate persistent 







Some analysts demonstrate persistent ability 
to forecast target price; while these results 
are statistically significant the economic 
significance is marginal and a strong 
optimism bias persists. Main contribution is 














‘Target price optimism is positively 
associated with proxies for analysts’ conflicts 
of interest, but negatively associated with 
country-level institutional infrastructure as 
characterised by strong investor protection, 






Target price errors can be explained by three 
sources: firm risk characteristics, errors in 
forecasting fundamentals and biases related 










Controlling for earnings forecast and 
recommendation revisions, target price 
revisions are associated with recent market 
returns, excess stock returns, and other 
analysts’ target price revisions. Target price 
revisions are more sensitive to negative than 
to positive excess stock returns. 






Panel B: Independent research and the effects of the Global Settlement 
Paper Analyst 
type(s) 





Diff-diff. study comparing 
periods before/after Global 
Settlement. Brokers shift to 3-
point (B/H/S) rather than 5-
point. 12% fall in average 
#stocks covered. 
Recommendations became 
less informative based on 3-





After Global Settlement: Fewer 
buy recommendations. 
Brokers with less uneven 
distribution of forecasts tend to 
be more accurate. IRPs are 
analysed separately in Barber 





Portfolio tests show unaffiliated 
analysts’ buy 
recommendations outperform 
investment bank (affiliated) 
comparators; IB hold/sell 
recommendations outperform. 








IB analysts are more accurate 
than IRPs. IB cross subsidise -
> superior resources, pay and 
access to (some) IB 
knowledge. ‘Quality of 







After GS: Fewer Buy 
recommendations, 









SS/IRP Recommendations  IRPs funded by GS are less 
accurate than brokerage 
analysts and other IRPs and 










SS/IRP Earnings and 
target prices 
 A single firm study of 
Morningstar analysts provides 
evidence that IRPs earnings 
forecasts are more accurate, 
especially for stocks with high 
momentum and high 
valuations; the improvement 
may be due to valuation 
approach and more modest 
long-term growth estimates. 
 
 












BS analysts’ earnings 
forecasts were more 
optimistic and less accurate 
than sell side forecasts. This 
may be because the BS firm 
has different forecasting 
horizon or because it retails 









BS research influences the 
holdings of portfolio 
managers, especially for 
stocks with little sell side 
coverage. BS analyst’s skill 
levels persist through time 




BS Fund holdings Multiple 
BS 
2000- 
Empirical tests of a model 
which combines biased SS 
analyst research with 
unbiased BS analyst 
recommendations. Fund 
managers have differential 
use of BS vs SS research as 
evidenced by a market survey 





and fund holdings 
 BS analysts’ 
recommendations influence 
decisions of portfolio 




more than SS analysts’ 
recommendations. Trades 






BS Fund holdings Single 
BS 
A study of funds managed by 
BS analysts within one BS 
firm. BS analysts demonstrate 
ability to generate alpha for 
their own fund and also have 
some influence on the 
holdings and performance of 





BS Recommendations Multiple 
BS 
2010 
Buy side recommendations 
posted on Sumzero (a private 
social network) are 
informative as evidences by 
short term reaction and longer 
term drift. Contrarian 
recommendations tend to 
produce larger and more 













The potential for machine learning based investment 














‘No human can beat a computer at chess. And no computer is better at chess than a 
human supported by a computer.’ 
Lopez de Prado (2018, 15) 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Machine learning (hereafter ML) algorithms could become ubiquitous in investment 
analysis. Certain tasks performed by analysts, such as risk assessments, could be 
systematically generated and calibrated on a continuous basis. Successful application 
could substantially extend coverage, reduce costs, mitigate biases found in human 
decision-making and, possibly, improve the quality of predictions. Early signs of 
adoption, which could change the role of both analyst and investment manager, are 
already appearing. Leading buy-side and sell-side firms have recently unveiled 
prodigious capabilities in ML, but the potential for change surely hinges on whether 
ML can match or even surpass analysts in predictive tasks. We contrast the ability of 
analysts and ML in quantifying the distribution of possible valuation outcomes. 
 
The prospect of wider coverage with frequent, cheaper and less biased valuations 
makes ML appealing. Yet, while ML has advantages in speed, scale and objectivity, 
human fundamental analysts, powered by expertise and intuition, can process 
unstructured data to identify and evaluate news, e.g. managerial changes, contracts 
won or controversies exposed. A systematic approach to ML may struggle to capture 




effectiveness when contrasted with alternative approaches, most obviously existing 
human approaches.  
 
Our setting allows us to examine the potential for ML based investment research. We 
use risk measures derived from data provided by an early adopter of ML, an 
independent research organisation with over 100 analysts covering some 1,500 firms 
globally. In 2012 the firm launched ML based trading recommendations, valuations 
and risk assessments for more than 20,000 firms.  
 
We use subsequent return volatility to measure the effectiveness of risk assessments. 
Prior evidence suggests that financial analysts can assess risk with substantially more 
success than predicting returns (Joos et al. 2016). In an efficient market, only 
exceptional individuals will consistently beat the market. There is no equivalent 
competitive element to risk assessment. For most stocks, risk in the next period is 
strongly associated with risk in the last (Poon and Granger 2003, 2005). Thus, whether 
analysts or ML can provide forecasts that have predictive ability is not contentious: it 
would be surprising if they did not. Analysts should be able to make accurate risk 
assessments. We compare analyst and ML risk assessments. 
 
4.1.1 Analyst risk assessment 
Analysts in our sample firm allocate firms to a low, medium, high or very high risk 
category. Each category is mapped to the distribution around each analyst’s valuation 
estimate. Rather than allowing analysts to produce refined, granular risk assessments, 




each category. The his is done by calculating the range between the upper (“bull”) 
valuation and the lower (“bear”) valuation, divided by the valuation estimate. For the 
lowest risk category, the standardised range is 44%. Morningstar analysts will assign 
a variety of recommendations for these firms, but all firms within the category have the 
same standardised range, i.e., the same risk assessment when expressed as a 
percentage range, in this case meaning that the analysts expect the value to be within 
22% above or below the valuation. The standardised ranges for the medium, high and 
very high categories are 63%, 88% and 111%, respectively. The mean range for our 
sample is 76%, i.e. between medium and high risk. Approximately 5% of firms are 
designated low, 47% medium, 38% high and 10% very high risk. The use of categories 
is similar to the approach used in Liu et al. (2007). 
 
The analysts do not have the opportunity to make more refined risk assessments, e.g., 
by setting other ranges or by allowing a wider range either above or below their 
valuation. Their only alternative would be to choose a different category. This risk 
assessment is coupled with the analysts’ valuation to price computation to determine 
the investment recommendations: the riskier the stock, the more extreme the valuation 
to price required to justify a buy or sell recommendation. Risk assessments are 
therefore directly plugged into the firm’s valuation process. 
 
4.1.2 ML risk assessment 
The firm’s ML approach is based on the random forest method (Breiman 2001). The 
intention is that ML will replicate each analysts’ output. ML produces 500 valuation 




available data. The output is then summarised as a mean, the ML valuation and MRisk, 
which is the interquartile range of 500 valuation estimates. The research provider 
specifically describes this as comparable to the analyst risk assessment.  
 
 
Our search for prior studies of ML in investment research therefore reveals that while 
practitioners invest substantial sums to forge ahead with ML applications, there is an 
important gap in the literature. Fortunately, our dataset provides a near-ideal setting. 
Our sample, MRisk, has a mean of 14% and lower and upper quartiles of 9% and 17% 
respectively. ARisk is therefore more than five times higher in mean score (0.76) than 
quantitative score (0.14).  
 
4.1.3 Future volatility 
Our outcome variable is return volatility for each security, measured as the annualized 
standard deviation of weekly returns for the forthcoming quarter. Volatility calculations 
using weekly data are helpful for our global sample as they are less susceptible to thin 
trading or price-timing issues. For example, news may arrive after Asian markets have 
closed but during US trading. Liu et al. (2007) also select volatility as their outcome 
variable, in their case using the log of daily volatility for their US sample. They also 
present a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate that their results are not affected by the 
precise calculation of volatility, including various calculation windows. We choose 
volatility in the subsequent quarter as it allows us to analyse non-overlapping data and 





Some papers choose valuation error rather than volatility as the outcome variable. 
Joos et al. (2016) examine the valuation error (the difference between analysts’ 
valuation estimate and the share price one year later). Alternative measures could 
include the range of prices in a subsequent period and non-symmetrical measures 
such as semi-deviation. The latter is designed to separate downside (possible loss) 
from upside (possible gain, i.e., opportunity). 
 
Although designed to be comparable, the two risk assessments (ARisk and MRisk) 
and the outcome (volatility) are measured differently. The mean ARisk and MRisk for 
our main sample is 0.142 and 0.767 respectively, whereas the outcome variable has 
a mean of 0.239. This difference complicates the interpretation of coefficients. We 
mitigate this problem by using Fama-MacBeth regressions to derive a forecast of 
volatility from the data at each quarter and then assessing the explanatory power of 
the derived forecast in the following quarter. Our three derived forecasts, one based 
on the ARisk measure, one on the MRisk and a third estimated using the financial 
characteristics of the firms, all have the same mean, 0.239, close to that of the 
outcome volatility. Each is explained in turn in the following subsections. 
 
4.1.4 Derived forecasts 
We estimate the relationship between the risk indicators at the end of each calendar 
quarter, labelled t, and volatility in the subsequent quarter, denoted t+1. The estimated 
relationship from this cross-sectional regression allows us to predict volatility at t+1 
based on the risk indicators at t. In other words, we are estimating volatility in each 




the effectiveness of the forecasts by estimating the explanatory power of the forecast 
in each quarter and the average across the 27 quarters in our seven-year sample 
period. (One quarter is necessarily dropped as the risk measures at the end of 2018 
would need to be assessed against volatility in the first quarter of 2019.) We have 
named the analyst-derived forecast (ADFor) and the machine-derived forecast 
(MDFor). This approach gives us a means to deal with risk assessments on different 
scales and is an innovation not included in previous studies, which typically estimate 
the relationship across a panel of firms and time.  
 
The third forecast we use follows a parallel approach, except that we based the 
forecast on the financial characteristics of the firms: the volatility in the previous 
quarter, the market capitalization of the firm, the firm’s beta and the dispersion of 
analyst valuations available on I/B/E/S. (We also use these variables as control 
variables because they represent important risk characteristics and are similar to those 
used in Joos et al. (2016)). This forecast is a simple model of the forecast an investor 
could access should they not have access to the analyst or machine risk measures. 
We name this the financial-derived forecast (FDFor).  
 
To provide a brief preview of the results, both analyst and ML risk assessments contain 
information on risk which is incremental to that contained in the typical risk model 
factors. Each can be improved by using information contained in the other. These 
results hold broadly across time and countries. However, the different constituents of 
the sample present different challenges. To examine this, we split the sample into US 




the information available to investors may be more complete, and code law countries, 
where the information environment may be less complete. We also divide the sample 
into cases where I/B/E/S collates valuations and forecasts, and those without I/B/E/S 
coverage. The presence of an I/B/E/S following indicates that at least one analyst is 
monitoring the firm and disseminating information to investors. 
 
Analyst- and machine-derived forecasts are both less effective indicators of volatility 
in code law countries than where common law is applied. The decline in analysts’ 
predictive ability across this divide is such that the ML predictions marginally 
outperform those from analysts for the code law sample. This indicates a potential 
advantage beyond the ability of machine-based techniques to produce more frequent, 
cost-effective and comprehensive coverage than is feasible with analysts: for our 
sample, the ML approach handles unfamiliarity and limited informational environments 
better than analysts. However, if this were a general result, we would expect analysts 
to cope less well with firms not covered by other analysts (i.e. with no I/B/E/S 
following). Our results show no appreciable difference between firms with and without 
I/B/E/S coverage. 
 
As we study analysts from an independent research provider, the adverse incentives 
faced by sell-side analysts are removed. This bias is most obviously demonstrated by 
the valuation to price assessment. For example, Joos and Piotroski (2017) report a 
mean valuation to price of 1.159 for their (2007-2012) Morgan Stanley sample, with 
only 22% of cases below one. The mean valuation to price for our sample is 1.055, 




still demonstrate mild bias. We find that analyst risk assessments are relatively narrow 
for companies for which they issue buy recommendations. Since the analysts in our 
sample do not face brokerage incentives, we infer that this bias is behavioural. The 
result is consistent with self-attribution of knowledge and overconfidence: experts have 
often been found to underestimate the range around their forecasts (Barberis and 
Thaler, 2003). We find that analysts do not impart bias on the ML risk assessments. 
 
The main contribution of this paper is to provide early evidence of the prospects for 
ML by evaluating the effectiveness of ML in performing tasks usually done by experts. 
The experts in our study are analysts at an independent research firm; biases in their 
outputs cannot be the result of sell-side incentives and therefore can be attributed to 
human behaviour. Rather than relying on stylized models, or attempting to present the 
best possible predictor, our data comes from a well-established, commercially 
available source. Such data is typically inaccessible (Brooks et al. 2019) Additionally, 
our work is related to recent research on the second moment of analysts’ predictions 
and the expanding independent category of investment analysts (see for example 
Joos et al. 2016). Finally, we present global results and therefore build on the minority 
of studies featuring global or international findings and analysts’ work. 
 
The study has a number of limitations. As with most studies of risk assessment, we 
use a single-firm setting. We present evidence that analyst and ML outputs are 
credible and widely available, and we make the case that the study of an early adopter 
is useful given the increasing interest in ML investment applications. Our sample firm 




These variables may become more or less important over time. Other supervised ML 
algorithms might use wider sets of input data. Other supervised learning approaches, 
such as deep learning and neural networks, might also be used and may be more or 
less effective (Gu et al. 2018). Unsupervised learning approaches are also popular 
and available to discretionary investment managers, i.e. where the ultimate investment 
decision is subjective rather than systematic (Lopez de Prado 2018). Examples 
include algorithms which establish sentiment scores from unstructured text. We expect 
a surge in the study of ML in investment management and research. 
 
4.2 PRIOR RESEARCH  
Stock valuations, or target prices, provide a more informative summary than 
recommendations or earnings forecasts (Bonini et al. 2010; Bilinski et al. 2012; 
Bradshaw et al. 2012). A recent, systematic review of the research concerning 
analysts in accounting, finance and management journals (Spence et al. 2019) reveals 
that two thirds of papers study earnings or recommendations, compared to only 10% 
examining other forecasts, of which target prices are only one type. 
 
More recently, analysts at some firms have included summary information about the 
distribution around their target price. These risk assessments, sometimes known as 
bull/bear analysis (BBA), usually take the form of alternative target prices for positive 
and negative scenarios. Several recent papers relate risk assessments to outcome 
variables which represent fundamental risk, such as future share price volatility (Liu et 
al. 2007) and absolute pricing error (Joos et al. 2016). Further, Liu et al. (2012) report 




returns, and Joos and Piotroski (2017) show how the relationship between the 
distribution of scenario (BBA) valuations and the analysts’ target price can be used to 
discriminate between more and less accurate investment predictions. Hashim and 
Strong (2015) also find that target prices accompanied by risk assessments 
outperform those without. Hashim and Strong (2015) use a wide-ranging sample of 
reports on US firms, while Liu et al. (2012) and Joos and Piotroski (2017) use single 
firm settings; all use risk assessments provided by sell-side analysts, with their well-
established propensity for biases 2, and all concentrate on US firms. To our 
knowledge, technological innovation, automation or machine learning have not 
previously been investigated in this strand of the literature.  
 
The Global Settlement and associated legislation placed restrictions on investment 
bank analysts and prompted a flurry of studies comparing investment bank and non-
investment bank analysts. Prior studies tend to group independent analysts with 
‘unaffiliated’ peers, who work at non-investment bank brokerage firms, and refer to this 
category as ‘independent’. Haig and Rees (2016) provide a discussion of the 
regulatory changes between the Global Settlement and current European regulation 
(MiFID II); they document that investment managers are becoming increasingly 
interested in independent investment research. MiFID II addresses the conflicts faced 
by brokers regardless of their affiliation to investment banks by ‘unbundling’ execution 
and research commissions, which means that the method used to pay brokers is now 
the same as that used to pay independent research firms. Studies of the 
characteristics of independent analysts are therefore likely to be valuable. Our 




4.3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Analysts, like many experts, are expensive to employ and are subject to human error. 
They make mistakes, such as those identified by Barberis and Thaler (2003). The 
possibility of using systematic processes to augment or replace expert decision-
making is therefore of interest. Simple static models have been shown to be more 
accurate than experts in domains such as psychological diagnosis (Meehl 1956), 
political forecasting (Tetlock 2005) and systematic, quantitative investment (Fabozzi 
et al. 2010). Systematic investment models have tended to be static and to require 
analysts’ skills and experience to determine when and how they should be re-
estimated in order to deal with living, evolving financial markets. Models which not only 
update data but also re-estimate the relationship between variables at short time 
intervals, e.g. daily or intraday, could replicate or even surpass experts. Developments 
in ML have led to the introduction of dynamic models which learn and update without 
human intervention. 
 
Risk assessment differs from volatility prediction. The former is a means for analysts 
to convey their expectations regarding the distribution around the target price; it is an 
indication of risk rather than a precise estimate of ex ante return variance (Joos et al. 
2016). The latter, volatility prediction, has various purposes, including options trading 
and risk management. The substantial literature on volatility prediction, reviewed by 
Poon and Granger (2003, 2005), ‘reflects the importance of volatility in investment, 
security valuation, risk management, and monetary policy making’ (Poon and Granger 




looking consensus estimate derived from option prices. Recent papers, such as those 
by Baltussen et al. (2012) and Szado et al. (2018), review the potential for implied 
volatility to be incorporated in stock selection strategies. All these studies use US-
implied volatility as a predictor; many use data from OptionMetrics, who provide US 
data on several thousand US companies. Even so, studies such as Szado (2018) 
restrict their analysis to S&P500 companies due to liquidity constraints. Outside the 
US, exchanges make single stock options available foe a narrow selection of the 
largest listed companies. In the UK, exchange traded options exist for around 120 
companies; in France and Switzerland, options are available only for  constituents of 
the large cap indices and a few additional large companies. Additionally, implied 
volatility is not reliable for illiquid options in these large companies. Our own 
discussions with option-savvy practitioners confirm that it is impractical to use implied 
volatility as an input to broad market equity strategies in non-US markets. Option 
implied volatility is only available for liquid single stock options, which makes it much 
less applicable for many companies in our sample. Since historic volatility is generally 
available, we include it as an explanatory variable in order to understand whether 
analysts or ML can provide incremental information in their risk assessments. 
 
4.3.1 Research Question 1: Can ML mimic analyst risk assessments? 
 
The ML algorithm learns from and attempts to mimic analysts’ target prices. If 
successful, we expect analyst and ML risk assessments to be related: 






This hypothesis is a basic preliminary for our analysis. We test this hypothesis by 
comparing the determinants of analysts’ risk assessments. 
 
4.3.2 Research Question 2: Are analyst or ML risk assessments more 
informative? 
Investors will surely be interested not only in the extent to which ML can mimic analyst 
risk assessments but also in the information they provide.  
 
Prior studies of investors’ geographic proximity to investee companies have often 
found a home bias. This is usually explained either by the familiarity hypothesis or the 
information asymmetry hypothesis. Familiarity may be due to cultural, linguistic or 
emotional factors (Grinblatt and Keloharju 2000) or behavioural biases, such as 
overconfidence and self-attribution of knowledge (Barberis and Thaler 2003). Analysts 
might therefore be likely to place too narrow a range around their target prices for 
companies with which they are familiar, such as those in their home market. 
 
Information asymmetry explanations for proximity effects are based on the idea that 
analysts who can make ‘house calls rather than conference calls’ (Malloy 2005, 1) are 
in a better position to find and interpret news which could affect local companies. 
Investment managers have been shown to generate higher returns on local rather than 
distant firms. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) attribute this to the value of local contextual 
information, such as face-to-face meetings with management. Similarly, analysts meet 
CEOs face-to-face and survey a firm’s operations directly, and use this private 





Since our data provider has a longer history of covering US companies than 
international firms, and the majority of analysts are based in the US or other common 
law countries, we can expect analysts to be more accurate in calibrating valuations for 
equities listed in the US and other common law countries, because of proximity to 
analysts. Few analysts in our sample are based in code law countries: 
H2a: Analyst risk assessments will be most informative for US stocks. 
H2b: Analyst risk assessments will be most informative for common law 
stocks. 
 
4.3.3 Research Question 3: Do independent analysts produce unbiased 
forecasts of risk? 
 
Analysts have been found to exhibit optimism bias due to behaviour and incentives. 
Sell-side research firms typically have more buys than sells. By contrast, Morningstar 
analyst recommendations follow a near symmetrical, bell-shaped distribution. We can 
therefore determine whether independent analysts suffer from the behavioural biases 
found in other samples (Groysberg et al. 2008). Our sample is unlike that of prior 
studies which merge independent analysts with their peers at non-investment 
brokerages, and it provides an unusual opportunity to study truly independent 
analysts. 
  
If independent analysts place a narrower range around buy-rated stocks than sell-




overconfidence in having picked a winner. If analysts forecast a narrower spread for 
US stocks than international stocks, after adjusting for risk, this would be evidence of 
familiarity bias. If analysts do not suffer from self-attribution bias, we expect analyst 
and ML spread to be similar for buy/neutral/sell-rated stocks. 
H3a: Analyst risk assessments underestimate risk for buy-rated stocks 
(self-attribution bias). 
H3b: ML risk assessments do not vary between (implied) 
recommendation category. 
 
4.3.4 Research Question 4: How can investors best use analyst and ML risk 
assessments? 
 
This paper could be framed as a contest between human and artificial intelligence. It 
is, however, possible that the best risk predictions can be made by a combination of 
mind and machine. In the absence of perfect correspondence between the two 
sources, it may still be possible for investors to combine the two valuations to their 
advantage. Taking stock of recent evidence on the use of ML to complement analysts’ 
earnings forecasts (Ball and Ghysels 2017), we have at least some basis to expect 
that a hybrid approach may be optimal. Our final hypothesis is: 
H4: A combination of ML and analyst makes superior predictions (than 
either source in isolation). 
 






4.3.4 SETTING, DATA AND METHOD 
Our data comes from a relatively large independent provider of equity research. With 
around 100 analysts covering securities issued by 1,500 companies, its scale is 
comparable to a large brokerage firm (although smaller than the very largest global 
investment banks) but without the incentives faced by sell-side analysts (Barber et al. 
2007). Analyst data is available from 2002; over time, the coverage expanded from 
the original US sample to include all sectors. Each analyst covers, on average, 15 
firms and typically holds similar credentials to sell-side analysts (Kang et al. 2018). 
Morningstar’s equity research reports and outputs resemble those of a brokerage firm, 
and they provide two risk assessments. The first is an analyst risk classification into 
low, medium, high or very high, where each category is also allocated a score 
reflecting the interquartile range of expected investment outcomes. The second, ML-
derived, is the interquartile range of valuations derived from 500 iterations of their 
random forest model. 
 
We also analyse a sample of firms for which Morningstar provides ML data without 
accompanying analyst output. This is a much bigger sample which reflects the wider 
coverage using the ML approach. The firms in this extension sample are often drawn 
from less developed or developing economies where the information environment 
might be expected to be shallower than in countries with long-established stock 
markets. When we match ML and analyst data in our comparison sample, we include 
969 target firms. When we analyse firms with ML data but no matched analyst data, 





Although the ML approach used is proprietary, the firm does provide documentation, 
and their research team assisted us in answering further questions. The input factors 
resemble those used in established stock selection tools. The firm makes their outputs 
widely available; we estimate that some 3,000 buy-side firms have access. It is 
reasonable to assume that other firms have developed comparable and possibly 
superior models, but these are much less widely available. Our setting therefore 
provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of a working ML process 
rather than a prototype model. 
 
4.4.1 Research method 
Liu et al. (2007) and Joos et al. (2016) first model the determinants of the analyst and 
ML risk assessments and future volatility. Although this analysis is descriptive, if future 
volatility is associated with a particular variable, and that variable is not associated 
with the risk measure, it would suggest that the risk measure neglects relevant 
information. To ensure consistency with previous studies, we have reported 
determinants by including controls for past volatility, the log of market capitalization 
and beta. We also control for the dispersion of I/B/E/S target prices, since this 
measures the variety of valuations made by analysts.  
 
We also considered including option-implied volatility as a viable forecast of volatility. 
Using implied volatility would be feasible for most US stocks, and a subset of the larger 
non-US firms, and we might expect analysts to refer to option prices in forming their 
expectations. However, deriving viable implied volatilities is not straightforward when 




out that implied volatility forecasts work well if calibrated by historical volatility, and 
that historical volatility is also an effective model when used alone. Our controls 
include historical volatility, and we experimented with the volatility index (US VIX and 
CBOE’s ex-US equivalent) to incorporate changing market-wide expectations, but this, 
while statistically significant, had little impact on our research question. We have also 
included the dispersion (coefficient of variation) of target prices available on I/B/E/S to 
represent uncertainty. Our goal is not to develop the best possible risk prediction 
model but to contrast the effectiveness of analysts and ML risk metrics. The control 
variables are used to ensure that the risk metrics provide information beyond what is 
readily available to investors. 
 
4.4.2 Information content of analyst and ML risk assessments 
To identify the relative information content of the two risk assessments, we estimate 
the results using the analyst- (ADFor), ML- (MDFor) and financials- (FDFor) derived 
forecasts separately and then together, with and without the control variables. 
Equation 1, estimated using Fama-MacBeth estimation, is: 
 
VOLATILITYi,t+1 = α  + β1XFori,t + β2VOLATILITYi,t-4  + β3VOLATILITYi,t-1 + 
β4FIRMSIZEi,t  + β5BETAi,t + β6IBES_CVi,t  + εi,t 
 
Where XFori,t is ADFori,t or MDFori,t or FDFori,t, respectively forecasts of forthcoming 
volatility derived from analysts, ML or financial-based risk assessments at time t, and 
the relationship between those variables at t-1 and volatility at t, VOLATILITYi,t+1 is 




quarter’s and last year’s volatility, FIRMSIZEi,t is the log of market capitalization in US 
dollars, BETAi,t is the Bayesian-adjusted beta estimated in the prior 36 months using 
either the US market index for US firms or the FTSE world (ex-US) index for non-US 
firms, and IBES_CVi,t is the coefficient of variation of the I/B/E/S reported target prices. 
Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 3.1.  
 
This model is similar to approaches used in previous studies, save that we omit 
accounting-based variables such as book-to-price and return on assets. In initial 
analysis we find that these variables can be statistically significant but do not affect 
our conclusions. We have also included the coefficient of variation of I/B/E/S target 
prices as an alternative measure of the second moment of valuation, which is also 
based on a distribution of valuation estimates, in this case from the cross section of 
analysts covering each given firm. We find this variable to be an effective indicator of 
future volatility. Finally, we have chosen to use Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional 
estimation (Fama and MacBeth 1973). Previous research has typically used panel 
data estimation, and we find the results are similar whether we use panel or Fama-
MacBeth estimation. In practice, a user of analyst output will have to predict the next 
period’s volatility using currently available indicators and experience of the relationship 
between those indicators and volatility in prior periods. By including forecasts derived 
from the previous quarter’s relationship between the indicators and volatility, and 
evaluating the performance of those derived forecasts quarter by quarter, we closely 
simulate the decision-making circumstances of a user of investment analysis – 





A feature of our sample is that analyst and ML valuations are updated at different 
intervals. Analysts tend to revise their targets intermittently, typically 3-4 times per 
year. ML is re-estimated daily. Quarterly cross sections provide a balance between 
these two frequencies. Since next-quarter returns are the key dependent variable in 
our analysis, this also means that there are no overlaps in our dependent variable. 
 
Fama-MacBeth regressions have other advantages. Petersen (2009) shows that the 
approach is appropriate where residuals are correlated across firms within any period, 
known as a time effect. In the same paper, Petersen reports that this attribute has 
often been used to claim that Fama-MacBeth standard errors are unbiased. 
Unfortunately, this need not be the case, as there may be a ‘firm effect’ where residuals 
for any one firm are correlated through time. The two effects can be identified in a 
dataset using a combination of clustering approaches. We can compare the 
significance of each coefficient produced using clustering by firm and time (two-way 
clustering) with the Fama-MacBeth regressions, where the latter incorporates a robust 
approach to deal with autocorrelation (Newey and West, 1987). What we are looking 
for is a small difference between these two robust approaches. A further practical test 
can be obtained from our Fama MacBeth analysis. Rather than simply relying on the 
average coefficient, we can perform a count of the direction and significance of each 
coefficient in each regression. If a coefficient tends to be, for example, positive and 







In our dataset, we have two different indicators of risk from the same supplier. The first 
is a traditional risk classification into low, medium, high and very high (plus extreme, 
but we have not identified any such case in our sample). This is notionally built on BBA 
with a 25% chance of exceeding each boundary, and the spread between the two can 
be interpreted as the interquartile range. This range is used to classify each firm into 
one of five categories, with 5% classified as low risk, 48% medium, 38% high and 9% 
very high. The range between bear, designated ‘consider buy’, and bull, ‘consider sell’, 
divided by the average of the two, is 44%, 63%, 88% and 111%, respectively. We use 
these to create ARisk in the results presented. Morningstar has chosen the blunt 
simplicity of ordinal categories rather than allowing analysts to assign precise ranges. 
 
The second Morningstar variable is a measure of dispersion within the valuation 
model, calculated as the interquartile range from 500 trees in the random forest. It 
therefore reflects uncertainty but is not explicitly a prediction of expected risk. In 
essence, a model is estimated which relates the predicted variable to a subset of 
available explanatory variables. The full set of explanatory variables is not used, as 
this is likely to result in over-fitting. Each iteration uses a random subsample of the 
available data and the results consolidated to a point estimate.  
 
The categories identified by each analyst are intended to indicate the expected 
interquartile range of share price changes, which is closely related to the expected 
share price volatility. Conversely, the ML estimates are based on 500 cross-sectional 




volatility. Volatility is itself just one way to measure risk, and we also include measures 
of upside and downside risk. 
 
To address potential issues regarding the comparability of ARisk and MRisk, we 
regress each on share price volatility estimated over the following quarter and predict 
the value of ARisk and MRisk, then ADFor and MDFor respectively. This common 
estimation process allows us to make comparisons based on forecasts expressed on 
the same scale. Interestingly, the correlation between ADFor and MDFor is 0.59, 






Table 4.1: Variable definitions 
Name Definition Source 
VOLATILITYi,t-4 
 
The standard deviation of 52 trailing weekly 
returns, including dividends, in local currency 
and annualized by multiplying by the square 
root of 52. Estimates below 0.1 or above 0.75 




The standard deviation of 13 trailing/leading 
weekly returns, including dividends, in local 
currency and annualized by multiplying by the 
square root of 52. Estimates below 0.1 or above 
0.75 are set to missing. 
Datastream 
ARisk Analyst risk assessment is the difference 
between analysts’ ‘consider sell’ price, i.e., the 
price at which a sell recommendation would be 
triggered, and ‘consider buy’ price, which is the 
price at which a buy recommendation would be 
triggered (scaled by analysts’ valuation 
estimate). 
Morningstar  
MRisk Machine learning risk assessment is the 
interquartile range of 500 quantitative 
valuations generated by Morningstar quant’s 
machine learning algorithm scaled by the 
machine learning valuation estimate. Estimates 
above 0.75 are set to missing. 
Morningstar  
ADFor Forecast volatility in the subsequent quarter 
based on latest analyst risk assessment 
(ARisk). 
 
MDFor Forecast volatility in the subsequent quarter 
based on latest machine learning risk 
assessment (MRisk). 
 
FDFor Forecast volatility in the subsequent quarter 





Analysts’ recommendation is a set of indicator 
variables where A_Buy = 1 for a buy or strong 
buy recommendation, A_Hold = 1 for a neutral 
recommendation, A_Sell if an analyst assigned 







ML Buy,  
ML Hold,  
ML Sell 
ML recommendation is a set of indicator 
variables where ML Buy = 1 for a buy or strong 
buy recommendation, ML Hold = 1 for a neutral 
recommendation,  ML Sell = 1 for ML sell or 




BETA Bayesian-adjusted beta estimate based on 5 
prior years of monthly data, where Bayesian 
beta = 0.4 + .6 (estimated coefficient). 
Estimates below zero or above 2.25 set to 
missing.  
Datastream 
FIRMSIZE Firm size measured by US$ market 
capitalization of equity. 
Datastream 
IBES_CV Target price coefficient of variation measured 
by the standard deviation of target price 
estimates divided by the mean target price. 
Estimates greater than 0.4 are set to missing. 
I/B/E/S 
INDUSTRY Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) 
level 2 industry classification 
Datastream  








Table 4.2: Sample by legal system 
 Comparison sample 




n Code US All 
Commo
n Code US All 
2012q2 111 89 412 612 561 4,527 34 5,122 
2012q3 121 97 412 630 765 5,373 32 6,170 
2012q4 138 86 419 643 988 5,571 31 6,590 
2013q1 163 102 400 665 994 5,704 35 6,733 
2013q2 224 110 393 727 664 5,819 34 6,517 
2013q3 218 113 415 746 754 6,093 35 6,882 
2013q4 225 109 415 749 1,032 6,205 37 7,274 
2014q1 219 115 421 755 814 6,276 37 7,127 
2014q2 240 116 427 783 1,211 6,840 38 8,089 
2014q3 244 119 428 791 1,173 6,493 43 7,709 
2014q4 253 122 430 805 1,212 5,861 44 7,117 
2015q1 253 121 433 807 1,238 6,395 47 7,680 
2015q2 261 123 440 824 1,264 5,428 47 6,739 
2015q3 250 122 432 804 1,223 5,204 46 6,473 
2015q4 258 131 437 826 1,317 5,843 42 7,202 
2016q1 252 149 426 827 1,368 6,603 47 8,018 
2016q2 259 156 452 867 1,385 7,569 55 9,009 
2016q3 262 165 466 893 1,396 7,854 59 9,309 
2016q4 275 182 473 930 1,428 7,889 60 9,377 
2017q1 282 181 482 945 1,452 7,907 52 9,411 
2017q2 281 179 469 929 1,436 7,294 53 8,783 
2017q3 271 180 476 927 1,418 6,867 49 8,334 
2017q4 264 177 473 914 1,396 6,267 51 7,714 
2018q1 268 185 427 880 1,403 7,475 50 8,928 
2018q2 280 186 486 952 1,536 8,253 60 9,849 




















Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Sample for which both analyst and machine learning based risk 
assessments are available 
 
N Mean SD Min Max 
VOLATILITYi,t+1 21,174 0.240 0.099 0.071 0.749 
VOLATILITYi,t-1 21,174 0.238 0.099 0.067 1.179 
VOLATILITYi,t-4 21,174 0.239 0.099 0.071 0.749 
ARisk 21,174 0.767 0.181 0.439 1.765 
MRisk 21,174 0.142 0.078 0.038 0.747 
BETA 21,174 0.986 0.363 0.002 2.248 
FIRMSIZE 21,174 16.366 1.333 12.397 20.810 
IBES_CV 21,174 0.109 0.051 0.000 0.400 
ADFor 21,174 0.239 0.057 0.121 0.497 
MDFor 21,174 0.239 0.055 0.148 0.761 
FDFor 21,174 0.239 0.086 0.046 0.748 
      
Panel B: Sample for which only machine learning based risk assessments and 
I/B/E/S target prices are not available 
 
N Mean SD Min Max 
VOLATILITYi,t+1 112,793 0.316 0.133 0.070 0.750 
MRisk 112,793 0.285 0.114 0.050 0.750 
MDFor 112,793 0.316 0.055 0.144 0.623 
FDFor 112,793 0.316 0.096 0.086 0.831 
VOLATILITYi,t-1 112,793 0.341 0.137 0.070 1.000 
VOLATILITYi,t-4 112,793 0.318 0.136 0.070 0.750 
FIRMSIZE 112,793 13.020 1.172 6.596 19.225 





Panel C: Sample for which only machine learning based risk assessments and 
I/B/E/S target prices are available 
 N Mean SD Min Max 
VOLATILITYi,t+1 89,560 0.299 0.113 0.070 0.749 
MRisk 89,560 0.244 0.110 0.050 0.750 
MDFor 89,560 0.298 0.054 0.144 0.623 
FDFor 89,560 0.297 0.084 0.073 0.785 
VOLATILITYi,t+1 89,560 0.313 0.109 0.071 0.995 
VOLATILITYi,t+1 89,560 0.298 0.114 0.070 0.750 
FIRMSIZE 89,560 14.297 1.229 9.182 19.499 
BETA 89,560 0.963 0.419 0.000 2.250 
IBES_CV 89,560 0.141 0.102 0.000 3.016 
Next Qtr Vol, Last Year Vol and Last Qtr Vol are the standard deviation of weekly 
returns, annualized, for the preceding and following year or quarter respectively. AU 
and QU are the analyst and machine learning risk assessments; Beta is the 
estimated sensitivity of share prices to market movements based on the preceding 
three years with Bayesian adjustment; Log(MktCap) is the log of market capital 
measured in US$; TP CV is the coefficient of variation of target prices recorded by 
I/B/E/S; and ADFor, MDFor and FDFor are the forecasts of volatility based on 
analysts, machine learning and financial data respectively. 





Table 4.4: Correlation matrix 











CV ADFor MDFor 
VOLATILITYi,t-4 0.674 
         
VOLATILITYi,t-1 0.680 0.983 
        
ARisk 0.461 0.472 0.475 
       
MRisk 0.448 0.444 0.444 0.383 
      
BETA 0.252 0.268 0.274 0.285 0.214 
     
IBES_CV 0.489 0.538 0.539 0.440 0.402 0.243 -0.137 
   
ADFor 0.474 0.588 0.591 0.801 0.341 0.208 -0.191 0.385 
  
MDFor 0.454 0.545 0.544 0.297 0.804 0.137 -0.126 0.340 0.592 
 
FDFor 0.637 0.912 0.918 0.442 0.406 0.290 -0.329 0.588 0.669 0.617 
 






Panel B: Sample for which machine learning, but not analyst, based risk assessments are available and for which I/B/E/S 
target prices are not available (N = 112,793 including 243 US cases not included in regressions) 
 
VOLAT 









       
 
MDFor 0.346 0.862       
 
FDFor 0.618 0.421 0.548      
 
VOLATILITYi,t-4 0.543 0.414 0.409 0.822     
 
VOLATILITYi,t-1 0.605 0.381 0.434 0.920 0.750    
 
FIRMSIZE -0.031 -0.286 -0.268 -0.058 0.005 -0.009   
 





         
Panel C: Sample for which machine learning, but not analyst, based risk assessments are available and for which I/B/E/S 
target prices are available (N = 89,560 including 941 US cases not included in regressions) 
 
VOLAT 




ILITYi,t-1 FIRMSIZE BETA 
 
MRisk 0.436 
       
 
MDFor 0.445 0.852       
 
FDFor 0.634 0.464 0.613      
 
VOLATILITYi,t
-4 0.578 0.500 0.486 0.807     
 
VOLATILITYi,t
-1 0.624 0.457 0.512 0.914 0.773    
 
FIRMSIZE -0.194 -0.271 -0.245 -0.225 -0.213 -0.191   
 
BETA 0.132 0.201 0.158 0.173 0.276 0.196 -0.008  
 
IBES_CV 0.264 0.266 0.240 0.299 0.347 0.310 -0.036 0.115 
 





Table 4.5 Sample derivation 
Comparison sample: Cases with both analyst and machine 
learning data 
Comparison 
sample Extension sample 
Extension sample: Cases with machine learning but not analyst 
data   
 
Firm quarters with US$ market value plus both analyst and ML 
risk assessments  25,670  
253,57
8 
Missing lagged or leading volatility 1,492  12,511  
Missing beta 2,022  847  
Missing I/B/E/S target price 60  n/a  
Missing generated forecasts 346 3,920 346 13,704 
  21,750  
239,87
4 
Outliers eliminated  576  37,521 
  21,174  
202,35
3 
           US  11,426  1,184 
           Code Law  3,597  
170,22
2 
           Common Law (XUS)  6,151  30,947 
     
           With I/B/E/S target price available  21,174  89,560 







Table 4.6: Sample distribution by industry 
 Extension sample  Comparison sample 
 N %  N % 
Auto & Parts 6,793 3.36  482 2.29 
Banks 9,249 4.57  1,105 5.24 
Basic Resources 9,872 4.88  858 4.07 
Chem. & 11,519 5.69  548 2.6 
Construct.  12,364 6.11  609 2.89 
Financials 8,392 4.15  1,174 5.57 
Food & 
Beverage 11,217 5.54  720 3.42 
Healthcare 12,714 6.28  2,047 9.71 
Ind. Goods  39,323 19.43  2,867 13.61 
Insurance 2,977 1.47  767 3.64 
Media 4,285 2.12  480 2.28 
Oil & Gas 4,535 2.24  1,521 7.22 
Personal & 
House 11,696 5.78  1,108 5.26 
Real Estate 13,482 6.66  1,111 5.27 
Retail 10,202 5.04  1,613 7.65 
Technology 17,131 8.47  1,539 7.3 
Telecom 2,358 1.17  601 2.85 
Travel & Leisure 7,922 3.91  665 3.16 
Unclassified 65 0.03  102 0.60 
Utilities 6,257 3.09  1,257 5.97 
      






Table 4.7: Sample distribution by country 
Extension sample Comparison sample 
Country N % Country N % 
China 44,557 22.02 
United 
States  12,221 57.72 
Japan 41,355 20.44 Australia 2,889 13.64 
Taiwan 14,910 7.37 Canada 1,041 4.92 
India 12,103 5.98 UK 944 4.46 
Korea 8,281 4.09 France 604 2.85 
UK 7,650 3.78 Japan 591 2.79 
Germany 4,531 2.24 
New 
Zealand 488 2.3 
Sweden 4,413 2.18 Germany 430 2.03 
France 4,150 2.05 Switzerland 338 1.6 
South Africa 3,466 1.71 Netherlands 281 1.33 
Indonesia 3,458 1.71 Singapore 256 1.21 
Brazil 3,070 1.52 Italy 218 1.03 
Switzerland 2,902 1.43 Denmark 164 0.77 
Malaysia 2,802 1.38 Spain 158 0.75 
Australia 2,701 1.33 Sweden 143 0.68 
Singapore 2,700 1.33 Belgium 124 0.59 
Thailand 2,520 1.25 Norway 63 0.3 
Italy 2,171 1.07 Finland 60 0.28 
Turkey 2,130 1.05 Korea 54 0.26 
Poland 2,060 1.02 Taiwan 44 0.21 
Mexico 1,941 0.96 Portugal 26 0.12 
Norway 1,899 0.94 South Africa 25 0.12 
Saudi Arabia 1,860 0.92 Mexico 12 0.06 
Israel 1,816 0.9    
Chile 1,808 0.89    
Russia 1,572 0.78    
Spain 1,429 0.71    
Belgium 1,385 0.68    
Denmark 1,254 0.62    
Finland 1,238 0.61    
United States  1,184 0.59    
 189,316 93.55    
48 other countries 23,037 6.45    





The second Morningstar variable is a measure of dispersion within the valuation 
model, calculated as the interquartile range from 500 trees in the random forest. It 
therefore reflects uncertainty but is not explicitly a prediction of expected risk. In 
essence, a model is estimated which relates the predicted variable to a subset of 
available explanatory variables. The full set of explanatory variables is not used, as 
this is likely to result in over-fitting. Each iteration uses a random subsample of the 
available data and the results consolidated to a point estimate.  
 
The categories identified by each analyst are intended to indicate the expected 
interquartile range of share price changes, which is closely related to the expected 
share price volatility. Conversely, the ML estimates are based on 500 cross-sectional 
iterations. Both are designed to calibrate valuations and are likely to reflect share price 
volatility. Volatility is itself just one way to measure risk, and we also include measures 
of upside and downside risk. 
 
To address potential issues regarding the comparability of ARisk and MRisk, we 
regress each on share price volatility estimated over the following quarter and predict 
the value of ARisk and MRisk, then ADFor and MDFor respectively. This common 
estimation process allows us to make comparisons based on forecasts expressed on 
the same scale. Interestingly, the correlation between ADFor and MDFor is 0.59, 







4.5.1 Research Question 1: Can ML mimic analyst risk assessments? 
 
In Table 4.8 we report models of the determinants of volatility and risk assessments. 
The first three columns show determinants of volatility and the raw risk assessments 
provided by Morningstar. Forecasts derived from our Fama-MacBeth estimation are 
shown on the rightmost columns. In all models, realised volatility over the preceding 
quarter, beta and target price dispersion are significantly positively related to the 
outcome variable. Company size is inversely related to risk in models of volatility and 
analyst risk assessments. ML risk assessments are not related to company size. 
Analysis of US and non-US samples (not tabulated) confirms only subtle differences 
in the significance of variables. 
 
Since the factors affecting raw risk assessments and derived forecasts are consistent, 
we proceed with the latter. In general, we conclude that the risk assessments tend to 
be influenced by the same characteristics as volatility, but to different extents. There 
is scope to improve both sets of risk assessments; for example, the analysts might 
pay more attention to 12-month realised volatility, and ML might be trained on a wider 
set of features or explanatory variables. 
 
We considered modelling option-implied volatility. The inclusion of VIX, a market-level 
option-implied volatility measure, led to no significant improvement in explanatory 




implied volatility data is sparse outside the US and certain large-cap stocks in other 
markets, we drop implied volatility from our analysis. 
 
We evaluate the explanatory power of the variables and the models as a whole by 
comparing the t-statistics and R-squared. The model of next quarter volatility has a 
higher explanatory variable than analyst or ML outputs, either in raw or standardized 
form, and this can most likely be explained by differences in the loading on realised 
volatility. This does not necessarily imply that risk assessments are inferior, as 
unmodelled elements may be related to future volatility. For example, the analyst may 
incorporate contextual information regarding the sector outlook. The analysis of 
determinants does, however, suggest that risk assessments underemphasise factors 
which are known to predict future volatility. 
 
Joos et al. (2016) use panel analysis to assess the importance of accounting 
characteristics, specifically leverage, book to market, return on investment, negative 
earnings, negative equity and combinations of these variables. Our variable selection 
is based on this selection. In many instances, these variables are statistically 
significant but their contribution to the explanatory power of the models is slight, none 
are robustly significant across all models, and sometimes the sign switches despite 
being statistically significant. This lack of stability within the accounting variables may 
be caused by the relatively high correlation between them. This is typical for such 
ratios. However, the significance of non-accounting variables is unchanged by the 
inclusion of accounting characteristics. Previous researchers also found their results 




sake of brevity, we exclude the accounting variables and retain realised volatility, beta, 
target price dispersion and company size.   
 
4.5.2 Research Question 2: Are analyst or ML risk assessments more 
informative? 
 
The workhorse for our analysis of information content is the Fama-MacBeth procedure 
(Fama and MacBeth 1973). The results allow an examination of the stability of the 
relationship and eliminate forward-looking bias. We test the influence of firm-specific 
financial variables but find them to be unimportant and drop them from the reported 
tables for the sake of brevity.  
VOLATILITYi,t+1 = α  + β1XFori,t + β2VOLATILITYi,t-4  + β3VOLATILITYi,t-1 + 
β4FIRMSIZEi,t  + β5BETAi,t + β6IBES_CVi,t  + εi,t 
 
To identify the relative information content of the two spread measures, we estimate 
the results incorporating analyst and ML spread separately and then together, with 








Table 4.8: Information content of next quarter volatility (comparison sample) 
 
LHS is VOLATILITYi,t+1 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
ADFor 1.011***    0.754*** 0.257***  0.217*** 
 (38.94)    (28.24) (12.19)  (11.87) 
MDFor  1.044***   0.712***  0.296*** 0.258*** 
  (24.72)   (17.16)  (9.18) (8.09) 
FDFor   0.988***      
   (46.55)      
VOLATILITYi,t-4    0.159***  0.150*** 0.137*** 0.133*** 
    (3.57)  (3.70) (3.14) (3.29) 
VOLATILITYi,t-1    0.415***  0.385*** 0.393*** 0.370*** 
    (9.22)  (8.72) (8.08) (7.82) 
FIRMSIZE    -0.0069***  -0.0062*** -0.0066*** -0.0060*** 
    (-10.13)  (-8.50) (-7.98) (-7.12) 
IBES_CV    0.322***  0.275*** 0.272*** 0.238*** 
    (24.84)  (20.26) (16.94) (15.80) 
BETA    0.0174***  0.0123*** 0.0149*** 0.0108*** 
    (5.05)  (3.98) (4.72) (3.66) 
Intercept -0.00040 -0.00916 0.00868 0.164*** -0.109** 0.110*** 0.106*** 0.0675*** 
 (-0.08) (-1.01) (2.01) (13.47) (-11.16) (7.16) (5.98) (3.41) 
N 21,174 21,174 21,174 21,174 21,174 21,174 21,174 21,174 
avg. R2 0.244 0.215 0.528 0.558 0.330 0.570 0.574 0.583 
 






Table 4.8 presents results from the following Fama-MacBeth estimation, is: 
 
VOLATILITYi,t+1 = α  + β1XFori,t + β2VOLATILITYi,t-4  + β3VOLATILITYi,t-1 + β4FIRMSIZEi,t  + β5BETAi,t + β6IBES_CVi,t  + εi,t 
Where XFori,t is ADFori,t or MDFori,t or FDFori,t 
 
VOLATILITYi,t+1 is volatility for the forthcoming quarter; XFor represents ADFori,t, MDFori,t or FDFori,t, respectively forecasts of forthcoming volatility derived from 
analyst-, ML- and financial-based risk assessments at time t and the relationship between those variables at t-1 and volatility at t; VOLATILITYi,t-1 and VOLATILITYi,t-
4 are the last quarter and last year volatility; FIRMSIZEi,t is the log of market capitalization in US dollars; BETAi,t is the Bayesian-adjusted beta estimated in the prior 
36 months using either the US market index for US firms or the FTSE world (ex-US) index for non-US firms; and IBES_CVi,t is the coefficient of variation of the 






















Table 4.9: Difference in predictive ability across legal systems (comparison sample) 
 
















ADFor 1.062*** 0.534*** 1.138***    0.756*** 0.372*** 
 (33.05) (10.34) (28.44)    (17.48) (8.68) 
         
MDFor    1.063*** 0.620*** 1.281*** 0.737*** 0.499*** 
    (18.73) (12.54) (20.44) (10.87) (9.58) 
         
Intercept -0.0185** 0.108*** -0.0241** -0.0198 0.0893*** -0.0587*** -0.124*** 0.0255 
 (-2.63) (10.11) (-2.75) (-1.45) (7.31) (-4.81) (-9.05) (2.04) 
         
N 6,151 3,597 11,426 6,151 3,597 11,426 6,151 3,597 
ave. R2 0.243 0.114 0.299 0.234 0.165 0.234 0.348 0.214 
t-statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
ADFor  is forecast volatility in the subsequent quarter based on latest analyst risk assessment (ARisk). 












Table 4.10: Predictions of next quarter volatility (extension sample) 
 
 
Cases without I/B/E/S cover 
 
Cases with I/B/E/S cover 
 
 
LHS variable is VOLATILITYi,t+1 
 
LHS variable is VOLATILITYi,t+1 
 
        
MDFor 0.995***  0.211*** 1.106***  0.320*** 0.303*** 
 (22.82)  (6.02) (19.57)  (11.02) (10.91) 
        
FDFor  0.974*** 0.923***  1.003*** 0.905*** 0.886*** 
  (44.82) (43.84)  (38.58) (32.89) (32.85) 
        
IBES_CV       0.0755*** 
       (11.38) 
        
Intercept 0.00266 0.0113*** -0.0384*** -0.0321 0.00383 -0.0641*** -0.0606*** 
 (0.19) (2.96) (-4.22) (-1.74) (0.68) (-6.86) (-6.71) 
        
N 112,793 112,793 112,793 89,560 89,560 89,560 89,560 
ave. R2 0.118 0.412 0.418 0.187 0.441 0.457 0.459 








The variable definitions are the same as for the previous model. In this 
instance, we do not include the accounting variables. They are often 
individually significant, especially in the absence of prior volatility, market 
capitalization and beta variables, but make no substantive difference to the 
results.  
 
These results show that a) analyst and ML risk assessments each contain 
information about future volatility, but b) both risk assessments omit relevant 
information. Since the control variables retain significance in the full model 
(columns 4, 6, 7 and 8), risk assessments are in one sense inefficient because 
they do not incorporate this information. Moreover, they do not fully incorporate 
the information included in the rival measure. Morningstar could point out that 
predicting volatility is not the function, or at least not the main function, of either 
analysts’ risk categories or ML valuation variability. Even so, both analysts and 
ML measures are statistically significant in the presence of the other, and 
inclusion of either or both risk assessments leads to greater explanatory 









4.5.3 Research Question 3: Do independent analysts produce unbiased 
forecasts of risk? 
 
Our sample comes from independent analysts and should not display the 
strong biases typically found among sell-side analysts (Barber et al. 2007). 
Even so, there is no reason to suppose that our analysts will not be subject to 
the behavioural biases which typically affect decision-makers. For example, 
Groysberg et al. (2008) find strong optimism bias among buy-side analysts. As 
the analysts in our sample have to assign  a recommendation from one to five 
to each stock, we can identify firms which are favoured as buy opportunities. 
If that benign attitude to the investment influences the assessment of spread, 
we might expect analysts to bias their spread measure down. To investigate 
this, we estimate the following relationship where the spread is conditioned by 
buy, hold and sell categories, and ADFori,t, MDFori,t and FDFori,t, i.e. the 
derived analysts-, ML- and financial-based forecasts of forthcoming volatility 
based on variables at time t.  
 
We also consider relative forecasting power across different environments. 
The US sample is stable and relatively homogenous and should be easier to 







analysis (not shown) we do indeed find that for all models the explanatory 
power is greater for US firms than non-US firms.  
 
Independent analysts should not display the strong biases typically found 
amongst sell-side analysts (Barber et al. 2007). Even so, there is no reason to 
suppose that our analysts will not be subject to the general behavioral biases 
that typically affect decision-makers. For example, Groysberg et al. (2008) find 
strong optimism bias among buy-side analysts. One of the main strengths of 
the ML approach is the ability of the machine to extrapolate the insights of 
analysts to extensive samples for which analyst coverage is not available. We 
find that ML shows promise in challenging regulatory and economic areas. 
 
Next, we investigate analyst bias by estimating the following relationship where 
the risk assessment is allowed to vary for buy, hold and sell stocks: 
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛽1,2 𝑜𝑟 3𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗ (𝐴𝐵𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝐵𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑟 𝐹𝐵𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
Where REC is the analyst or ML recommendation, denoted as Selli,t, Holdi,t 
and Buyi,t in Table 4.10. If the analysts are unbiased, we would not expect 1, 
2 and 3 to be significantly different. A positive bias towards stocks 







would be relatively low and would need to be multiplied by a larger coefficient 
in order to forecast volatility. Here the variables represent the analyst, or ML, 
recommendations. Following prior research (Barber et al. 2006), we have 
merged strong sell with sell, and strong buy with buy, as there are few cases 
in the extreme categories. If analysts, or ML, are biased towards stocks they 
favour, we would expect the beta coefficients to be significantly different and 
ß3 to be the highest: the low risk indicator for the stocks they favour needs to 
be multiplied by a larger coefficient to produce a reliable forecast of future 
volatility. 
 
Table 4.10 reports our results for analyst-based and ML-based predictions of 
volatility conditioned by analyst and ML recommendations. In column one we 
report the result for analyst risk conditioned by analyst recommendation. The 
coefficient on ADFor*Analyst Buy is some 10% higher than for Analyst Hold or 
Analyst Sell. The difference is statistically significant. Across the six columns 
we report, three based on analyst recommendations and three based on ML 
recommendations, with three different forecasts of risk (analyst, ML and 
financials), in only one case is the Forecast*Analyst Buy not the highest 
coefficient. That case is ML forecasts and ML recommendations. Our results 
therefore indicate analyst bias. Since the analysts in our study do not face 







that this bias is behavioural. By contrast, ML makes unbiased risk 
assessments. 
 
If the analysts are unbiased, we would not expect 1, 2 and 3 to be 
significantly different. A positive bias towards stocks categorised as buy would 
increase 3, whereas a negative attitude towards sell stocks would decrease 
1. We also run the model in the absence of fixed effects to ensure that the 
relationship between spread and volatility is a direct test, and the results are 
robust. Here the variables are as before, plus Analyst Selli,t,  Analyst Holdi,t 
and  Analyst Buyi,t represent recommendations made by analysts or ML. For 
the analysts, we have merged strong sell with sell, and strong buy with buy, 
following Barber et al. (2007), as there are few cases in the extreme 
categories. This is also consistent with the ML version, which provides three 
categories: fairly, over- and under-valued. Buy, hold and sell are distributed 










4.5.4 Research Question 4: How can investors best use analyst and ML 
risk assessments? 
 
It is apparent that when modelled together, analyst and ML risk assessments 
are both statistically significant and produce higher explanatory power than 
either alone. A possible reason is differential effectiveness between US and 
non-US samples. The US sample is stable and relatively homogenous and 
should be easier to analyse using either traditional or ML methods. In Table 
4.9 we do indeed find that explanatory power, i.e. average R-squared, tends 
to be greater in the US sample.  
 
We investigate this further by dividing the non-US sample into common law 
and code law countries. For Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, New Zealand, 
South Africa and the United Kingdom, the results follow the US model and are 
shown in table 4.11. The predictive ability of analyst and ML risk assessments 
in common law countries is similar when modelled separately. When used 
together, ADFor is marginally more significant and therefore marginally more 
effective in predicting future volatility than MDFor. This would not surprise 
practitioners who view the operating practices of common law capital markets 
as having much in common. However, for the sample of code law countries, 







significance, and when used jointly, MDFor is marginally more significant than 
ADFor. We notice a deterioration in the value of analysts’ risk assessments, 
while the significance of MDFor remains fairly constant. If the work of 
investment analysts is more difficult in code law countries, they may struggle 
to match the insights of analysts based in common law countries. The 








Table 4.11  
Panel A 
Analyst predictions (ADFor) conditioned by analyst 
recommendation (Analyst sell,  Analyst hold or Analyst 





VOLATILITY t+1 VOLATILITY t+1 
Analyst sell * 
ADFor 
0.923***  
 (18.72)  
Analyst hold * 
ADFor 
0.904***  
 (19.66)  
Analyst buy * 
ADFor 
1.004***  
 (21.19)  
ML sell * ADFor  0.853*** 
  (19.38) 
ML hold * ADFor  0.874*** 
  (18.26) 
ML buy * ADFor  0.986*** 
  (20.95) 
Intercept 0.0157 0.0253** 
 (1.44) (2.41) 
N 21,072 20,755 
avg. R2 0.389 0.396 
F-test 45.23*** 53.58*** 













ML prediction (MDFor) conditioned by analyst recommendation (Analyst 
sell,  Analyst hold or Analyst buy) and by ML recommendation (ML sell, ML 
hold or ML buy) 
   
 VOLATILITY t+1 VOLATILITY t+1 
Analyst sell * 
MDFor 
0.882***  
 (15.51)  
Analyst hold * 
MDFor 
0.922***  
 (15.62)  
Analyst buy * 
MDFor 
0.901***  
 (16.15)  
ML sell * MDFor  0.797*** 
  (14.65) 
ML hold * MDFor  0.826*** 
  (14.72) 
ML buy * MDFor  0.874*** 
  (15.96) 
Intercept * MDFor 0.0233 0.0415*** 
 (1.73) (3.23) 
N 21,072 20,755 
avg. R2 0.357 0.378 
F-test 7.13*** 22.40*** 














Predictions made using risk characteristics (FDFor) conditioned by analyst 
recommendation (Analyst sell, Analyst hold or Analyst buy) and by ML 
recommendation (ML sell, ML hold or ML buy) 
 VOLATILITY t+1 VOLATILITY t+1 
Analyst sell * 
FDFor 
0.865***  
 (67.60)  
Analyst hold * 
FDFor 
0.865***  
 (70.29)  
Analyst buy * 
FDFor 
0.903***  
 (72.15)  
ML sell * FDFor  0.844*** 
  (61.46) 
ML hold * FDFor  0.859*** 
  (64.56) 
ML buy * FDFor  0.900*** 
  (74.66) 
Intercept * FDFor 0.0302*** 0.0327*** 
 (10.73) (11.12) 
N 21,072 20,755 
avg. R2 0.573 0.574 
F-test 26.15*** 50.69*** 










Our research provider uses ML to extend their stock coverage. The extension 
sample provides a further opportunity to explore the potential for ML. The ML 
model is trained to predict analyst valuation to price. For companies outside 
the Morningstar analyst coverage universe, the model is trained on the 
valuation of peer companies as defined (although not disclosed) by the model 
provider. Does predictive ability decline for stocks not covered by Morningstar 
analysts? By comparing the R-squared of ML in our comparison sample (Table 
3.8, column 2) with the extension sample (Table 4.10, columns 1 and 4), we 
can see that the coefficient on MDFor remains significant. There is, however, 
a drop in overall explanatory power. The comparison sample R-squared drops 
from 0.215 (Table 3.8, column 2) to 0.12 and 0.18 in Table 4.10, column 1; the 
more marked decline in R-squared is evident for companies with no I/B/E/S 
coverage (Table 4.10, column 1) compared with those with I/B/E/S data 
(column 4). The extension sample shows ML to be more informative in the 
presence of sell-side analysts, i.e. where more extensive investor information 










We contrast the effectiveness of risk assessments derived from traditional 
financial analysis and ML for a large international sample drawn from 2012 to 
2018. We find that independent analysts’ risk assessments are good 
predictors. Analysts’ assessments also retain an element of behavioural bias 
not found in the ML assessments.  
 
Research into ML in investment research is relatively new. We believe our 
study is the first to conduct a head-to-head comparison of ML- and analyst-
based financial analysis. Our results suggest that ML is effective, but for 
decisions where unstructured and unquantified information play a larger role, 
ML may find it more difficult to match the insights of analysts. As ML is already 
established, and we anticipate its use will grow rapidly, more research 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION  
This paper examines the informational environment at a time of substantial 
change in the marketplace for investment research. The UK investment 
management industry has rapidly adopted new methods to pay for analyst 
research in order to comply with a major new European regulation, the Second 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II). The new rules are at least 
in part the product of the UK regulator’s mission to protect customers, foster 
integrity and promote competition (FCA, 2017). Should a better-functioning 
marketplace for research emerge, we might expect supply and demand to be 
better matched, resulting in efficiency gains for investment managers and 
welfare gains for end investors.  
  
Conversely, others have expressed concern that the informational 
environment will be depleted due to reduced quality and availability of research 
(Walker and Flood, 2018). This paper seeks to resolve these positions by 
asking whether analyst information has expanded or contracted.  
  
Since the 1970s, it has been common for investment managers to “bundle” 
together execution and research costs and to pass both on to end investors. 
Regulatory intervention, centred around the 2003 Global Analyst Research 







activities, disclose incentive bias and subsidize independent research 
providers (IRPs). It did not, however, address payment for investment 
research. Investment managers could continue to pay for research through the 
commissions paid for dealing shares to be bought or sold; these payments 
continued to be funded by end investors rather than the investment 
management firm itself.   
  
Coinciding with these US measures, the UK government commissioned the 
former chairman of a leading buy-side firm to investigate the condition of the 
UK equity market. The government was explicitly advised to simplify the 
means of paying for research, i.e. to replace the opaque, relational system of 
dealing commissions with a neoclassical market system. The proposed 
outcome was that investment managers would pay for investment research. 
This would encourage efficiency because they would carefully consider which 
research to buy and would compare the costs and benefits of procuring broker 
research with that of doing their own research.  
  
The UK regulatory approach had little impact until 2014, when strict new 
European rules on the use of dealing commissions to pay for research were 
proposed. Around this time, investment managers first reacted by adopting an 







managers and research producers had come to expect new procedures for 
obtaining external research. These new rules, debated in regulatory 
consultation from 2014 to 2017, took effect at the start of 2018. Consequently, 
research producers and consumers are now required to agree prices for 
investment research in advance of use. Investment management firms can no 
longer access broker research without payment as this would constitute an 
inducement to trade according to MiFID II. To continue the established industry 
norm of charging end investors for research, the buy-side must also set 
research budgets in advance and meet the requirements of a Research 
Payment Account (RPA) which are far more stringent than the prior system of 
Commission Sharing Agreements (CSAs). Alternatively, they can treat 
research as a cost to their own business. A significant change came in the 
second half of 2017 when the UK asset management industry shifted almost 
in unison by choosing the latter approach, i.e. to pay for research, with a view 
to reducing regulatory risks, operational burdens and client confusion. 
Investment managers have been taking a closer look at the cost of research: 
media reports link these to the “exodus” in sell-side research (Walker and 
Flood, 2018) and a 10% fall in sell-side analyst headcount between 2012 and 
2016 (Gordon, 2017), a period of buoyant stock market growth.  
  
A newcomer to this market might expect to find significant change in research 







example, it would be reasonable to expect to find fewer sell-side analysts, also 
less bias in the forecasts of those who remain, and possibly a narrower range 
of research providers. The quantity, quality and price of research might fall. 
Unfortunately, data to test these expectations is rather scattered. Additionally, 
many suppliers and consumers of research have become quite guarded in the 
information they wish to disclose. This trend is, in itself, informative: fund 
managers do not want to flag the providers they are using because of the 
franchise value of unique information networks.  
  
In this paper, I examine the proportion of stocks which are covered by analysts 
(breadth of coverage) and the number of analysts covering each stock (depth 
of coverage). Narrower or shallower coverage would constitute evidence of a 
weaker informational environment. Next, I turn to the overall distribution of 
recommendations. A more even balance between buy and sell 
recommendations would indicate a stronger informational environment. 
Finally, I consider the role independent analysts constitute in supplementing 
stock coverage.  
  
This examination is of practical importance because analysts have for decades 
played an important role in the discovery, interpretation and dissemination of 







is large, important to many buy-side firms and costly for end investors, who, in 
aggregate, fund an estimated £1.5bn of external research per annum in the 
UK alone (FCA, 2014). It therefore cuts across themes of fairness and value 
for money in financial services (Kay, 2016). An early evaluation of the effect 
on the informational environment is therefore necessary.  
  
Data vendors such as IBES, First Call, Factset and Bloomberg provide 
researchers with summary information from numerous research providers. 
This data, which is referred to as archival data in prior studies, is the principal 
and established method of studying analyst information. I find that the 
proportion of buy, hold and sell recommendations has remained almost 
constant since 2010. The tendency for analysts to issue buy recommendations 
persists at similar levels to those found bt Barber et al (2006). 
 
Regarding the role if independent research, I find archival sources to be 
insufficient. Data vendors include almost no IRP predictions, archival methods 
cannot fully answer my questions about stock coverage. Rather than limiting 
the study to archival data, I use a second batch of data sources, each of which 
provides a window on a cross-section of data providers. Survey data shows, 
however, that many IRPs cover FTSE All-Share stocks. Perhaps more 







The survey data is particularly useful for my third question which considers the 
range of ways that analysts inform investors. Most IRPs supply coverage only 
to existing clients rather than the market as a whole. Since many are 
specialized, and have focused client lists, limited diffusion of information is 
likely. Investment managers will often be able to obtain independent research 
on a given company, but only if they are an existing client. IRP research is less 
likely to leak into the marketplace. MiFID II prohibits the supply of “free” 
research. It seems that there are now more suppliers of company research 
than ever before, but the services of many analysts reach fewer investors than 
in a bundled system where research was made available to the market as a 
whole.  
  
There seems little doubt that brokerage analysts are under pressure and that 
sell-side head count is falling. This is likely to result in reduced coverage but 
could also mean lower-quality research. If more independent analysts are 
covering companies, this could mitigate or even counteract shrinking 
coverage. Evidence of increasing numbers of independent analysts, whether 
or not they contribute to archives such as I/B/E/S, would count as evidence of 
an improvement to the informational environment. I do not propose to be able 
to make a causal link or even to assess whether the net effect on the 
informational environment is positive or negative. Nevertheless, demand from 







high, and in the absence of other independent sources, an earlier version of 
this paper was shared with the FCA and practitioners in early 2018.  
 
 
5.2 PRIOR LITERATURE  
5.2.1 The role of analysts in the information 
environment  
Analysts play an important role in supporting the informational environment, 
via discovery, interpretation and dissemination of information (Bradshaw et al., 
2017). Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the relative efficiency of the US stock 
market, recent content analysis shows that only one report in eight contains 
discovery and over one third of analysts never discover new information 
(Bradshaw et al., 2017). Interpretation seems to be more pervasive. Analysts 
also act as a conduit by broadcasting information even where a report lacks 
new discovery or insightful interpretation. Analyst activities often blend two or 









5.5.2 The effects of regulation on investment 
research  
Researchers have only begun to examine the effects of MiFIDII. Prior studies 
do, however, examine analyst coverage in the aftermath of previous regulatory 
changes which affect investment research. Regulation of analysts remained 
stable from the deregulation of commissions in the US in 1975 until the early 
2000s (Bradshaw et al., 2017). Analysts earned a higher profile during the 
1990s and a few US analysts even became well known to the public (Beunza 
and Garud, 2007). In the early 2000s, analysts had to grapple with new US 
regulations covering corporate disclosure (Regulation Fair Disclosure), 
corporate governance (Sarbanes–Oxley) and sell-side analyst activities 
(Global Analyst Research Settlements, hereafter referred to as the Global 
Settlement). In an early paper on the impact of the Global Settlement, Barber 
et al. (2006) examined coverage and recommendation bias in First Call, a 
popular archive of US analyst recommendations. They found that sell-side 
analysts’ optimism bias attenuates in response to the regulation’s goal of 
reducing unjustifiable buy recommendations. This work was followed by a host 
of papers, reviewed in detail by Bradshaw et al. (2017), which examine the 







By updating the distribution of US analyst recommendations presented by 
Barber et al. (2006), Bradshaw et al. (2017) confirm a relative decline in sell 
(including strong sell) recommendations from 2002 onwards. They attribute 
this to the effect of the Global Settlement and related legislation which explicitly 
aimed to temper excessive optimism. The proportion of sell recommendations 
was extremely low throughout the 1993 to 2015 sample period (Bradshaw et 
al., 2017, p. 164) but reached its highest level in 2002 and 2003, matching a 
stock market trough in the wake of the 1990s technology stock bubble and 
accounting scandals, with a smaller peak in 2008 and 2009 reflecting analysts’ 
views during and after the global financial crisis. Sell recommendations 
stabilized at around 6% to 8% of all US stocks covered from 2010 to 2015. US 
analysts’ reticence to issue negative recommendations persists.   
  
Barber et al. (2006) continue their study by grouping unaffiliated and 
independent analysts, creating investment strategies which follow the 
recommendations of each group, and comparing the profitability of these 
strategies to the distribution of ratings for each firm. This approach does not 
suit the present enquiry for several reasons. First, where the Global Settlement 
and associated legislation sought to address the bias towards buy 
recommendations, MiFID II is silent on practices relating to recommendations, 
or indeed other analyst outputs. Second, the lack of IRP data makes it 







and unaffiliated brokers, it would not be appropriate to merge the latter with 
IRP analysts. Third, studies such as Brown et al. (2015), Imam and Spence 
(2016), Bradshaw et al. (2017) and Spence et al. (2019) provide much stronger 
evidence that recommendations, or indeed other analyst summary predictions, 
are of secondary importance to analysts’ clients.  
 
The lack of prior research on the effects of MiFIDII, or even scholarly papers 
attempting to consider what effects the regulation might have on analysts and 
their work, presents a gap. This study aims to take an early step in addressing 
that gap and considering the most effective approaches for further study.  
 
Although the research market has attracted little interest from scholars over 
the years, several working papers have emerged which could signal a change. 
In the first, Fang et al. (2019) find fewer sell-side analysts covering European 
firms post MiFID II implementation. Using a sample of analysts covering 
companies listed in 31 European Economic Area countries between January 
2015 and February 2019, the authors compare analyst coverage and accuracy 
before and after January 2018. This date is reasonable, some sell-side firms 
had reduced coverage well before 2018; in Unbundling Uncovered 2018 it was 
noted that other brokers might be expected a reassess coverage in 2019 or 







(in 90% of cases because a single analyst drops coverage). The analysts who 
exit tend to be less experienced, less accurate in predicting earnings more 
prone to making overly bullish recommendations. The find buy side analysts 
to be more numerous and more active in company conference calls. In short, 
there has been a slight trimming of sell-side analyst headcount and a shift of 
effort to the buy side. A second study, Lang et al (2019), uses a different 
sample and method, finds some evidence of falling stock coverage and also 
that analysts tend to cover fewer stocks in 2018 compared to 2015-2017. 
Neither study considers independent research providers (IRPs). 
 
The third study in this area, which also became available in 2019, specifically 
addresses the effects of RPA adoption. Using the setting of Sweden, where 
several large asset managers unbundled their research payments in 2015, 
Pope et al. (2019) compare Sweden-domiciled and foreign-based analysts 
covering Swedish stocks. Analysis of the 2013-2016 sample reveals a fall in 
coverage, particularly for smaller firms and those with lower institutional 
ownership, but also an increase in research quality (measured primarily by the 
accuracy of each analyst’s earnings forecasts). Limitations include specificity 
to the Swedish model, the choice of 2015 as a preview notwithstanding that 
the definition of RPA in the UK and other markets was unclear until 2016, and 







5.2.3 Studies of independent analysts  
Few prior studies focus on independent research. Jacob and Rock (2008) find 
that investment bank analysts make more accurate earnings forecasts than 
their independent peers; this is likely to be a result of the superior resources 
afforded by the deep pockets of a Wall Street firm, including higher 
remuneration. Cross subsidies and certain types of knowledge sharing are 
typical and can be arranged without contravening regulations. Clarke et al. 
(2011) and Kadan et al. (2008) compare recommendations made by IRPs and 
sell side analysts before and after the imposition of new US analyst rules and 
note a shift towards less granular three-point recommendation scales 
(buy/hold/sell) rather than five-point scales, featuring strong buy and strong 
sell or equivalent. Price reaction to IRP recommendation changes became less 
informative. Taken together, these studies provide evidence that analysts were 
less likely to issue strong buys, which might have been inappropriate, but 
otherwise the impact on the informational environment was to provide less 
informative recommendations. Buslepp et al. (2014) confirm these findings 
over a longer time period and add that analysts at IRPs funded by the Global 
Settlement tend to make less accurate forecasts despite having greater 
financial resources. Barber et al. (2007) merge unaffiliated and independent 
analysts and therefore do not produce results on IRPs alone. To complement 







the equity research arm of Morningstar, the firm studied in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Like other research on IRPs, their results are confined to the US market.  
  
5.2.4 Quantitative processes as an alternative 
to analysts  
Analysts have been shown to provide higher-quality outputs when they are 
well resourced and cover fewer stocks (Clement, 1999). Since technology is 
more scalable, quantitative coverage is less constrained. Sell-side and 
independent firms have long provided quantitative recommendations to 
institutional clients. Even static quantitative models are demonstrably more 
effective than relying on experts (see, for example, Wahlen and Wieland, 
2011). An example of a dynamic approach, where machine learning (ML) is 
applied to continuously update algorithms, can be found in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Systematic approaches are also likely to be less costly:   
“Advances in technology may also decrease the value of analysts’ 
discovery and interpretation roles. Presumably one reason for the 
historical reliance of the buy-side on sell-side analysts is the cost of 
conducting high-quality research for a large number of stocks. As costs 
of research decline, the buy-side may be less willing to pay for sell-side 








In addition to cost reduction, technological advances may improve analytical 
capabilities. Grennan and Michaely (2018) reveal the diversity of information 
which is available to professional, and often individual, investors.   
  
Fabozzi (2008) records the growth in popularity of quantitative investing in the 
first half of the 2000s. This trend reversed sharply in August 2007 when 
illiquidity emerged as a common factor which had not been priced in. 
Confidence in systematic processes suffered from “widespread loss of faith in 
quant investment methods and those who use them” (diBartolomeo, 2013, p. 
7). Although some active quant processes may have faced a decline in 
demand, low-cost “smart beta” processes, which apply factor methodologies 
and generally do not require analyst research, have become a prominent part 











5.3 Research Questions  
I use five research questions to examine change in the informational 
environment, starting with an examination of the number of stocks covered by 
at least one analyst (breadth). With fewer analysts in post, we can expect the 
number of companies covered to fall.  
RQ1: Do research providers cover fewer companies?  
(breadth of coverage) 
  
Second, I consider the number of analysts covering each stock (depth). 
Investors are likely to be best serviced where multiple analysts cover any given 
stock. Where a single analyst covers a given company, this is most likely to be 
the house broker who is unlikely to convey a truly critical perspective.   
RQ2: Do fewer analysts cover each stock?  
(depth of coverage) 
  
Since investment managers are unlikely to pay for surplus, duplicate research, 
we can expect fewer companies to attract a very large number of analysts. 







given company when there are 27 other views? Some analyst retained posts 
because their employer wanted to be able to provide research on a very wide 
universe, i.e., to demonstrate breadth even if depth was questionable. My third 
research question is as follows. 
RQ3: Are fewer companies are covered by more than 20 analysts? 
(excessive coverage)  
  
Next, I examine the distribution of analyst recommendations. If the link 
between execution and research is removed, sell-side analysts have less 
incentive to make buy recommendations. We can expect to find a higher 
proportion of sell and strong sell recommendations.  
RQ4: Has optimism bias declined?  
  
Some investment managers use independent analysts and it would be 
reasonable to expect that they may have replaced outgoing sell-side analysts. 
My final research question addresses this.  
RQ5: Do independent analysts constitute a greater proportion of 








We are most likely to observe change in coverage of UK companies because 
the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and UK market participants have 
shaped the new European rules. Although the changing regulations, now 
enshrined in the second European Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID II), affect global markets via international firms, the earliest adoption is 
likely to be found in the UK. We can also expect to find change in the other 
European Union markets. Finally, there might be less amplified changes in the 
US market.  
  
I do not claim to demonstrate causality. In time, it may be possible to do so. 
Even so, we should be able to provide an informed assessment of the current 
state of the informational environment.   
  
5.4 RESEARCH DESIGN  
5.4.1 Archival analysis  
Researchers have tended to use databases collecting analyst predictions. 
IBES, First Call and Zacks were early in requesting forecasts from brokerage 
firms; Bloomberg, Factest and others now have comparable offerings. Prior 








I examine the number of stocks covered in each market and the intensity of 
coverage, i.e. the number of analysts covering each stock.   
  
Barber et al. (2006) present graphical evidence of aggregate changes in 
analyst recommendations. In their case, they examine the recommendation 
bias before and immediately after the Global Settlement, a regulation which 
was explicitly aimed at preventing inappropriate buy recommendations. In this 
case, the regulatory change is not explicitly aimed at reducing bias. Even so, 
if MiFIDII reduces surplus supply, we can expect the surviving analysts to strive 
for accuracy. The distribution of recommendations would therefore correspond 
more closely to the distribution of stock returns, i.e. with approximately the 
same proportion of buy and sell recommendations.  
  
MiFID II has global ramifications. Research on US firms may be purchased by 
MiFID II-regulated firms, and EU companies will be researched by non-EU 
research analysts and the research sold to non-EU investors. Although I 
cannot make a complete separation between the three markets, it is 
reasonable to expect changes to be most evident in the UK, where the 







evident in the US. Rather than limiting my research to a single market, I 
examine the US and UK separately.  
  
The sample comprises all companies which have been present in the FTSE 
All-Share index since 1996. This index comprises the large cap FTSE 100, mid 
cap FTSE 250 and small cap firms; it therefore represents the broad market. 
Few companies outside these indices are covered by analysts. Repeating the 
analysis on all available constituents appears to make little difference to the 
results. I would welcome data on small company stock coverage in order to 
extend the analysis.  
   
Barber et al. (2007) blend unaffiliated analysts with IRPs due to the paucity of 
truly independent firms. This approach identifies non-investment bank analysts 
and is approptriate to their post- Global Settlement setting. In contrast, MiFID 
II applies to all brokers regardless of investment bank affiliation. My line of 
enquiry requires IRPs to be studied separately from unaffiliated brokerage 
analysts. Although there are many hundreds of IRPs, no more than ten IRPs 
appear in each of I/B/E/S and Bloomberg (July 2018). It is simply not possible 









5.4.2 Survey evidence  
Although I/B/E/S is known to have a long history and wide coverage, the data 
availability constraint noted by Barber et al. (2007) persists. Few IRPs submit 
to data vendors and no comparable, dedicated database exists for IRPs. 
Bloomberg lists over 300 brokerage firms, but only ten IRPs. Since archives 
provide little information about IRP analysts, I turn to other sources to obtain a 
more complete picture.   
  
Several additional sources document the expansion of independent research. 
A survey of a leading IRP specialist (survey A), and two major surveys 
(questionnaires B and C) and are both described below. The surveys, one 
polled from IRPs and the other from their buy-side clients, provide the most 
representative picture I have found on independent investment research. The 
surveys allow us to see the research procured by early adopters of IRP 
research in the UK and therefore provides a window on the emergence of 
IRPs. I identified these datasets during fieldwork for Chapter 2 to complement 
archival analysis. While it would be wonderful to base the paper on a single 
instrument, the more specialist nature of research pricing required me to work 
with those best able to elicit data from informed participants; the three surveys 
in this paper provide the best insight I can find into the cross-section of IRP 







a study investigating buy-side research, would have collected views from 
industry professionals who typically have rather limited  knowledge of the 
research marketplace. 
  
5.4.2.1 Survey A  
My first additional data source is the records of the commission management 
department of a brokerage firm. The firm did not have a research department 
and instead operated as an agency brokerage to facilitate CSAs (see Chapter 
2 for further details). As a result, the brokers were experts in the CSA business 
because this system provided their revenue in the form of commissions. The 
agency broker arranged CSA payments for 22 investment managers to 216 
IRPs during the nine years following the introduction of CSAs in 2006. The 
dataset comprises annual invoice totals with descriptions and therefore reveals 
the actual prices paid for research services. The broker classifies IRPs into 
seven categories, such as fundamental, quantitative, macroeconomic and 
idiosyncratic. The underlying invoices are similar to the invoices issued for 
work undertaken by professional services firms. No questionnaire was 
involved; rather, this survey contains the actual accounting records and 








5.4.2.2 Survey B  
My second source is a survey conducted with expert practitioners. Since all 
but the largest IRPs are small and specialised, at least in comparison to 
brokerage firms, the distribution of research is more challenging. Fund 
managers may not be aware of independent firms who could be best 
positioned to service them; IRPs may not be able to find the most appropriate 
buy-side specialists who might purchase their research. Integrity Research 
formed a business to introduce IRPs to investment managers. Founded by 
veterans of the IRP industry, the firm has, to my knowledge, the widest 
catalogue of IRP firms and also the buy-side contacts who are most cognisant 
of independent research. This firm is therefore ideally positioned to obtain 
informed questionniare responses.  
 
I worked with the founders of Integrity Research to set the scope of the study 
and on the drafting of questionnaire items. Particular attention was paid to the 
response grids. Questionnaires set by industry and professional bodies in this 
field tend to be impeded by imprecise question sets and incomplete or unclear 
response grids. I am comfortable that the data, and that of Survey C described 








US-based IRP specialist Integrity Research created a 17-item questionnaire 
on the topic of research payment. IRPs were contacted by email between 
September and December 2014. From 417 IRPs, 118 firms provided 
anonymous responses, 62% of which were US-based and 25% European 
IRPs. Assuming an actual population of 500 to 1000 IRPs, this implies a 
response rate between 12% and 28%, which is high for a survey in the 
investment industry.  I assisted in the design of the questionnaire but had no 
commercial involvement with Integrity or with any IRPs.  
  
5.4.2.3 Survey C  
Investment manager practices were surveyed by RSRCHXchange, a UK-
based FinTech firm focused on written research. Using a 25-item online 
questionnaire in April/May 2017, a sample of 562 individual responses was 
obtained from around 10,000 investment managers who were approached by 
email. A 5% to 6% sample is not uncommon in surveys of investment 
managers (Brown et al., 2015). As with questionnaire B, I assisted in the 
design of the questionnaire scope, drafting and checking. One cofounder had 
extensive experience in questionnaire research and employed a professional 
polling company. As with survey B, I am confident that the instrument design 







5.5 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS  
In this section, I discuss the findings for each research question based on 
I/B/E/S data. In the subsequent section, i.e., section 5.6, I consider additional 
survey evidence.   
  
5.5.1 RQ1: Do research providers cover fewer 
companies?   
 
I first address this question using archival data. Figure 5.1 Panel A shows 
analyst coverage of the FTSE allshare ex investment trust index, which 
represtents large, midcap and small companies in the UK main market. almost 
all companies are covered by at least one analyst. In 2018, 540 companies 
were covered compared to an average of 542 over the past ten years, with 
little deviation from year to year. The level was slightly higher in the mid-2000s, 
peaking at 604 in 2007, before dropping to around 540 immediately after the 
financial crisis. After excluding investment trusts, which have corporate status 
but represent portfolios of other investments, almost all companies are 
covered by at least one analyst. (Prior to 2001, 700–800 companies were 
covered; the index had over 800 companies compared to around 650 post 










Panel A – US depth of coverage (S&P500) 
 








Figure 5 shows the number of companies covered by exactly one analyst, one 
to three analysts, one to five analysts, and more than ten analysts at each year 
end in the S&P 1500 (Panel A) and FTSE Allshare ex investment trusts (Panel 
B). The vertical axis shows the number of companies covered. In panel B (UK), 
the drop in number of companies covered in 2002 can be explained by FTSE’s 
policy: fewer companies were included in the Allshare post 2002.   
 
The number and proportion of UK companies not covered by at least one 
analyst appears not to have changed in the past ten years. My analysis spans 
the broad market index and includes small cap companies. It does not, 
however, include companies listed in the UK’s small/micro-cap Alternative 
Investment Market. It may also be that sell-side firms are still taking stock of 
the required level of coverage. Analyst roles might be adjusted based on 
meetings to review 2018. Since research pricing negotiations are new, and it 
may take time to negotiate the price of research services, it may take several 
years for research provision to adjust. A complete evaluation may not be 
possible until the early 2020s.  
  
Turning to the US market, the total number of stocks was highest in the tech 
boom, with between 1,912 and 1,952 stocks in the years 1996 to 1999 (Figure 







dropped over the last decade, dropping below 1,800 in 2013 and below 1,700 
in 2015. The 2018 coverage stands at 1,560, indicating that coverage barely 
extends beyond the S&P1500. This marks a fall of almost 20% from peak 
coverage and 11% from 2015 levels. It is interesting to note that US coverage 
has contracted almost twice as much as UK coverage in the past decade. The 
downward trend is steady and does not appear to have changed pace since 
the announcement of new rules for research payment in 2015. Even so, the 
breadth of coverage remains wide in both US and UK. It may be that MiFIDII 
is affecting global firms but it is also possible that this trend is the result of other 
industry factors, such as the shift to passive investment management, 
pressure on buy-side fees and structural decline in brokerage commissions. 
  
5.5.2 RQ2: Do fewer analysts cover each 
stock?   
 
Investors are likely to be best served when multiple analysts cover each 
company. Additional analysts are likely to be less biased than the house broker 
and more likely to issue sell recommendations. It is therefore important to 








Figure 5.2 panel A shows that around 50 UK companies have been covered 
by a solitary analyst in each of the last ten years. This represents around 10% 
of the index if we disregard investment trusts. UK analyst coverage remains 
broad. The number of companies with sparse coverage has remained stable: 
almost 150 companies are covered by one, two or three analysts and 
approximately 200 are covered by one to five analysts. Deep coverage, which 
I define as the number of companies covered by more than ten analysts, 
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Panels C and D show the number of companies covered by many (more than 
20 and more than 25) analysts at year end. Max represents the maximum 
number of analysts covering any single company.   
 
Turning to the US market, Figure 5.2 Panel B shows that the depth of stock 
coverage has been stable over the past decade. More companies received 
deep coverage in the aftermath of the Global Settlement. Roughly 600 
companies were covered in 2001; this rose to over 900 in the early 2010s. In 
the past five years, we can see a trend towards shallower coverage towards 
2018, when 756 companies were covered by more than ten analysts.  
  
The combined effects of the Global Settlement (2003) and the early 2000s 
recession and stock market trough had a significant effect on financial services 
headcount in the UK. There is some evidence that coverage deepened during 
the 2000s: fewer companies were sparsely covered; more were deeply 
covered. The 2010s exhibit a stable level of deep coverage. We cannot 
conclude that fewer analysts cover each stock both in the UK and US.  
  
Research providers may choose other ways to try to provide research more 







quality. The number of stocks covered by each analyst is, however, of limited 
use as a quality measure. The adoption of technologies such as ML (Chapters 
2 and 3; Grennan and Michaely, 2018) could allow analysts to expand 
coverage and improve quality. Like Bradshaw et al. (2017), I expect this area 
to be an important field in research on analysts in the coming decade.  
 
5.5.3 RQ3: Are fewer companies excessively 
covered?   
A more significant change is evident when examining those companies which 
are covered by more than 20 analysts. It seems unlikely that the informational 
environment would be improved by additional analysts above this threshold. 
Since few investment managers will be prepared to pay for less valuable 
research, we can expect fewer highly ranked analysts to cease coverage. 
Around 30 UK companies are covered by 20 or more analysts.   
  
In 2013, nearly 400 US companies were covered by more than 20 analysts 
and 200 were covered by more than 25 analysts. As at 2018, these figures 
have dropped to 150 and 300 respectively. Only five companies were covered 
by more than 25 analysts in 2018 compared to 25 in 2015 at the announcement 








Evidence from archival sources therefore confirms that brokerage firms have 
trimmed some of the redundant investment research. We know that some 
brokers have ceased covering the UK market, and others have chosen to focus 
on particular sectors. Brokers may also have removed analysts who produced 
less revenue in the form of payments from investment management firms. It is 
evident that fewer companies are excessively covered. In both the UK and US, 
it seems clear that the termination of research coverage by any single research 
provider has little effect on the overall informational environment.  
5.5.4 RQ4: Is optimism bias lower?   
We follow the approach of Bradshaw et al. (2017), who in turn update the 
findings of Barber et al. (2006, 2007), by examining coverage and 
recommendation bias in archives of analyst predictions. Bradshaw et al. (2017) 
report on US analysts’ recommendation categories ranging from strong buy 
(1) through neutral (3) to strong sell (5). From 1993 to 2000, this average was 
always above 3.5 and, in 2000, reflecting the exuberant technology stock 
boom, reached a high of 4. At its lowest, the bias disappeared (reaching 3.0, 
i.e. neutral) in only two years: the 2002 bear market and 2008 global financial 
crisis. The average recommendation was steady at around 3.5 from 2010 to 
2015. The sample ends in 2015 and consequently no inference can be made 









Panel A – US recommendation distribution 
  









In my analysis, the average recommendation across all UK companies is 2.14 
(as at October 2018), very close to the ten-year average of 2.20 within a range 
of 2.12 to 2.30. The US sample is closely in line with Bradshaw et al. (2017) 
and I find no shift in the tilt towards optimism.  
  
The relatively low percentage of buys (and high percentage of sells) in 2009 is 
likely to reflect the financial crisis. The proportion of buy, hold and sell 
recommendations has remained almost constant since 2010.   
  
Optimism bias persists. In UK, US and European markets, the bias towards 
buy recommendations has remained at similar levels since the mid-2000s. I 
note, however, that few independent analysts supply their data to archives. It 
is possible that recommendations which are shared only with investment 
management clients follow a more balanced distribution.  
  
The data availability constraint noted by Barber et al. (2007) remains: few IRPs 
submit to these databases. For example, Bloomberg lists over 300 brokerage 
firms but only ten IRPs. Although no comparable database for IRPs exists, a 







of this survey data to reveal a clearer picture of the information provided by 
IRPs. I examine these in the next section.   
  
5.5.5 RQ5: Do independent analysts constitute 
a greater proportion of stock coverage?   
Since only around ten IRPs supply data vendors, we cannot use archives to 
answer this question. Unlike brokers, IRPs are not required to record or publish 
stock coverage. Bloomberg reveals the identity of all contributing firms. In July 
2017, ten IRPs contributed alongside 322 brokerage firms. A search of I/B/E/S 
coverage for major US and European indices revealed a comparable number 
of IRP contributors. Taken at face value, this would indicate that IRPs are just 
as rare as Barber et al. (2007) found in the wake of the 2003 Global Settlement. 
Despite this, surveys A and B in this chapter show the number of IRPs seems 
to have expanded at least since the mid 2000s.   
  
Investment managers use estimate archives such as I/B/E/S and Bloomberg 
to check the consensus view and the stance taken by individual analysts, but 
will almost certainly access reports and seek analyst interactions. A 2017 







used and highly valued component of analysts’ work. These reports are usually 
sent to investment managers via private email or accessed via password-
protected websites hosted by individual brokers or aggregators such as 
Thomson Reuters or Factset. Vendor data on recommendations tends to be 
for reference use (e.g. to play “devil’s advocate” or to discover “what the street 
is thinking”) or by quantitative funds who use them as an input to their process.  
  
It is clear that very few IRPs contribute their recommendations to vendors such 
as Bloomberg or I/B/E/S. There are some possible reasons for the sparsity of 
IRP recommendations in vendor databases. First, many IRPs do not produce 
stock recommendations: fewer than half of the IRPs in survey A make stock 
recommendations. Instead, these firms are specialists, for example conducting 
analysis on an economy, an industry, a political event or technological 
innovation. Second, most IRPs who do make stock recommendations choose 
not to supply data vendors and as a result protect their intellectual property 
from quickly entering the informational environment. Third, most IRP research 
is, to some extent, exclusive: recommendations and other services are 
reserved only for their paying customers, thus protecting the IRP’s intellectual 








Investment managers use estimate archives such as I/B/E/S and Bloomberg 
to check the consensus view and the stance taken by individual analysts, but 
will almost certainly access reports and seek analyst interactions. A 2017 
survey (questionnaire B) shows that written reports are the most frequently 
used and highly valued component of analysts’ work. These reports are usually 
sent to investment managers via private email or accessed via password-
protected websites hosted by individual brokers or aggregators such as 
Thomson Reuters or Factset. Vendor data on recommendations tends to be 
for reference use (e.g. to play “devil’s advocate” or to discover “what the street 
is thinking”) or by quantitative funds who use them as an input to their process. 
 
It is clear that very few IRPs contribute their recommendations to vendors such 
as Bloomberg or I/B/E/S. There are some possible reasons for the sparsity of 
IRP recommendations in vendor databases. First, many IRPs do not produce 
stock recommendations: fewer than half of the IRPs in case study A make 
stock recommendations. Instead, these firms are specialists, for example 
conducting analysis on an economy, an industry, a political event or 
technological innovation. Second, most IRPs who do make stock 
recommendations choose not to supply data vendors and as a result protect 
their intellectual property from quickly entering the informational environment. 
Third, most IRP research is, to some extent, exclusive: recommendations and 







IRP’s intellectual property and the investment manager’s information 
franchise. 
  
5.6 SURVEY EVIDENCE  
Since the Global Settlement, US brokerage analysts have been required to 
disclose coverage, and this practice has been mimicked globally. IRPs do not 
face such a requirement and Chapter 1 revealed that it is very common for the 
recommendations to be privately available to clients, or indeed that no stock-
level recommendations exist at all.   
  
A subset of IRPs mimic the structure of the investment research department 
at a brokerage firm. Some employ scores of analysts, divided by sectoral 
specializations; they supply investment managers with reports, predictions, 
calls and meetings. In the past decade, some IRP analysts have ranked among 
the leading analysts in investment manager surveys (e.g. Extel).   
  
Standardization does not, however, appear to be the norm. A 2015 survey 
identified 417 IRPs (questionnaire B) and noted that hundreds more are likely 







representative of the industry. Instead, a secondary analysis of survey data 
shows extensive variety in the types of independent research used by 
investment managers.  
  
The stock exchange rules associated with the Global Settlement require 
brokers to publish a distribution of recommendations. As a result, each 
broker’s research universe, including initiation and cessation of coverage, is 
carefully disclosed to investment management clients. IRPs do not have the 
potential conflicts of interest inherent in brokerage firms, they operate without 
the full constraints imposed by the Global Settlement, and they are therefore 
free from such restrictions. This freedom allows them to provide different types 
of coverage. IRPs can set their universe and allocate analysts accordingly. 
Some augment coverage by producing research on other companies on 
request; others refuse to define a fixed coverage list at all: IRPs need only 
inform their existing clients. Merely giving away the name of a company may 
signal potential interest and might give non-client investment managers a new 
“idea”. Quantitative IRPs provide yet another form of coverage: these firms 
generate lists or portfolios of trade ideas, valuations, sentiment measures and 
risk characteristics. In summary, IRPs can provide flexible, exclusive and 








Other segments of the IRP industry do not attempt to provide company-specific 
recommendations at all. Most “macro” IRPs do not include valuations or 
recommendations for individual stocks. Some of the longest-established IRPs 
are macro, and this subsector is one of the largest, in number and aggregate 
revenue, in the UK market. The largest category is, in fact, labelled 
“idiosyncratic” by the agency broker. Other examples from the IRP invoice 
dataset (survey A) include political commentary, customer surveys and 
industry expertise. It appears that many IRPs choose strategies to 
complement, rather than replace, broker research. There is considerable 
redundancy in broker research and so it seems clear that investment 
managers buy analysis from IRPs; the informational environment is enhanced 
but the channel of transmission is not via stock coverage. Even so, IRPs 
provide a mix of competition and complementarity.   
  
Bradshaw (2009) provides a five-stage illustration of a sell-side analyst’s 
information process. In the first three stages, the information is collected, 
processed and used to estimate earnings or cash flows. The final steps are 
valuation and recommendation. This depiction seems uncontroversial. IRPs 
who do not provide forecasts must, therefore, limit their activities to some 
combination of the first two activities, i.e., information collection and 
processing. This finding also aligns with investment managers’ demands for 







Imam and Spence, 2016). The buy-side analyst uses this information, then 
makes her forecasts, valuation and recommendation.   
  
Gleason and Lee (2003) find a considerable lag in price adjustment following 
publication of research by analysts who are accurate but less well known; 
many IRPs are likely to fit this description.   
  
Some IRP research is exclusive to the client, i.e. it is written for the use of a 
single investment management firm and is not available to competing firms. A 
large dataset of IRP invoices (survey A) reveals that around half of IRPs who 
perform fundamental research do so primarily on an exclusive basis, with 
some firms specializing in this type of work. Research of this type is less likely 
to duplicate the reports of sell-side analysts and is likely to be distilled slowly 
into the informational environment.   
  
Some market participants have expressed concern that new research payment 
rules would reduce the availability of information to investors. In the UK, the 
birthplace of research unbundling, the number of stocks covered by analysts 
remains steady although with less excessive duplication. IRPs rarely supply 







recommendation distributions. As a result, they offer more flexibility in their 
ability to focus resources. There are now many more IRPs than brokers, and 
this may improve the informational environment for investment managers who 
pay for access.   
 
5.7 LIMITATIONS  
Archival data has numerous limitations, not least rather sparse IRP data. My 
approach complements archives and makes this limitation less serious. Even 
so, the following limitations should be noted.  
  
We use archives to assess coverage but make no evaluation of the quality of 
the research provided. Assessing quality is challenging. Forecast accuracy 
has been used in prior studies but not without challenges (Beunza and Garud, 
2007; Imam and Spence, 2016); my own data (Chapter 1) shows that accuracy 
has barely been mentioned in industry discussions on research pricing. 
Rankings such as Extel and Institutional Investor indicate the relative 
popularity of each analyst but identifying the top three or five analysts in each 
sector would add little to the study. Experience and resources offer some 
potential (Brown et al., (2015). Practitioners have voiced concern regarding a 







subordinates: this effect, sometimes termed “juniorisation”, was a recurring 
theme at the 2018 Substantive Research conference. Quality remains difficult 
to measure.   
 
Data vendors do not typically pay research providers to do this and the quality 
and availability of such data is shrinking. UBS, a broker which had one of the 
widest and deepest research capabilities in the past three decades, is one 
example of a firm which ceased supplying data vendors; this change was 
effected in the run-up to MiFID II. 
  
We have studied the coverage of large and midcap companies in two major 
markets. Investors and regulators are also concerned about the provision of 
information on smaller firms. US and UK stock markets may be losing 
prominence compared to emerging markets such as China, which are now well 
established and companies listed there will be attracting a new generation of 
analysts. Geographic classifications also add complexity. MiFID II affects the 
provision of research by and to firms with customers in European jurisdictions. 
UK investment managers and research providers often have global coverage. 
Conversely, some UK companies will be covered by analysts who are not 







and for global markets. Research regulation therefore affects the information 
environment.   
  
Finally, I note that regulatory change need not be exogenous. The present 
case, MiFID II, affects some firms but not others both in EU and non-EU 
informational environments. Member state regulators are not uniform in their 
application and enforcement. Requirements were announced in a series of 
communications between 2014 and 2017. In short, studies attempting to use 
research payment changes as an exogenous shock face greater 
methodological challenges than studies of the Global Settlement. I do not 
make claims regarding the causal nature of any change observed.  
 
5.8 CONCLUSIONS 
Analysts have for decades played an important role in the informational 
environment. Their world has undergone dramatic change in the past decade, 
most recently due to changes in the procedures used to pay for investment 
research, primarily due to MiFID II. A structural decline in the profitability of 
equity brokerage, exacerbated by regulation on research payment, means that 
many research providers are expected to reduce analyst headcount and 







participants have voiced concerns that analysts now cover fewer stocks.  I 
present early empirical evidence on stock coverage and consider the role of 
IRPs.   
  
I examine change in stock coverage since the announcement of new payment 
rules in the UK. Archival data shows no economically meaningful drop in the 
number of companies covered. I see no increase in the proportion of relatively 
large companies covered by only one analyst, or a small number of analysts. 
It appears that some of the most intensively covered stocks are now followed 
by fewer but still more than 20 analysts. Some surplus coverage has therefore 
been trimmed and it seems unlikely that this would reduce the available 
information set on large companies.  
  
My own contribution is more basic than either of these papers yet is timely and 
has been shared with regulators in early 2019. The analysis presents early 
descriptive analysis on stock coverage in the US, UK and Europe. I examine 
change in stock coverage since the announcement of new payment rules in 
the UK. I/B/E/S data shows no economically meaningful drop in the number of 
companies covered. I see no increase in the proportion of relatively large 
companies covered by only one analyst, or a small number of analysts. It 







fewer, but still more than 20 analysts. Some surplus coverage has therefore 
been trimmed and it seems unlikely that this would reduce the available 
information set on large companies. The data reveals modest change in the 
number of stocks covered by analysts and no reduction in the bias towards 
buy recommendations. Since the number of listed companies is falling in some 
markets (e.g. UK) and increasing in others, I have also recently checked that 
I/B/E/S coverage in China and India is increasing. Stock coverage continues 
to follow institutional investor demand. 
 
Archival analysis reveals modest change in the number of stocks covered by 
analysts, insubstantial change in breadth and depth of coverage, and no 
reduction in the bias towards buy recommendations.    
  
In this chapter I investigate the effect of IRPs on stock coverage. Since archival 
sources contain very few IRP predictions, I use secondary analysis of three 
surveys to examine IRP stock coverage. Equity IRPs tend to be sector 
specialists. IRPs are not required to disclose coverage, and often choose not 
to do so. This strategy protects the value of their ideas. It is also clear that 
many IRPs draw softer boundaries around their coverage universe; they can 
initiate or cease coverage without the formal communique required by 








Since their definition of stock coverage is more flexible, the means by which 
IRPs contribute to the informational environment constitutes the third question 
in this study. IRPs may or may not provide stock recommendations and many 
focus instead on business or industry research which investment managers 
use to make their own valuation and decision. Indeed, the largest category of 
IRPs provides idiosyncratic services. The survey data also shows that 
independent investment research reveals different categories and that novel 


















This thesis investigates regulatory and technological changes in investment 
research. As a starting point, the first empirical study identifies and explains 
the mechanisms used to pay for investment research over the past four 
decades. The reciprocal arrangements embedded in the research marketplace 
are structured as a gift exchange. Buyers and sellers of research have typically 
favoured this opaque system and resisted change. 
 
Using data collected from specialist industry events and documents, chapter 2 
of this thesis identifies five market mechanisms used to pay for investment 
research in the past four decades. The characteristics of each mechanism are 
classified according to their orientation towards neoclassical market or 
reciprocal exchange. The latter type of system has prevailed. Research has 
typically been provided without explicit pricing in order to attract a counter-gift 
(brokerage commission) which is proportional to trade size and therefore 







practice in Europe, imposing competition in its place and thus performing the 
marketplace in the image of an economic model. 
 
The change has important ramifications. Investment managers must now 
evaluate the cost of research alongside the other costs incurred to run their 
business, allowing managers to compare external and internal research costs 
such as analyst compensation. Greater scrutiny can be expected than was 
typical in many reciprocal systems. Research which is not perceived to add 
value will be removed from future research budgets. In many cases, the overall 
budget for research will be lower than it was prior to 2018. Research providers 
must negotiate the price of research in monetary terms rather than percentage 
points and reach agreement in advance of use. For firms with little prior use of 
CSAs or P&L-paid research, this change will be radical. Few brokers now 
attempt to provide full coverage of listed stocks in all sectors or countries; 
instead, most specialize. End investors have greater transparency regarding 
the costs of investing. Since investment managers have a regulatory 
requirement to avoid paying for underutilized research, we can expect less 
duplication. Competition should result in greater value for money. It may be 
harder for investors to find and evaluate research but entrepreneurs have set 








My empirical results indicate that the change has not affected firms in a uniform 
fashion; it is therefore difficult to identify an exogenous change. Regulatory 
change was negotiated over several decades. MiFID II is enacted somewhat 
differentially in each European Union member state and has also induced US 
regulatory change. A sharper focus on the cost of research may improve 
quality but also reduce quantity.  
 
Cost pressures faced by research providers and investment managers are one 
motivation for automation, including the adoption of machine learning (ML). 
The second study – chapter 3 – examines the ability of analysts and ML to 
predict returns. This task is substantially harder as it requires the ability to beat 
markets which are thought to be reasonably efficient. Analysts’ valuations 
show some ability to predict next quarter returns. ML valuations are contrarian, 
most likely because the algorithm is sensitive to short-term price movements. 
When used together, analyst and ML valuations show significant ability to 
predict returns, but since this strategy requires the ML signal to be inverted, 
this seems contrived and infeasible in practice. ML appears to be too sensitive 
to price changes, which drive the target variable which is defined as analyst 









The third study - chapter 4 - presents a comparison of the relative effectiveness 
of risk assessments derived from traditional financial analysis and ML for a 
large international sample. Prior studies show that analysts are effective in 
predicting fundamental risk, i.e. the distribution of possible valuations around 
a central estimate. My analysis confirms that risk assessments provide 
incremental information about fundamental risk. I also contribute to the 
literature on the second moment of analysts’ target price estimates by showing 
that independent analysts retain an element of behavioural bias. This bias is 
not found in the ML assessments. 
 
These results have several implications for investors. The first is that ML may 
be able to perform tasks which have previously required human expertise. In 
this case we examine the calibration of target prices but it may also apply more 
generally to tasks where analysts demonstrate successful prediction. The 
second is that, because analyst and ML risk assessments are not perfectly 
correlated, investors will be better informed by using a combination of analyst- 
and ML-derived risk assessments. The third implication is that analysts may 
be able to monitor and recalibrate their own risk assessments, particularly 
where associated with their own buy recommendations, in order to reduce self-








My results have two implications for the work of financial analysts. First, 
combining the assessments from the ML process with that produced by 
analysts clearly improves the information content of the analysts’ work. 
Recommendations made by our sample analysts are computed using the risk 
assessment, and so analysts may benefit from combining the insights from 
traditional investment analysis with that from ML. Second, ML learning appears 
to match the effectiveness of traditional analysis in producing informative risk 
assessments, and its cost-effectiveness leads to substantial increases in 
coverage and much faster updating. Particularly in the market for investment 
research, where regulatory changes have put considerable pressures on cost 
structures, cost-effective ML techniques may become widely adopted. 
 
Research into ML in investment research is relatively new. Chapters 3 and 4 
provides new evidence on the use of ML to mimic analysts. This chapter is, to 
my knowledge, the first to conduct a head-to-head comparison of ML- and 
analyst-based financial analysis. Our results suggest that ML is effective but 
for decisions where unstructured and unquantified information play a larger 
role, ML may find it more difficult to match the insights of analysts. 
 
The third and fourth chapters also contribute to the literature on technological 







investment analysts and their work comes from studies of sell-side analysts in 
the US. Chapters 3 and 4 present evidence on independent analysts in a global 
setting. For practitioners, the results suit global equity strategies rather than 
limiting the study to US equities. The key message from this study is that ML 
cannot be expected to succeed where expert predictions have little or no 
predictive ability. 
 
The fourth study – chapter 5 – takes stock of the informational environment. 
The financial media has reported a decline in stock coverage. My results 
confirm a steady but gradual decline in the breadth and depth of stock 
coverage in the past decade. But there is no evidence of a sharp decline since 
the announcement of new regulations in 2015 or the introduction of MiFID II in 
2018. Archival evidence indicates that stock coverage remains wide and deep. 
There has been a modest contraction in the coverage of UK stocks in the 
current decade compared to a slightly greater contraction in the US. Although 
few independent analysts contribute to archives, case study evidence shows 
a healthy independent sector to complement brokerage analyst research. 
 
Perhaps the most important implication of this simple empirical analysis is that 
archives of analyst data are becoming less representative of the forecasts 







independent experts submit their forecasts; second, some top-tier brokerage 
firms no longer submit analysts’ forecasts; third, there are now more 
crowdsourced estimates and other FinTech solutions (see, for example, 
Grennan and Michaely, 2018); and, finally, buy-side firms increasingly develop 
their own capabilities. Even the most established vendors are affected by 
these trends. I also present evidence that there has been relatively little change 
to date in the availability of information to investors in two major markets. 
Archival sources show that the availability of sell-side analyst research has 
slowly contracted but no sudden drop in coverage was evident in 2018.  
 
I make no evaluation of the quality of the research provided. Quality is hard to 
define and is subjective. Proxies such as forecast accuracy have become 
increasingly contested (Imam and Spence, 2016), and rankings may be 
incomplete. In chapters 3 and 4, analysts in our single-firm sample have 
extensive experience and resources, and this in turn provides some indication 
of quality. In chapter 5, analysis on US and UK broad market indices and 
therefore provides no evidence on small companies or those listed in other 
markets.  
 
Finally, I note that regulatory change need not be exogenous. The present 







informational environments. Member state regulators are not uniform in the 
application and enforcement. Requirements were announced in a series of 
communications between 2014 and 2017. In short, studies attempting to use 
research payment changes as an exogenous shock face greater 
methodological challenges than studies of the Global Settlement. I do not 
make claims regarding the causal nature of any change observed. 
 
Archival data has numerous limitations. IRPs often choose not to supply 
archives and take a less formal approach to stock coverage. Novel types of 
research exist which may not even include earnings forecasts, stock 
recommendations or target prices, the three summary outputs upon which 
most scholarship is based. Archives therefore capture a diminishing share of 
analyst research. This thesis contributes to the rather sparse literature on 
independent investment analysts. 
 
In chapter 5 I focus on broad market coverage and include the UK and US 
listed companies which most investment managers could hold. The analysis 
excludes very small companies which might be held in specialist funds. To my 
knowledge, there is no archive of stock coverage for very small companies, 
such as those on the UK Alternative Investment Market. The study could, 







expanding, for example in emerging markets. Finally, recent testimony from 
practitioners highlights that the annual review of research costs might lead to 
a fall in overall spending in 2019 or even later.  
 
Taken together, this thesis contributes to our existing knowledge of investment 
analysts. Specifically, it adds to the existing literature on the economics of the 
marketplace for analysts’ work, the expanding category of independent 
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